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Abstract
This dissertation presents empirical findings related to two aspects of long-range
planning: scenario planning as a planning method and cognition of planners. Long-
range planning situations are encountered when designing public infrastructures (e.g.
transportation systems) as well as developing strategies for corporate enterprises (e.g.
firms' supply chains), due to the long implementation times and/or long lives of the
invested assets. Such investments tend to have high stakes, face extreme uncertainty
about the future environment they encounter, and have an open-systems nature as the
implementation and operation of assets affects and is affected by the actions of many
and diverse stakeholders. Three research questions pertaining to these aspects are
answered in this work as three stand-alone studies.
The first study (Chapter 2) examines the effects of scenario planning on long-
range investment decisions made by field experts. The results of three field experiments
show that experts systematically change their investment decisions and/or their
confidence in them after evaluating the investments in a scenario. Field experts are also
more likely to invest in flexible strategies after being exposed to multiple scenarios.
The second study (Chapter 3) presents an extensive and an abridged version of
the scenario creation process. Instead of seeing scenario-creation as an art, this
research provides two versions of a more engineered scenario-creation process, and
demonstrates their application in two separate field studies. Both versions of the
process are presented with detailed instructions and rationale for performing each step.
This study also provides clear definitions of the terms used in the process description
and grounds them in the organizations literature.
The third study (Chapter 4) explores the relationship between a manager's
perceptions and beliefs about future environment, and the strategies s/he recommends.
Using a prospective research design, this study first tests three hypotheses about
general characteristics of managerial cognition. A closer look at different cognitive types
in this data reveals unsuspected patterns in strategic thinking of managers of different
types. A typology of managerial cognition is built using this inherent variation. Inductive
analysis shows that managers of different cognitive types envision strikingly different
types of strategies.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation presents empirical findings related to two aspects of long-range
planning: scenario planning as a planning method and cognition in long-range planning.
Such planning situations are encountered when designing public infrastructures (such
as transportation networks, public utilities, defense systems, etc.) as well as developing
strategies for corporate enterprises (such as firms' supply chains, manufacturing
systems, etc.). Three characteristics of these planning situations are particularly
important for the planning process: they have high stakes, face extreme uncertainty,
and have an open-systems nature.
The planning situations considered in this research are high-stake problems, as
implementations of the plans can affect the quality of service rendered by infrastructures
to a large number of people, or determine the profitability and survival of competitive
firms. The solutions to these problems typically lead to investments in large, capital-
intensive assets. Such assets have long lives and therefore, long planning horizons.
The environments in which the assets would operate far into the future are notoriously
hard to predict. Thus, planning is done under the conditions of extreme uncertainty and
unpredictability. Finally, these plans typically affect a large number and a diverse group
of stakeholders-making it necessary to consider their perspectives-and the plan's
success is also affected by the stakeholders' actions. This open-systems nature of the
problem context makes it hard to draw a boundary to define the problem and to design
solutions to work well inside that boundary. Not surprisingly, these problems have been
called "messy" or "wicked" (Rittel & Webber, 1973).
1.1 Scope of dissertation research
The research in this dissertation is concerned with two aspects of long-range
planning: a decision-making process used for long-range planning (specifically,
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scenario planning), and the characteristics of managerial thinking when faced with a
long-range planning problem.
1.1.1 Methods for long-range planning
The long-range planning problems defy algorithmic solution methods because of their
lack of structure. Defining the problem itself can be a difficult task, and could lead the
planners into the decision trap of plunging in to solve the problem without understanding
it fully (Russo & Schoemaker, 1989). Therefore, these problems tend to be addressed
using heuristic approaches that seek to define and structure the problem appropriately,
which may also make it more tractable (possibly in parts) for analytical solution
methods.
Scholars of long-range planning recognize that (Wachs, 2001, p. 369) "while
equations, computers and databases give forecasts an aura of scientific complexity...
the most critical inputs needed to make a forecast often consist of assumptions about
the future." Generally, the methods used for long-range planning either explicitly or
implicitly seek to uncover and challenge the assumptions made in developing the plans,
to make the plans more robust. The examples of such methods include Strategic
Assumption Surfacing and Testing (Mason & Mitroff, 1981), Scenario Planning (Wack,
1985; Schwartz, 1991), Driving Force Analysis (Christensen C. M., 1997), and
Assumption-based Planning (Dewar, 2002). Scenario planning is one of the most widely
used long-range planning methods, and is studied in this dissertation.
1.1.1.1 Scenario planning
Scenario planning was developed specifically to help government agencies conduct
long-range planning. It was first used after World War II independently in the U.S. for
planning investment in weapons systems, and in France for developing the National
Plan. In 1967, Royal Dutch Shell created scenarios for its "Year 2000" project and later
credited its scenario planning activities for its preparedness to the 1973 Oil Crisis. This
brought scenario planning into corporate spotlight. Since then, scenario planning has
been and is being used by numerous government planning agencies (cf.: Cousens, et
al. 2002; Zegras & Sussman, 2004; Caplice & Phadnis, 2012) as well as private
companies, including some of the world's largest corporations, such as Royal Dutch
(16)
Shell (2005, 2008), General Electric (Bradfield, et al, 2005), UPS, DHL (Deutsche Post
AG, 2012), British Airways (Ringland, 1998). In this dissertation, two aspects of scenario
planning-effect of the process and methods for creating scenarios-are studied in the
first two studies (Chapters 2 and 3).
1.1.2 Managerial thinking in long-range planning
As pointed out by scholars of long-range planning (Mason & Mitroff, 1981; Dewar,
2002), one of the most valuable contributions of a good long-range planning process is
uncovering the assumptions made by managers and planners in developing the plan.
Understanding the way managers think about the problem context can be helpful in
refining the planning methods or devising better ones. The third study (Chapter 4) in this
dissertation examines managerial cognition in the context of long-range planning using
an inductive field study.
1.2 Overview of the dissertation
In all, this dissertation answers three research questions listed below, in Chapters 2
through 4:
e How does the use of scenario planning affect long-range investment decisions
made by field experts?
" How should scenarios be created to address a given long-range planning
problem using scenario planning?
* How do managers think about the problem context they encounter in long-range
planning situations?
1.2.1 Effects of scenario planning
While scenario planning has been used for more than half a century to tackle the messy
long-range problems, little research has been done to test the effectiveness of this
planning method. Most of the published work on scenario planning has been limited to
the anecdotal claims of usefulness and illustrative cases describing the application of
this method (Schoemaker, 2004; Bradfield, et al., 2005). This lack of empirical
examination exists for a reason. Scenario planning is a "prescriptive" decision-making
method, and such methods are "evaluated by [their] pragmatic value, that is, by [their]
(17)
ability to help people make better decisions" (Bell, Raiffa, & Tversky, 1988, pp. 17-18).
However, a better decision is difficult to define in context of the scenario planning
research for several reasons.
Scenario planning is used for making investment decisions with long planning
horizons, spanning as long as a few decades-as in case of infrastructure projects
(Zegras, Sussman, & Conklin, 2004; Caplice & Phadnis, 2012)-and seldom shorter
than five years, as in case of corporate investments (Linneman & Kennell, 1977). With
such long planning horizons, it becomes impractical to evaluate the effectiveness of
scenario planning using the eventual performance of the decision. Furthermore, such a
research approach would require an appropriate control group to rule out the threats to
internal validity due to the effect of "history", i.e. uncontrollable environmental events
between the pretest and the posttest (Campbell & Stanley, 1966). An alternate
approach is to use natural experiments. This requires comparing the "performance" of a
historical decision made using scenario planning to another, relatively similar decision
made without the use of scenario planning, over the same period. However, scenario
planning is typically used for making decisions that are confidential-such as, corporate
strategies, Department of Defense projects (Harries, 2003)-and getting information
about decision-making process used or its result is difficult. It is especially hard to get
access to unsuccessful decisions made using scenario planning, as organizations are
generally not interested in making information about their failures public (ibid). Even if
one was able to get access to an unbiased sample of historic scenario planning studies,
the researcher would need to know the actual process used for creating scenarios and
making the decisions, as there are two dozen variations of just creating scenarios.
Thus, evaluation of scenario planning by measuring the performance of the decisions
made using it is a difficult research strategy.
An alternate approach is to use surrogate indicators for the effect of scenarios,
as is done when testing medical treatments whose clinical outcomes are not evident for
a long time (Frey & Dym, 2006). Surrogate indicators are (ibid, p. 50) "parameters that
are observed in place of the relevant clinical outcomes when it is difficult to make a
direct observation of effectiveness." These parameters are thought to be related to the
outcome expected from the procedure. The research presented in the first study takes
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this approach for testing the effects of scenario planning. An appropriate surrogate
measure for evaluating decisions made under uncertainty is the confidence decision
makers have in their decisions. Psychologists have argued that one of the main causes
of poor decisions under uncertainty is the decision-maker's overconfidence in the
decision (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Barnes, 1984). This theoretical argument
has also been supported empirically in laboratory experiments with student subjects
(Camerer & Lovallo, 1999) and in econometric analyses of strategic decisions of
business firms (Simon & Houghton, 2003). Therefore, the research in the first study
tests the ability of scenario planning to help planners and managers make better
decisions under uncertainty, by testing if/how it influences a decision-maker's decision
itself or his/her confidence in that decision.
1.2.1.1 Research method: Field experiments
We used the "Future Freight Flows" project, conducted by MIT's Center for
Transportation & Logistics (CTL), to test the effect of scenario planning on decision-
makers' long-range plans. Under the aegis of this project, CTL developed a set of four
scenarios to help transportation planning agencies in the U.S. determine investments in
the transportation infrastructure to meet the need for freight transportation in year 2040.
The use of these scenarios was demonstrated in six workshops conducted at different
transportation planning agencies in the U.S. Treating the use of scenario planning by
field experts in three of these workshops as the experimental treatment, this research
tested if and how experts' decisions changed after participating in the workshop. The
design of these field experiments and their results are presented in Chapter 2.
1.2.1.2 Contributions
The field experiments show that the use of scenarios does influence experts'
evaluations of long-range investments (in transportation infrastructure, in this case). A
majority of field experts modify their decisions according to what they learn from
evaluating those investment decisions in a scenario. Furthermore, the results show that
the experts are also more likely to choose a more flexible implementation of their plans
after being exposed to multiple scenarios.
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1.2.2 Scenario creation process
Having shown that scenario planning does have a beneficial effect on long-range
investment decisions, the next obvious question of practical importance is how
scenarios should be created to facilitate long-range planning. At least three distinct
philosophies and a large variety of scenario planning methods exist (Bradfield, et al.
2005; Bishop, Hines, & Collins, 2007). One of the most commonly used scenario
planning method is the so called Intuitive Logics School, which was pioneered at the
Shell Corporation and has roots in the works of Herman Kahn, the father of scenario
planning (Bradfield, et al., 2005). A generic process for creating scenarios is provided
by the school's leading practitioner (Schwartz, 1991). However, this account describes
scenario creation as an "art" and does not prescribe what methods should be used for
executing individual steps in the process. Thus, an important long-range decision-
making process becomes difficult to apply and possibly out of reach for many who
cannot afford an "artist" to create the scenarios for them. The second study takes a step
towards engineering this art, by developing and applying in practice, two versions of the
scenario creation process provided by Schwartz (1991) - and extensive version and an
abbreviated version.
1.2.2.1 Research method: Action research
The research method used in this study is "action research". Action research is a family
of research practices used to address practical problems with a rigorous approach.
Since, the goal of this research work is to develop a practicable process ("scenario
creation") to address a specific challenge faced by practitioners ("long-range planning"),
which is also generalizable to other contexts, action research provides an apt fit. In this
study, a scenario creation process is applied to two cases, a pharmaceutical distributor
in the U.S. (codenamed "Medford") and a multinational chemical company
headquartered in Europe (codenamed "Chembridge). Chapter 3 describes the research
method, and the resulting scenario creation processes.
1.2.2.2 Contributions
The primary output of this study is two versions of the Intuitive Logics School scenario
creation process, an extensive version (created for Medford) and an abbreviated
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version (created for Chembridge). Both versions describe in detail how each step in the
scenario creation process is performed, and why the specific method is chosen. A
secondary (but just as important) contribution of this research is clear definitions, and
grounding in scholarly organizations science literature, of the terms used in the scenario
creation process for describing various aspects of the organizational environment. As
illustrated in Chapter 3, the clear definition of terms provides the necessary foundation
to develop a structured approach for creating scenarios.
1.2.3 Managerial cognition and strategic thinking
This research work studies managerial cognition in the context of long-range planning.
This research is situated in the scholarly tradition of strategic planning, typically studied
in business schools. Strategic planning is a long-range planning problem, as strategic
decisions have long planning horizons and get made under high uncertainty about the
future business environment, have high stakes (often having implications for the firm's
survival), and have a quintessentially open-systems nature as multiple stakeholder
groups affect and are affected by a firm's strategy. Business strategy scholars have
been studying managerial cognition continually for at least 30 years (beginning with the
work of Kiesler and Sproull (1982)), and this literature provides a rich foundation for this
research. Chapter 4 reviews the pertinent literature, and presents the research.
1.2.3.1 Research method: Mixed-methods field research
This research has two parts: deductive and inductive. Three hypotheses about different
aspects of managerial cognition pertinent to long-range planning are tested in the
deductive part. The hypotheses are tested in a field study of executives at a U.S.
pharmaceuticals distributor ("Medford"), engaged in strategic thinking as a prelude to
long-range planning of the firm's supply chain strategy. These executives were
responsible for various aspects of Medford's supply chain, which is the core
competence of this organization. The deductive work is followed by an inductive,
qualitative analysis of the strategic thoughts expressed by the executives. The research
uses open-ended interviews and structured questionnaires to collect data used in the
research.
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1.2.3.2 Contributions
The deductive analysis finds support for all three hypotheses of managerial cognition,
characterizing the cognition of a typical manager. The in-depth qualitative analysis of
the interview data reveals the richer underbelly of the hypotheses, which describe
managerial cognition only at an aggregate level. This inductive analysis shows that
managers vary widely in their strategic thinking, and the strategies they envision are
strongly related to their perceptions of the environment and their beliefs about the
environment the firm will encounter in future. These patterns of strategic thinking give
rise to a typology of managerial cognition, with each type suggesting distinct ways for
the organization to pursue its goals in the long term.
1-3 Dissertation outline
The rest of this document is structured as follows. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are self-
contained studies on "effects of scenario planning", "scenario creation process", and
"managerial cognition and strategic thinking", respectively. Each chapter begins with its
own review of the pertinent literature, describes the research method, and presents the
results. Each chapter also places the findings of the particular research in the larger
body of literature, highlights their pragmatic implications, and provides directions for
future work. Chapter 5 summarizes the results of the three disparate, but related,
studies, and also provides some directions for future research at the intersection of the
separately studied topics.
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Chapter 2
Effects of scenario planning on long-range
investment decisions of field experts
This chapter presents the results of three field experiments demonstrating
the effects of scenario planning on long-range investment decisions made
by field experts. Contrary to past findings, the results show no aggregate
increase or decrease in experts' confidence in their decisions after the use
of scenarios. Rather, the results show that experts change their decision
to invest an asset and/or their confidence in it depending on how the asset
performs in the scenario. The effects of scenarios on expert decision are
stronger when the experts do not have the highest level of confidence in
the investment decision before using the scenario. Finally, the
experimental results suggest that experts are more likely to invest in
flexible strategies after being exposed to multiple scenarios.
2.1 Introduction
Scenario planning is a decision-making method used for long-range planning. It is
generally applied to decisions where it is difficult to forecast the future, such as long-
range forecasts which may be subject to "step changes" that cannot be predicted based
on extrapolations of historical data. Because scenario planning can require significant
effort, it is usually applied only to evaluating decisions that have significant, long-term
impact. Scenario planning uses multiple, structurally different views of the future to help
planners envision different environments their plans could encounter. The origin of
scenario planning is traced back to 1950s, when government agencies in the U.S. and
France started using it for making public policy decisions whose effects would last for
decades (Bradfield, et al. 2005). In the U.S., scenario planning was conceived at the
RAND Corporation to help Department of Defense choose projects for development of
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new weapons systems. Concurrently, a scenario planning method known as La
Prospective was developed in France and used to form the French National Plans. The
first reported use of scenario planning by a corporation is at Royal Dutch Shell ("Shell"
hereafter) in 1971. Shell credited scenario planning activities having been prepared for
the 1973 Oil Crisis. This brought scenario planning into corporate spotlight (Wack, 1985;
van der Heijden, 2005). In 1981, 38% of the Fortune-1000 corporations reported using
scenario planning (Linneman & Klein, 1983). This study also showed that companies
with longer planning horizons, i.e. those facing greater uncertainty in their planning
horizons, were more likely to use scenario planning than those with shorter planning
horizons. Today, scenario planning is used by government organizations as well as
corporations for long-range planning (Schoemaker, 1991; Ringland, 1998; Cousens, et
al., 2002; Royal Dutch Shell, 2005, 2008; Deutsche Post AG, 2012; etc.).
The term "scenario planning" encompasses a broad spectrum of planning
processes, ranging from strategic planning with a handful of scenarios to tactical
planning using simulations involving thousands of scenarios. Even when used for
strategic planning, scenario methods vary widely. In an extensive review, Bradfield, et
al. (2005) classified the scenario planning field into three dominant schools. The most
prevalent approach and the one practiced at Shell, Intuitive Logics School, treats a
scenario as a qualitative, cognitive device (de Geus, 1988) that helps managers
organize their "perceptions about alternative future environments" (Schwartz, 1991) for
long-range planning. This allows managers to envision and plan for a broad range of
futures (Porter, 1985, p. 446; Courtney, Kirkland, & Viguerie, 1997; Eisenhardt, 1999, p.
68). The other two schools, La Prospective and Probabilistic Modified Trends, view a
set of scenarios as a convex hull of the future environment in which multiple strategies
are evaluated quantitatively. The research in this dissertation studies the effect of
scenarios as practiced in the Intuitive Logics School.
While scenario planning has been used for over half a century and
recommended as a cognitive aid in long-range planning (van der Heijden, 2005), the
empirical evidence of effect of scenario planning on managerial decision-making is
almost non-existent. Our extensive review of the scenario planning literature surfaced
only two relevant empirical studies, both using classroom experiments yet reaching
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opposite conclusions. Schoemaker's (1993) experiments with MBA students showed
that subjects acknowledge greater uncertainty in forecasts after using scenarios. Kuhn
and Sniezek (1996) experiments with students in introductory psychology class showed
that subjects become more confident in their point forecasts after using scenarios. In a
field study, Phelps, Chan and Kapsalis (2001) correlated the practice of scenario
planning by a firm with faster growth, higher profit rate, and higher return on capital.
However, their results do not suggest a causal relationship between the use of scenario
planning and firm performance: it is possible that better performing firms are more likely
to practice scenario planning.
Aside from these three studies, there seem to be no objective tests of how
scenario planning affects long-range decisions. This gap has been highlighted by
several authors. Paul Schoemaker, author of the three most frequently cited peer-
reviewed articles on scenario planning (Varum & Melo, 2010), acknowledges that the
evidence of usefulness of scenario planning is "anecdotal" (2004, p. 288). Others have
lamented the lack of rigorous tests of scenario planning (Harries, 2003, p. 803), and
noted that even field studies of scenario planning exercises lack "reliable accounts that
render explicitly what has worked and what has not, and why and for whom in what
settings" (Wilkinson, 2009). Furthermore, the mention of any research about an
objective assessment of the effect of scenario planning is conspicuously missing from
the two most recent surveys of the scenario planning literature (Bradfield, et al, 2005;
Varum & Melo, 2010).
Three factors potentially contribute to this gap in the scenario planning literature:
One, scenario planning exercises are often secretive (military or corporate strategy
planning) and do not get published (Wilkinson, 2009). Two, scenario planning practices
are highly personalized, and hence difficult to compare (ibid). And three, the decisions
where scenario planning is used have long lags between making of the decision and its
eventual performance, rendering it difficult to attribute the performance of a decision to
the decision-making process used. Regardless of the reason, the mostly "subjective and
heuristic nature [of scenario planning] leaves many academics uncomfortable"
(Schoemaker, 2004, p. 288). The research work presented in this chapter is a first step
to address this gap. In this work, experiments with field experts are used to evaluate if
(25)
and how the use of scenarios changes the experts' decisions about long-term
investments. This research work does not profess to evaluate the performance of
decisions made using scenario planning; rather, the question is much more basic: does
the process of scenario planning have any effect on decisions?
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the literature
from decision theory to illustrate the psychology of long-range and strategic planning.
This knowledge is integrated with the claims from the scenario planning literature to
develop four hypotheses about the effect of scenario planning on strategic thinking. The
hypotheses are presented in Section 2.3. This is followed by the description of the
research method (field experiments) in section 2.4. Section 2.5 through 2.8 present the
results of the tests of the hypotheses. Finally, section 2.9 discusses the theoretical and
pragmatic implications of the findings, and provides directions for future research.
2.2 Psychology of long-range planning
The quintessential characteristic of long-range planning is the difficulty, almost
impossibility, of predicting the business environment over the planning horizon with any
reasonable accuracy. Over the long planning horizon, not only is the prediction of
known variables of organizational environment difficult, the environment is also likely to
undergo step changes arising from unknown variables. In such situations, planners and
managers cannot rely on historical data to envision the future they need to plan for.
Therefore, decision-making in this domain is characterized as "not the decision making
under uncertainty of the textbook, where alternative are given even if their
consequences are not, but decision making under ambiguity, where almost nothing is
given or easily determined" (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, & Theoret, 1976, p. 251).
Sans the ability to rely on interpolation of past data, managers making long-range
decisions under ambiguous conditions rely on intuition to make sense of the decision
context (lsenberg, 1984). The missing information is "inferred from available
information, especially the person's own experience and 'world knowledge' in general.
This process of going 'beyond the information given' is particularly important in strategic
[and long-range] planning." (Klayman & Schoemaker, 1993, p. 162). In this process,
decision-makers are believed to resort to cognitive simplification processes to make
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sense of the complex and unpredictable decision context they face (Schwenk, 1984;
Russo & Schoemaker, 1989; Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993). Various psychological
heuristics and biases are known to underlie such simplification processes (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). While the heuristics help
managers arrive at decisions, they also give the managers a false sense of confidence
in their decisions. In general, overconfidence in human judgment under uncertainty is a
robust phenomenon (Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1977), and has been detected in
laboratory and field studies of strategic decision-making, such as market-entry decisions
(Camerer & Lovallo, 1999), real-life product introduction decisions (Simon & Houghton,
2003), and personal investment decisions of CEOs (Malmendier & Tate, 2005a; 2005b).
Barnes (1984, p. 133) calls overconfidence "dangerous", as "it indicates that we
often do not realize how little we know and how much additional information we need."
Decision theorists have argued that overconfident decision-makers plunge in to solve a
problem without clearly and completely defining it (Russo & Schoemaker, 1989).
Overconfidence is also shown to have detrimental effect on long-range plans and
strategic decisions. Empirical research shows that "managerial overconfidence is
associated with aggressive corporate policies including investment, financing, financial
reporting, and executive compensation" (Ben-David, Graham, & Harvey, 2006), and that
"overconfident managers overestimate the returns on their investment projects"
(Malmendier & Tate, 2005a), and overpay for acquisitions (Malmendier & Tate, 2008).
Overconfidence manifests in the "forecasts of future outcomes [that] are often anchored
on plans and scenarios of success rather than on past results, and are therefore overly
optimistic" (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993). Known causes of overconfidence include
unrealistic optimism (Weinstein, 1980), illusion of control (Langer, 1975), and motivated
inference, i.e. people's tendency to view their own attributes as more predictive of
desirable outcomes (Kunda, 1987). Regardless of the cause, scenario planning is
argued to be one of the processes that can contribute to correcting this bias in the
decision-making process.
The following section presents four hypotheses about how scenarios may affect
long-range planning and strategic decision-making. Note, however, that the field
experiments in this research, in which experts actually made investment decisions for a
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planning horizon reaching year 2040, do not allow us to term the experts' confidence as
over- or under-confidence at this time, due to the inability to compare the decision to the
actual outcome. Therefore, this research tests for the efficacy of scenario planning to
influence experts' investment decisions and their confidence in them.
2-3 Theory and hypotheses
Scholars and practitioners of scenario planning argue that scenarios help planners think
about long-range investments differently by influencing the "perceptions inside
managers' heads" and changing managers' "assumptions about how the world works"
(Wack, 1985). Because of their 'frame-breaking' ability, considering several scenarios
can "create alternatives to obvious points of view" (Eisenhardt, 1999). This research
tests four hypotheses about the "frame-breaking" effect of scenarios. Although some of
these hypotheses may seem obvious, they have not been empirically proven or refuted.
2.3.1 Effect of scenarios on managers' confidence
The evidence of the "frame-breaking" ability of scenario planning was found in the
laboratory experiments conducted by Schoemaker (1993), which showed that "exposure
to scenarios help[ed] subjects broaden their consideration of uncertainty." Schoemaker
asked subjects (MBA students) to estimate the future value of an important parameter
of a strategic issue of their choice (e.g. profit margin, market share, etc.) and provide
50% and 90% confidence ranges for it. The widths of the 50- and 90-percent confidence
ranges increased by an average 56% and 44% respectively after the subjects used
scenarios, suggesting a decrease in confidence. Kuhn and Sniezek (1996) also found
evidence that scenario planning changed their subjects' confidence in future outcomes,
but in the opposite direction. They asked subjects (students in an introductory
psychology class) to provide point forecasts for eight social issues (e.g. murder rate in
Chicago, world population, etc.) for five future decades and their confidence in each
forecast on a nine-point scale (subjects were provided present values of the issues).
They, contrary to Schoemaker, found that the subjects who used one or more scenarios
expressed significantly greater confidence in their point forecasts compared to the
subjects who did not use a scenario.
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There are two possible explanations for this contradiction. One, Schoemaker
study did not have a control group. All subjects in the study used scenarios and average
confidence ranges became wider. The pretest and posttest were conducted over the
course of a semester, and it is possible that student subjects became more accepting of
uncertainty as the semester progressed. Kuhn and Sniezek's experiments did have a
control group, and the subjects who used scenarios became more confident compared
to the subjects who did not. Two, the difference in result could be an artifact of the
method used for soliciting confidence. While both studies asked subjects to make point
estimates, Schoemaker solicited confidence using 50- and 90-percent confidence
ranges (ratio scale) whereas Kuhn and Sniezek asked subjects to pick a confidence
level on a nine-point ordinal scale. Psychologists (Klayman, et al., 1999) have shown
that different methods used for soliciting confidence (two-choice questions vs.
confidence intervals) can render radically different results. While we did not find any
studies comparing confidence solicited using ordinal and ratio scales, method effects
cannot be ruled out as a possible explanation of the discrepancy. In summary, the
evidence from laboratory studies for the effect of scenarios on users' confidence in their
judgment is inconclusive and even contradictory. Therefore, we propose the null
hypothesis that the use of scenarios does not affect a manager's confidence in his/her
long-range decisions, and provide two alternate hypotheses: one for decrease in
confidence and one for increase in confidence.
Hypothesis 1a (Hia): Evaluating a long-term investment decision in the
context of a scenario will not change a manager's confidence in his/her
decision.
Hypothesis 1b (Hib): Evaluating a long-term investment decision in the
context of a scenario will decrease a manager's confidence in his/her
decision.
Hypothesis Ic (H1c): Evaluating a long-term investment decision in the
context of a scenario will increase a manager's confidence in his/her
decision.
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Note that both Schoemaker, and Kuhn and Sniezek reject hypothesis H1a; the former
accepts H1 b as the alternate hypothesis, whereas the latter accepts H1 c.
2.3.2 Effect of scenarios on investment decisions
The second set of hypotheses focus on effect of scenarios on investment decisions.
Schoemaker (1993, pp. 200-1) hypothesized that the use of scenarios influences a
manager's investment decision by overcoming the "availability bias", which may lead
him/her to undervalue what s/he has not experienced or seen in the past. A decision-
maker may find the possible future environment described in the scenario to be different
from his/her ex-ante perception of the future, and may realize that his/her investment
decisions could fare differently from the ex-ante expectation. Kuhn and Sniezek's (1996,
p. 241) between-subject experiments, in which subjects were given either an "increase
from present" or "decrease from present" scenarios, found that the forecasts made by
the subjects "were strongly influenced in the direction of the single scenario they
received". It stands to reason that any change in a manager's investment decision after
evaluating its performance in a given scenario will depend on whether the investment is
judged to be favorable or unfavorable in context of that scenario. Therefore, we propose
two hypotheses, albeit somewhat obvious, about the scenario-induced changes in a
manager's investment decision:
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): If a manager changes his/her decision to invest in
an asset after evaluating it in a scenario, s/he would become more
favorable about investing in it if the asset was found to be a useful
investment for that scenario.
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): If a manager changes his/her decision to invest in
an asset after evaluating it in a scenario, s/he would become less
favorable about investing in it if the asset was found to be a wasteful
investment for that scenario.
Even if these two hypotheses can be supported by data, there is still the question of the
impact of each type of scenario. Prospect theory and the ensuing empirical evidence
show that people are loss-averse (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979): they weigh losses more
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than equivalent gains. A meta-analysis of research in psychology (Baumeister, et al.,
2001, p. 323) shows that "events that are negatively valenced (e.g. losing money, being
abandoned by friends, and receiving criticism) will have a greater impact on the
individual than positively valenced events of the same type (e.g. winning money, gaining
friends, and receiving praise)" - suggesting that "bad is stronger than good".
Baumeister, et al. (ibid) present evidence for the preponderance of bad events over
good in affecting individuals in more than a dozen domains, including those related to
decision-making, such as "reacting to events", "information processing" and "learning".
Furthermore, studies of brain waves using electroencephalography (EEG) show that
negative information has a stronger effect on the brain than equally extreme positive
information (Ito, et al, 1998). This suggests that the effect of a scenario in which an
investment is seen as wasteful will be stronger than one in which an investment is seen
as useful. More formally:
Hypothesis 2c (H2c): The effect of scenarios in changing a manager's
investment decision will be stronger for the assets found to be "wasteful"
in a scenario than for the assets found to be "useful" in a scenario.
2.3.3 Effect of ex-ante confidence on scenario-induced changes
Albeit expected relationship between a manager's ex-ante confidence in his/her
decision and the propensity to change it after scenario evaluation suggests that:
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The use of scenarios is more likely to change a
manager's investment decision if his/her ex-ante confidence in that
decision was low.
2.3.4 Effect of scenarios on preference for flexible investment
Strategy researchers have hypothesized and observed that successful organizations in
unpredictable environments employ flexible structures and processes. In business firms,
structural flexibility is rendered using multi-souring, excess capacity, and postponement
of sunk-costs investments by implementing the overall strategy in stages (Eisenhardt,
1989; Ilinitch, et al. 1996; Schilling & Steensma, 2001). Normative strategy research
recommends that firms adopt flexible strategies to compete successfully in uncertain
environments (Courtney, et al. 1997). Scenario planning proponents argue that by
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considering a broad range of futures, managers using scenario planning are likely to
choose more flexible strategies. In the field study conducted by Phelps, et al. (2001),
the IT consulting firms using scenario planning exhibited more flexibility to adapt to new
environment than the firms that did not use the method. Thus, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 4 (H4): After evaluating long-range investment decisions in
multiple scenarios, managers will choose more flexible solutions to make
that investment.
2.4 Research method: Field experiments
The hypotheses presented above are tested in three field experiments, denoted as
Studies I, II, and Ill. The experiments were conducted under the aegis of the Future
Freight Flows project executed by MIT Center for Transportation & Logistics (CTL). CTL
developed four scenarios and a scenario planning process to aid making decisions for
investments in the U.S. freight transportation infrastructure. The transportation planning
process and implementation of plans can take many years, and once implemented the
transportation assets have long lives. Therefore, transportation planners need to take a
long-term perspective in planning infrastructure investments. This makes transportation
infrastructure planning a very good setting for using scenario planning.
The application of four scenarios was tested in three scenario planning
workshops conducted with different transportation planning agencies in the U.S. (e.g. a
state department of transportation or a port). For each workshop, the host agency
selected a number of transportation infrastructure investments to evaluate using
multiple scenarios. The investments included major highways, rail lines, ocean and river
ports, airports, intermodal facilities, etc. whose development, operations, and
maintenance were to be funded by the agency. (Note: any single investment option may
include several distinct projects.) The purpose of each scenario planning workshop was
to solicit the individual and collective insights from a diverse group of "field experts" to
prioritize the investments for the agency to meet the transportation needs over next 30
years. In each workshop, about 50 experts evaluated the investments selected for that
workshop in context of the scenarios created for the larger study. The data collected
during workshops was delivered to the respective agencies for use in their long-range
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planning process. These workshops gave an opportunity to test the effect of scenario
planning on long-range investment decisions made by field experts. The data used to
test hypotheses was collected separately from the insights sought for the larger project.
2.4.1 Scenarios
The aforementioned CTL scenarios describe four structurally different pictures of the
world in year 2040. Scenario "Global Marketplace" depicts a globalized world where
goods flow seamlessly between virtually all markets. Scenario "Millions of Markets"
paints United States as a country of highly self-reliant, geographically-dispersed small
cities, fostered by advances in small-scale manufacturing and adoption of renewable
energy sources. Scenario "Naftastique!" is the polar opposite of "Global Marketplace",
and depicts a world fragmented into several blocs of countries; the countries trade
seamlessly within their respective bloc but the trade between blocs is minimal. The flow
of goods and people is fluent among United States, Canada, and Mexico, but very little
is traded with other blocs. Scenario "One World Order" is polar opposite of "Millions of
Markets": the goods flows are global, but, unlike market-based trade in "Global
Marketplace", the global trade in "One World Order" is dictated by a supranational
organization that seeks to globally optimize matching of demand and supply.
Researchers at CTL also developed descriptive brochures for each scenario. The
brochures included a one-and-half page description of the world, followed by 6 to 10
pages of charts presenting various statistics (such as U.S. import and export of goods
and services, population, population dispersion, energy consumption by source of
energy, etc.) that described the world. The charts typically showed the metrics from
1990 or 2000 through year 2040. Past values of the metrics showed actual historic data,
and the future values showed hypothetical data generated from assumptions underlying
each scenario. In addition to the brochures, CTL also created videos for each scenario.
The video for each scenario was about 5 minutes long, and showed a news broadcast
in year 2037 in that scenario. These videos were professionally made. The reason for
using the various forms of information to describe the scenario-such as narratives,
charts, videos, etc.-is that people have different preferences for understanding and
processing information: some people are "detail conscious" while others are "big-picture
conscious", and they prefer different types of information (Hodgkinson & Clarke, 2007).
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The goal of creating an ensemble of scenario descriptors was to covey the essence of
each scenario to each decision-maker using the language s/he understands best. The
scenario descriptions and videos are available on the CTL websitel.
2.4.2 Field subjects
The experts who participated in the scenario planning workshops served as the field
subjects for the experiments. They were not self-selected, but invited by the host
agency or CTL to participate because of their experience and knowledge of the context
of the study. A wide cross-section of expertise was sought: private sector executives
(shippers, carriers, third-party logistics service providers), government planners (federal,
state and local planners, port authorities, military, etc.), and other organizations
(academics, consultants, community groups, etc.). Two sources were used for
identifying experts for a workshop. One, we asked the host agency to identify
experienced professionals whose insights would be useful for the agency in developing
its long-range plans. Two, we identified individuals from the database of executives
maintained at CTL who were deemed to be knowledgeable about the transportation
infrastructure of the region considered in the workshop. We compiled the names from
both sources into a single database, and classified each expert further as type-"A", "B",
or "C": "A" being the most experienced / insightful to "C" being the least. Initial invitations
to attend the workshop were sent to only type-"A" individuals about 10-12 weeks before
the workshop. If a type-A subject was unable to attend, we asked him/her to
recommend someone as insightful; such individuals were denoted as type-"B".
Type-"A" experts constitutes all 60 participants in Study I; 37 out of 41 in Study II
(remaining four are type-"B"), and 39 out of 46 in Study III (remaining seven are type-
"B"). The typical participants were presidents, CEOs, and owners of carriers and
consulting firms; Senior vice presidents, vice presidents, or directors of logistics,
transportation, or supply chain functions of large firms; and directors and managers in
transportation planning agencies. All participants were informed that their evaluations of
investments and insights would be used by the transportation agency hosting the
workshop in its long-range planning process.
1 See http://cti mit.edu/research/futurefreiqhtflows/scenarios
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2.4.3 Experimental treatment
The pretest-posttest experiments were conducted in three workshops, which have been
developed and tested by CTL researchers in multiple settings, mostly for formation of
corporate supply chain strategies. Research designs of studies I and 11 were identical
with the exception of the scales used for recording experts' investment decisions. They
were used to test hypotheses H1 through H3; the experimental treatment was
immersion in one scenario. Study Ill had a similar pretest-posttest design, but used a
different questionnaire and tested hypothesis H4; the experimental treatment was
immersion in one scenario and exposure to the remaining three. Figure 2-1 depicts the
workshop steps and experimental tests on a timeline.
Experimental Treatment (Study il)
Experimental Treatment (Studies I and II)
Reading Immersion Discussion Evaluation of Exposure
assigned- in assigned + of scenario U to all
I scenario scenario implications scenarios
Pretest Posttest
(Studies (Studies (Sttdls)
I, lI, )(Study 1l,)
2-5 days 1-3 days 1-4 days
before before Scenario planning workshop (one full day) after
workshop workshop I > workshop
Figure 2-1: Design of field experiments (Studies I, II, and III)
Each "subject" participated in an in-depth evaluation of the selected infrastructure
investments in one scenario. Each workshop used either three or four scenarios
depending on the number of experts participating in the workshop, so that between 10
and 15 experts evaluated all investments in each scenario. Experts were assigned to
scenarios using stratified random sampling: they were classified as shippers, carriers,
government planners (state and local), government planners (federal), third-party
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logistics providers, and others. Investments in each scenario were evaluated by an
equal number of experts of each type, randomly assigned to scenarios within the type.
Before participating in the exercise, each expert was asked to complete a pretest
using a web-based survey. After completing the pretest, the expert was sent a detailed
brochure of the scenario s/he was assigned to via email. The brochure included a
detailed narrative of the scenario as well as several tables and charts illustrating specific
economic, technological, and demographic aspects of the scenario. Experts were asked
to read their respective scenarios before the workshop. At the start of the workshop, the
head of the transportation agency informed the participants that their evaluations of the
investments and the underlying rationale would be considered in the agency's planning
process. After emphasizing the importance of the workshop and an introduction to the
scenario planning method, the workshop participants were separated by the scenarios
they were assigned to. The participants in each scenario met as separate groups in
separate rooms and engaged in facilitated group-discussion sessions. Each session
began with immersion of experts in their assigned scenario to ensure that everyone
understood his/her scenario well before making appropriate judgments about the
investments for that scenario. Immersion consisted of the group members identifying
key features of their scenario and watching a custom-designed video showing a fictional
newscast from that scenario in 2037. The conversation during immersion referenced the
quantitative charts and tables, and highlighted qualitative features of the scenario. This
was followed by a discussion of implications of the scenario, in which the experts
shared their views on how the region's transportation infrastructure will be affected in
that scenario. The implications consisted of types of goods transported, their origins and
destinations, transportation modes favored, etc. Using the knowledge of scenario
implications, each expert evaluated every investment chosen for the workshop
individually and then expressed the evaluation using the voting mechanism described in
§2.4.4. The reading of the scenario, scenario immersion, discussion of implication, and
the evaluation constitute the "experimental treatment" in Studies I and 11.
After evaluating investments in their assigned scenarios, all experts participating
in a workshop assembled together to compare the evaluations across the scenarios
used in the workshop. The experts first watched the videos illustrating all four scenarios.
(36)
Then, each scenario group presented evaluation of the investments in their assigned
scenario. Following this, the authors led a presentation and discussion of the evaluation
of each investment across all scenarios. This constitutes exposure to all scenarios. The
experimental treatment in Study Ill consisted of all aspects of the treatment in Studies I
and II, and exposure to all scenarios.
2.4.4 Voting mechanism to evaluate usefulness of an investment
The following voting mechanism was employed to evaluate the usefulness of each
investment for a particular scenario. Each participant was asked to assign 100 points
among the investments selected for the workshop, such that more points for an
investment indicate greater benefit of making that investment in the context of the
selected scenario, as perceived by the individual participant. Each participant was also
asked to veto at least one and up to three investments. Vetoing an investment indicated
that the investment was not useful in the context of that scenario. Participants chose
their allocation of points and vetoes individually, and placed their votes on a group
voting sheet using poker chips. The facilitator tallied and revealed the collective vote to
the group. He highlighted the investments receiving most points and most vetoes, and
led a group discussion by asking the experts to explain the rationale behind the vote.
After this discussion, the experts were given a chance to change their vote by
reassigning poker chips on the group voting sheet. The distribution of points and vetoes
among the investments from the final group vote was used to measure the usefulness
of each investment for the scenario used by the group.
2.4.5 Pretest and posttest
The questionnaires used in the pretest and posttest of each study were identical. Each
subject completed both questionnaires individually. We assured the subjects of the
anonymity of their responses to discourage any "pro-social behavior" by informing them
that the data collected through these questionnaires would not be shared with the
transportation agency in any way that may reveal their identity. The subjects were
asked to evaluate whether to make each investment selected for the workshop in the
context of the next 30 years. This design assumed that each subjects will complete the
pretest based on his/her perception of the future 30 years, and complete the posttest
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based on his/her perception of the future after using scenarios. In the posttest, we
informed the subjects to judge the investment decisions based on how they think the
future would be, and not based on the scenario they had participated in.
2.5 Test of Hi: Effect of scenarios on experts' confidence
Hypotheses H1 a,b,c were tested in Studies I and II. Their results are presented below.
2.5.1 Study I: Design and results
The host agency in Study I had chosen 16 infrastructure investments for this exercise.
In pretest and posttest, the subjects made a two-part assessment-a commonly used
approach in the tests of confidence (Fischhoff, et al., 1997)-about each investment
using multiple-choice questions. In the first part, the subjects indicated whether an
investment should be made today to meet the transportation needs of the region for
next 30 years, by choosing one of three choices: Yes, No, Do not know. In the second
part, subjects denoted their confidence that this decision would turn out to be a good
investment decision. A four-point scale, ranging from "Highly certain (75-100%
confidence in answer)" to "Highly uncertain (0-25% confidence in answer)", was used to
rate confidence. 51 subjects completed 816 assessments in the pretest; 44 subjects
completed 704 assessments in the posttest. A total of 551 pretest-posttest pairs of
evaluation were available in which a particular subject had evaluated a particular
investment in both pretest and posttest. Hypothesis H1 is tested using these 551
assessments; Table 2-1 shows their distribution in pretest and posttest.
Ptest:Befr wokso Pote Aft er onescnario.
Confidence level Do not Yes or Do not Yes or
Yes No know No Yes No know No
Highly certain (75-100% confidence) 162 31 8 193 165 33 0 198
Somewhat certain (50-75% confidence) 130 43 2 173 137 45 1 182
Somewhat uncertain (25-50% confidence) 43 18 11 61 72 50 2 122
Highly uncertain (0-25% confidence) 4 1i 18 5 14 6 2 20
Not applicable (answered "Do not know") 1 0 79 1 0 0 24 0
Total assessments in each test (551) 340 93 118 433 388 134 29 522
Table 2-1: Distribution of votes in pretest and posttest (Study I)
(38)
2.5.1.1 Results of Study I
Among 551 pretest assessments in pretest, the subjects either supported (voted "Yes")
or opposed (voted "No") making investments in 433 cases. In the remaining 118 cases,
the subjects abstained from making an investment decision (voted "Do not know"). In
posttest, the number of decisions either supporting or opposing an investment
increased to 522. Figure 2-2 shows the proportion of votes in pretest and posttest for
each confidence level. The proportion of votes either supporting or opposing an
investment with the highest confidence decreased from 0.45 to 0.38 (p=.01 9, z test for
two independent proportions). The proportion of votes where subjects were "Somewhat
certain" in the investment decision decreased from 0.40 to 0.35 (p=.053). This drop was
compensated by an increase in proportion of votes where the subjects were "Somewhat
uncertain" (from 0.14 to 0.23, p<.001) or "Highly uncertain" (from 0.01 to 0.04, p=.005).
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Figure 2-2: Distribution of votes either supporting or opposing investment
(Study I)
Even when the assessments supporting and opposing investments are
considered separately (Figure 2-3 and Figure 2-4), the pretest-to-posttest changes
remain statistically significant: proportion of assessments made with "somewhat
uncertainty", either supporting (0.13 to 0.19, p=.015) or opposing investment (0.19 to
(39)
0.37, p=.002), increase after scenario use. Similarly, the proportion of assessment with
the highest confidence either supporting (0.48 to 0.43, p=.083) or opposing investment
(0.33 to 0.25, p=.076) drop after scenario use.
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Figure 2-3: Distribution of votes supporting investment
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Figure 2-4: Distribution of votes opposing investment (Study I)
Overall, these results suggest that after immersion in a single scenario, experts
became less confident in their long-term investment decisions. This supports rejecting
the null hypothesis (H1a) and accepting the alternate hypothesis H1b.
(40)
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However, an alternate explanation exists for these results. The number of
assessments where the subjects had abstained from either supporting or opposing an
investment reduced greatly from pretest (118; 21.4%) to posttest (29; 5.3%). It is
possible that after thoroughly evaluating an investment in one scenario, the experts felt
sufficiently informed to make an investment decision, but did so with lower confidence
(i.e. choose "somewhat..." or "highly uncertain"). This would increase the proportion of
assessments at the lower confidence levels and decrease the ones with high
confidence levels. Thus, the increase in the relative proportion of votes at lower
confidence level could instead be the result of the experts feeling more confident to
make a decision, and not due to drop in confidence from the use of a scenario. This
alternate explanation was tested in Study 11.
2.5.2 Study II: Design and results
Study 11 was conducted with a U.S. ocean port. The design of this study was identical to
Study I, except for two differences. First, the subjects were required to either support or
oppose a long-term investment by having only two choices for the investment decision
("Yes" and "No"). Second, a finer seven-point scale, obtained from Windschitl and Wells
(1996), was used for reporting subject's confidence in the investment decision. 15
infrastructure investments associated with the port were selected for the study. Similar
to Study I, the subjects were asked to make two assessments about each investment
using multiple-choice questions: first whether to invest and then the confidence in that
judgment. Only those responses where a subject evaluated an investment in both
pretest and posttest were used for testing the hypotheses. The usable data consisted by
404 pairs of pretest and posttest assessment of the same investment by the same
subject. The pretest-posttest distribution of 404 assessments is shown in Table 2-2.
(41)
Confidence level
Yes No Yes No
Certain (100%) 52 0 55 2
Almost totally certain (90-100%) 72 6 61 4
Very likely (80-90%) 69 13 66 15
Likely (70-80%) 50 2 52 26
Fairly likely (60-70%) 50 13 44 20
Slightly likely (50-60%) 19 8 19 8
As likely as is unlikely (a 50-50 chance) 8 22 5 27
Total assessments in each test (404) 320 84 302 102
Table 2-2: Distribution of votes in pretest and posttest (Study II)
2.5.2.1 Results ofStudy H
Figure 2-5 shows the proportion of all votes for each confidence level in pretest and
posttest. Figure 2-6 and Figure 2-7 show the proportion of votes supporting and
opposing investments, respectively. In all three cases at no confidence level, with one
exception, was the change from pretest to posttest statistically significant at p 5 .10.
The only exception was the increase in assessments opposing investment with certainty
from 0 to 2 (p=.098), which can be neglected due to very small sample size. The
average confidence, calculated by multiplying the proportion of votes by mean
confidence for each confidence interval on the scale, was almost unchanged from
pretest to posttest among all votes (change from 0.794 to 0.788), those supporting
investments (from 0.823 to 0.826), and those opposing (from 0.680 to 0.676).
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Figure 2-5: Distribution of all votes at each confidence level (Study II)
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Figure 2-6: Distribution of votes supporting investments (Study II)
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Study 11 showed no significant pretest-posttest change in the aggregate proportion of
votes at each confidence level after the use of scenarios. This supports the alternate
explanation offered for the results of Study 1. Therefore, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis (HIa) that the use of scenarios does not affect decision-makers'
confidence, and find no support for the two alternate hypotheses H1 b and H1 c.
The proportion of votes where subjects opposed an investment with the lowest
level of confidence was much higher in Study 11 (0.26 in both pretest and posttest) than
in Study I (0.01 and 0.04 in pretest and posttest, respectively). This was observed even
though there was no significant difference in the relative proportions of Yes and No
votes in the two studies (3.66 and 3.81 "Yes" votes for every "No" vote in Study I and 11
pretests, respectively; 2.90 and 2.96 "Yes" votes for every "No" vote in the posttests).
This suggests that instead of not committing to a decision, the experts may have
chosen to oppose an investment and expressed high uncertainty in that opposition.
2.6 Test of H2: Effect of scenarios on investment decisions
While the use of scenarios showed no change in the aggregate confidence in the long-
range investment decisions, hypotheses H2 a, b, c suggest that the effect of scenarios
on investment decisions may depend on how the investments perform in the scenario.
2.6.1 Study design
The distribution of points and vetoes among the investments from the final group vote,
described in the experimental treatment section, was used to measure the usefulness of
each investment in the context of a given scenario as perceived by the subjects using
that scenario. Figure 2-8 shows one example of the results of a voting session (scenario
"One World Order" in Study II). The bars of positive values show the proportion of points
assigned to each investment among the total points assigned by the experts under
scenario "One World Order" (from the 100 points allocated by each expert). The hights
of these bars add to 1. Similarly, the bars of negative values show the proportion of
vetoes assigned to each investment in the scenario, and their magnitudes also add to 1.
These votes are used to measure the utility of each investment in that scenario.
(44)
2.6.1.1 "Useful" and "Wasteful" investments
To test hypothesis H2, the investments are classified as either Useful or Wasteful for
each scenario. Useful investments are those that are perceived as good by the
participants in the context of a given scenario; Wasteful investments are the ones
judged not to be good for the scenario. In a workshop where n investments were
evaluated, an investment is designated as Useful if it received a minimum of 1/n points
(Condition 1), and the ratio of proportion of points to proportion of vetoes it received is at
least 3 (Condition 2, which includes receiving no vetoes as well). Condition 1 ensures
that the number of points received by an investment is greater than what it is expected
to receive if the points were assigned randomly; Condition 2 ensures that only the
investments receiving sufficiently high proportion of points compared to the proportion of
vetoes are chosen as Useful investments. Parameterization of both these conditions is
somewhat arbitrary, but the results of sensitivity test (presented in section 2.10, the
appendix for this chapter) show that the findings are robust. In Figure 2-8, investments
S10, S12, and S13 qualify as Useful for Scenario "One World Order": they received
10%, 19%, and 14% of the points (exceed the threshold of 1/15=6.67%, satisfy
Condition 1), and 0, 0, and 4% of the vetoes (exceed %vote-to-%veto-ratio threshold of
3, satisfy Condition 2), respectively.
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Figure 2-8: Evaluation of investments in "One World Order" (Study II)
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Definition of Wasteful investments is symmetric to the Useful investments: They
receive a minimum of 1/n vetoes (Condition 3), and the ratio of proportion of vetoes to
proportion of points exceeds 3 (Condition 4). In the example shown in Figure 2-8,
investments S02, S03, S04, S06, and S15 are "Wasteful" investments: the proportion of
vetoes for each investment exceeds 1/15 (Condition 3), and the ratio of proportion of
vetoes to points exceeds 3 (Condition 4). Useful and Wasteful investments are mutually
exclusive but not collectively exhaustive.
2.6.1.2 Change in expert judgment: "More favorable" or "Less
favorable"
The pretest-to-posttest change in an expert's judgment of an investment is classified as
either becoming "more favorable", "less favorable", or not changing. An expert's
judgment is defined as becoming "more favorable" for a particular investment if the
pretest to posttest change matches any one of the following three conditions:
e Changed recommendation from opposing investment to supporting investment
e Maintained the recommendation to oppose making an investment, but lowered
the confidence in the assessment
" Maintained the recommendation to support making an investment, and increased
the confidence in the assessment
The definition of a change in judgment becoming "less favorable" is symmetric to above.
2.6.2 Results of tests of hypotheses H2 a,b,c
The hypothesis was tested in both Studies I and II both, and identical results are
obtained. The results from Study II are presented here. Out of 404 assessments in this
study, 288 (71.3%) changed from pretest to posttest in one of the six ways used to
define whether the expert judgment became "more favorable" or "less favorable".
Hypotheses H2 (a, b, and c) are tested using the direction of change in these 288
judgment. Table 2-3 depicts the distribution of the assessments among the three types
of investments identified in a scenario. For each of 288 expert judgments that changed
from pretest to posttest, the assessment of the investment as either useful, wasteful, or
neither is taken from the scenario in which the expert had participated. (Each expert
participated in only one scenario).
(46)
Became more Became less Total
favorable favorable
Investment Useful 35 20 55
assessed Wasteful 22 48 70
as... Neither 79 84 163
Total 136 152 288
Table 2-3: Change in expert judgment by assessment of investment in a
scenario
If an expert, John, changed his decision to invest in S1 from "No" (pretest) to "Yes"
(posttest) after evaluating it in Scenario A, and if investment S1 was found to be useful
in context of Scenario A, then the changed assessment of S1 by John will be counted in
cell "Useful & Became more favorable". If an expert, Jane, changed her decision about
invest in S1 from "No" and "Certain" to "No" and "Likely" after evaluating it in Scenario B,
and if investment S1 was found to be wasteful for Scenario B, then the changed
assessment of SI by Jane will be counted in cell "Wasteful & Became less favorable".
2.6.2.1 Tests ofhypotheses H2a and H2b
Among 55 changed judgments about investment found to be useful, 35 (63.6%) became
more favorable as predicted in hypothesis H2a. Similarly, among 70 changed judgments
about investments found to be wasteful, 48 (68.6%) became less favorable as predicted
in hypothesis H2b. The distribution of assessments among "became more favorable"
and "became less favorable" within the three types of investments is not homogenous
(X2 = 13.05, df = 2, p = .001).
The distribution of changed judgments between those becoming "more favorable"
and "less favorable" among "useful" investments (35 and 20, respectively) is different
from that in "wasteful" and "neither" investments combined (101 and 132) (X2 =
7.35, df = 1, p = .007), and in "neither" investments (79 and 84) (X2 = 3.79, df = 1, p =
.051). Similarly, the distribution of changed judgments between those becoming "more
favorable" and "less favorable" among "wasteful" investments (22 and 48) is different
from that in "useful" and "neither" investments combined (114 and 104) (X2 = 9.26, df=
1, p = .002), and in "neither" investments (79 and 84) (X2 = 5.79, df = 1, p = .016).
(47)
Among 288 changed judgments, 136 (47.2%) became more favorable. The
likelihood that a changed judgment becomes more favorable is higher among useful
investments (35/55 = 63.6%) than the average of 47.2% (p=.0049, binomial test of
proportions), as predicted in hypothesis 2a. Similarly, the likelihood of a changed
judgment becoming less favorable is higher among wasteful investments (48/70 =
68.6%) than the average of 52.8% (p=.0053), as predicted in hypothesis 2b. Thus, the
results support hypotheses H2a and H2b.
2.6.2.2 Test ofhypothesis H2c
Hypothesis 2c is tested by comparing the proportion of judgments remaining unchanged
from pretest to posttest among useful and wasteful investments in Study 11. Out of 92
judgments of useful investments, 55 changed and 37 (40.2%) remained unchanged.
Out of 95 judgments for wasteful investments, 25 (26.3%) remained unchanged. The
proportion of unchanged judgments among wasteful investments is smaller than among
useful investments (p=.022). However, in 13 of the 37 unchanged judgments of useful
investments, experts had favored the investment with the highest confidence in both
pretest and posttest. These judgments could not "become more favorable" in the
posttest as they already supported the investment with the highest confidence in
pretest. Excluding these from the analysis, the difference between the proportions of
unchanged judgments among useful ((37-13)/(92-13) = 30.4%) and wasteful
investments (25/95 = 26.3%) is not statistically significant (p=.28). Thus, the results
favor rejecting hypothesis 2c.
2.7 Test of H3: Effect of ex-ante confidence on scenario-
induced changes
The test of hypotheses H2 showed that evaluation using a single scenario can
systematically change experts' long-range investment decisions. Hypothesis H3
suggests that a scenario's efficacy of changing an expert's decision depends on the
expert's confidence in the investment decision before using the scenario. Data from
Studies I and II were used to test this hypothesis.
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2.7.1 Results of tests of hypothesis H3 (from Studies I and II)
Among 551 assessments in Study 1, 432 assessments either supported or opposed
making an investment. Table 2-4 shows the distribution of assessments of investment
decisions by experts' confidence before the use of scenarios, and the distribution of
assessments that changed after the use of scenarios. An expert's assessment of an
investment decision is considered changed when s/he either changes his/her decision
to support or oppose a particular investment from pretest to posttest, or maintains
his/her decision but changes the confidence in it. As shown in Table 2-4, 247 of the 432
assessments changed. In 193 assessments, the subjects had expressed the highest
confidence in their investment decision before the use of scenarios. Of these, 70 (0.363)
changed after scenario use. For every other confidence level, more than 70% of
assessments changed after scenario use. The proportion of changed assessments with
highest ex-ante confidence (0.363) is lower (p<.001) than average (247/432 =0.572).
The proportion of changed votes increased as experts' prior confidence decreased.
Experts' confidence prior Nbr of Nbr of Prop. of
to use of scenarios in votes in votes that votes that z score p value
"Yes" and "No" votes pretest changed changed
Highly certain 193 70 0.363 8.78 0.00
Somewhat certain 173 123 0.711 -5.85 0.00
Somewhat uncertain 61 50 0.820 -10.41 0.00
Highly uncertain 5 4 0.800 -9.59 0.00
Total vtes 40
Table 2-4: Ex-ante confidence and scenario-induced changes (Study I)
The results from Study 11 are similar (Table 2-5). Out of 404 assessments, 288 (0.713)
changed. The proportion of changed assessments was lowest (0.365) when the experts
were "Certain" about the assessment of their investment decision prior to the use of
scenarios. For all other ex-ante confidence level, at least 2/3 of the assessments
changed after scenario use, with the proportion of changed votes generally increasing
with the drop in the prior confidence.
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Experts' vote prior to Nbr of Nbr of Prop. of
use of scenarios votes in votes that votes that z score p value
pretest changed changed
Certain 52 19 0.365 15.44 0.000
Alm ost totally certain 78 53 0.679' 1.48 0.069
Very likely 82 65 0.793 -3.55 0.000
Likely 721 56, 0.778 -2.88 0.002
Fairlylikely 63 53 0.841 -5.70 0.000
Slightly likely 27 21 0.778 -2.88 0.002
As likely as is unlikely 30 21 0.700 0.57 0.284
Table 2-5: Ex-ante confidence and scenario-induced changes (Study II)
Charts in Figure 2-9 show the data presented
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Figure 2-9: Prior confidence and scenario induced changes
2.8 Test of H4: Effect of scenarios on preference for flexible
investment
Hypothesis H4 suggests that the experts choose more flexible strategies after
evaluating the investment decisions in multiple scenarios.
2.8.1 Study design (Study III)
This study was conducted with a U.S. transportation planning agency different from
those involved in Studies I and 11. Like the others, this agency wanted to use scenarios
(50)
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to evaluate the relative merits of investing in various types of segments of transportation
infrastructure. 13 segment types-such as ocean ports, border crossings, highway
corridors, rail corridors, intermodal facilities, etc.-were chosen for the workshop. In
both pretest and posttest questionnaires, subjects were asked to choose an appropriate
investment option for each of the 13 segment types. Four investment options, ranging
from the least flexible (OPTION-1) to the most flexible (OPTION-4) were provided for
each type. These options are shown in Table 2-6.
'a V
Investment options for each type of infrastructure segment
00
OPTION 1: Identify specific regions and projects where investments should
be made, allocate funds, and start implementing those projects.
OPTION 2: Identify specific regions and projects where investments should I
be made, and allocate funds to the projects. BUT DO NOT START x x x
IMPLEMENTING.
OPTION 3: Identify specific regions where investments should be made, and
allocate funds to those regions, BUT DO NOT ALLOCATE FUNDS TO x x
PROJECTS.
OPTION 4: Allocate funds to this segment, but do not allocate funds to
individual regions within the segment.
Table 2-6: Four investment options (Study III)
The most flexible option called for allocation of funds to the segment (i.e. a highway),
but not to a particular region (i.e. a highway in Florida) or a particular project (i.e.
expansion of 1-95 between exits 10 and 20 in State of Florida). The least flexible option
called for allocation of funds to a specific project of a particular segment, and start
implementation. The instructions for the questionnaire pointed out that the options
ranged from the least to the most flexible.
Similar to Studies I and II, Study Ill had the planning horizon of 30 years and
used the same four scenarios. Each subject participated in an in-depth evaluation of the
13 segments in one of the four scenarios. At the end of the single scenario evaluation,
the workshop participants from all four scenarios presented the segments' evaluations
in the respective scenarios. A comparison of usefulness of each segment across
(51)
multiple scenarios was presented to the entire group of experts. Thus, the experiment
treatment consisted of immersion in one scenario and exposure to the other three.
2.8.2 Results of tests of hypothesis H4
27 subjects evaluated 13 segments in both pretest and posttest. These 351 pretest-
posttest assessments were used to test the hypothesis. The results are shown in Table
2-7 and depicted graphically in Figure 2-10. The subjects overwhelmingly chose the
least flexible option as the investment strategy before participating in the scenario
planning workshop (229/351 = 0.652). After the workshop, the least flexible option was
chosen in only half of the assessments (176/351). This drop was complemented by
almost doubling of the assessments choosing a more flexible Option 3 (81/351). The
pretest-to-posttest drop in choice for Option 1 and increase in choice for Option 3 are
both statistically significant (p<.001; z-test for two independent proportions). The
proportion of assessments choosing the most flexible option (Option 4) also increased
(p=.056).
<--- Flexibility --->
Least Most
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4
Number of choices:
Pretest 229 53 43 26
Posttest 176 54 81 40
Propotion of choices:
Pretest 0.652 0.151 0.123 0.074
Posttest 0.501 0.154 0.231 0.114
Statistics:
z score 4.002 -0.104 -3.418 -1.585
p value 0.000 0.459 0.000 0.056
Table 2-7: Pretest-posttest preferences for investment options (Study III)
(52)
Figure 2-10: Pretest-posttest preferences for investment options (Study III)
The results support hypothesis H4: the proportion of experts choosing the least flexible
option decreased and those choosing more flexible options increased after the use of
scenarios. This suggests that scenarios are effective in making field experts realize
the value of investing in more flexible strategies for their long-range investments.
2.9 General discussion
Researchers and practitioners of scenario planning as well as strategy scholars have
extolled scenario planning for its "frame-breaking ability" (Eisenhardt, 1999) to change
planners' "assumptions about how the world works" (Wack, 1985) and influence their
long-range investment decisions. However, the literature on scenario planning or long-
range planning is devoid of rigorous tests of whether scenario planning influences the
decisions of field experts (Kuhn & Sniezek, 1996; Schoemaker, 2004; Wilkinson, 2009).
This research is a first attempt to address this gap in the literature.
2.9.1 Summary of results
This research tested four hypotheses about the effect of scenarios on experts' long-
range investment decisions using field experiments. Overall, the results of these studies
show that the use of scenarios does influence the long-range investment decisions
(53)
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made by field experts. Immersion in one scenario does not produce an all-
encompassing increase or decrease in the experts' confidence in their decisions
(hypothesis HI). Instead, single-scenario immersion has a more subtle, albeit
somewhat obvious, effect: the change in an expert's decision to invest in an asset after
evaluating it in a scenario depends on the usefulness of that asset in the scenario
(hypotheses H2a and H2b). If an asset is judged useful (wasteful) in a scenario, any
change in the expert's assessment is likely to make the investment in that asset more
(less) favorable. The scenario-induced changes are also more likely when the experts
do not have the highest level of confidence in their investment decision (hypothesis H3).
Finally, after being exposed to multiple scenarios experts are more likely to invest in
flexible strategies after being exposed to multiple scenarios (hypothesis H4).
Some of these results are interesting, as they either contradict the extant
knowledge (hypothesis H1) or provide new insights (hypothesis H4). Other results
confirm the obvious (hypotheses H2 and H3). Nonetheless, this study makes a
contribution by providing empirical support to the "commonsense".
2.9.1.1 Salientfeatures of the experiment design
This study was conducted in conjunction with a large scenario planning project led by
the CTL research team. The "subjects" in the study were experts in the field; they were
knowledgeable about the investments evaluated and knew that their input would be
considered by the planning agency in long-range planning. The experiments score well
on all six criteria used by Harrison and List (2004, pp. 1012-3) to define field
experiments: the "subject pool" was composed of field experts, who were invited to
participate in the workshop for their insights and the "information [they] bring to the
task"; the experimental task involved making decisions about the "actual goods", i.e. the
infrastructure investments, which also ensured that the "rules applied" by the subjects in
making the decisions were appropriate to the domain of transportation infrastructure
planning; the subjects were informed of the high "stakes" of their decisions as informing
the agency's planning process, and the experimental tasks were performed either at the
subject's or at the planning agency's office, i.e. in an "environment the subjects [would]
operate in" for making such decisions. This suggests that the findings of the study have
high ecological validity and may be generalized to other long-range planning decisions.
(54)
While the experiments measured the change in subjects' confidence in their
decisions, we do not make claims about the subjects being overconfident or scenario
planning being able to reduce overconfidence. The studies of overconfidence rely on
having an objective measure to which the subjects' answers, and their confidence in
their answer, are compared (Fischhoff, et al., 1977). Given that the decisions made by
the subjects in this study do not pan out for years and are likely to be influenced by
numerous factors beyond the control of the experiment, we do not have the luxury of
knowing the "right answer" or the "right decision" for the experimental tasks. Therefore,
instead of making any claims about decision overconfidence, this study only tests for
the change in confidence resulting from the use of scenario planning.
2.9.2 Results in context of extant literature
In all three studies, a large proportion of investment decisions changed after the use of
scenarios. Given the status-quo bias among decision-makers to stick to their choices
(Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988), the ability of scenarios to influence even some expert
decisions is noteworthy. Thus, scenario planning may have the potential to be used as a
"cognitive repair", i.e. an organizational practice "that may effectively repair the cognitive
shortcomings of individual" (Heath, Larrick, & Klayman, 1998) that are argued to lead to
poor decisions. It would be a socially administered, domain-general cognitive repair that
is likely to be purposefully designed and applied from the top-down by managers (ibid).
Hypotheses H1 a,b,c about the effect of scenarios on experts' confidence in their
decisions were based on conflicting empirical evidence in the literature. The findings of
this research contradict the results of both Schoemaker (1993) and Kuhn and Sniezek
(1996), finding that use of scenarios does not increase or decrease experts' confidence
in decisions at the aggregate level. However, the study did find widespread changes in
experts' specific investment decisions and confidence in those decisions, corresponding
with the performance of the investments in the scenarios. One plausible reason why
experts change their evaluations according to the suitability of the asset for the scenario
is that the use of scenario may influences the cognitive processes involved in assessing
the environment. Entrepreneurs are shown to use "their prior knowledge of markets to
search for and think of opportunities for new technologies" (Gregoire, Barr, & Shepherd,
2010, p. 426). Scenarios may work in the reverse direction: they may allow experts to
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use their prior knowledge of an asset's capabilities to envision how the asset could
become a strength or a weakness in the new market conditions envisioned after using a
scenario. By placing an asset into a scenario that is potentially different from his
conception of the future, an expert is more likely to learn about the advantageous
(disadvantageous) features of that asset, and become more (less) favorable about
investing in it.
After participating in a scenario planning workshop, experts were more likely to
invest in flexible strategies. The value of flexibility is undisputed when preparing an
organization for unpredictable environment, such as the ones encountered in long-
range planning or in fast-paced industries (Eisenhardt, 1989; Ilinitch, et al. 1996;
Schilling & Steensma, 2001). However, research shows that organizations have a
tendency to add more structure and lose flexibility as they age (Sorensen & Stuart,
2000). Eisenhardt, et al. (2010) argue that this drift towards over-structuring is
problematic for organizations operating in dynamic environments, and the leaders of
such organizations have to overcorrect in the direction of flexibility. Organizational
leaders could use scenario planning to help their decision-makers recognize the value
of flexibility when preparing for an unpredictable environment. Scenario planning also
allows a group of experts to pool their insights to think about an organization's future
strategy. Due of this ability "to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external
competences to address rapidly changing environments" scenario planning can be a
valuable strategy process in an organization's arsenal of dynamic capabilities (Teece,
Pisano, & Shuen, 1997; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000).
2.9.3 Future (empirical) research in scenario planning
This research focused on testing whether and how one-time use of scenarios influences
the investment decisions made by experts. A plethora of questions about the effects of
scenario planning remain to be answered empirically. This section provides four
suggestions for future research. These, by no means, are exhaustive.
The experts in our studies systematically changed their decisions after using
scenarios. An immediate question of interest is what causes this change. One way to
answer this is to see if and how the use of scenarios changes the knowledge structure
of the scenario users. Researchers have used mental maps to articulate the structure of
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a person's knowledge employed in the decision-making process (Fiol & Huff, 1992;
Hodgkinson & Johnson, 1994). A change in the mental map after the use of scenarios
can give us insights about why scenarios influence decisions.
In the experiments in this research work, the posttest was conducted immediately
after the experts participated in the scenario planning session. A second relevant
question is how long the effect of scenarios lasts. A posttest could be conducted at
different intervals (such as one week, one month, and so on) to detect the longevity of
the effect from scenario use.
A third area of interest is to explore how the effect of one-time use of scenarios
differs from a repeated use of scenarios. Scenarios could be used for one-time strategy
development or on an on-going basis for organizational learning and sense-making as
practiced by Shell (Bradfield, et al. 2005). Several interesting questions lurk here: how a
decision-maker's mental map evolves through the repeated use of scenarios, or how
mental maps of executives in organizations that practice scenario planning regularly
differ with their counterparts in firms that do not use scenarios on a regular basis.
A fourth area for further inquiry is to test the effect of multiple scenarios. In
Studies I and II, each subject used only one scenario. It would be useful to test how the
change in decisions after the use of a single scenario differs from the change in
decision after evaluating the decisions in the context of multiple scenarios. Since the
scenarios in a set are structurally very different from each other, use of multiple
scenarios may increase the uncertainty experts perceive in the future and could lead to
a drop in confidence. One could also study the change in knowledge structure of an
expert with the use of multiple scenarios.
In summary, scenario planning is a rich field for management research. The
process is practiced and recommended by researchers for making strategic decisions in
unpredictable environments. This process could be a potential dynamic capability that
helps organizations accomplish their goals in turbulent environments. Undertaking a
rigorous empirical scrutiny of scenario planning will help us understand the true merits
of this strategic thinking process.
(57)
2.10 Appendix for Chapter 2
2.10.1 Sensitivity of hypothesis H2 to definition of "useful" and "wasteful"
Two symmetric criteria are used to define useful and wasteful investments. For an
investment to be termed "useful" ("wasteful"), the proportion of points (vetoes) it
receives has to be at least (k * number of segments) and the ratio of proportions of points
to vetoes (vetoes to points) has to exceed p. In the analyses presented in section 2.6.2,
k = 1, p = 3. To test robustness of the results to these somewhat arbitrary definitions,
value of k was varied from 0.8 to 2 (0.2 increment; seven values), and p from 1.5 to 5
(0.5 increment; eight values). The proportion of expert judgments that changed
according to hypotheses H2a and H2b, among all changed judgments for "useful" and
"wasteful" investments defined for these 56 pairs of criteria are presented in Table 2-8
and Table 2-9, respectively.
Multiplier for proportion of vetoes (k')
0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0
.-'8 '8 1.5 0.67 0.67 0.66 0.66 0.70 0.70 0.70
C 2.0 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.70 0.70 0.70
. t 2.5 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.70 0.70
3 
..
- . 3.0 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.70 0.70
S3.5 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.70 0.70 0.70
0 4.0 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.70 0.70 0.70
4.5 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.67 0.67
5.0 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.67 0.67
Table 2-8: Proportion of changed wasteful assessments confirming
hypotheses
The proportion of changed judgments for the "wasteful" investments where the expert
evaluated the investment less favorably in the posttest than in pretest varies in a narrow
range of 0.66 to 0.70, and appears robust to the change in criteria for defining "wasteful"
investments.
(58)
Multiplier for proportion of points (k)
0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0
1.5 0.61 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.63 0.57 0.57
2.0 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.63 0.57 0.57
o .2
S-& 2.5 0.59 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.63 0.57 0.57
o
L3.0 0.63 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.65 0.56 0.56
0 .0 3.5 0.63 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.65 0.56 0.56
- COCa, I
oL * 0 4.0 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.65 0.54 0.54
. 4.5 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.65 0.54 0.54
5.0 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.65 0.54 0.54
Table 2-9: Proportion of changed useful assessments confirming
hypotheses
The proportion of changed judgments for the "useful" investments where the
expert's assessment became "more favorable" from pretest to posttest varies from 0.54
to 0.65. This proportion drops as the criteria for defining a judgment as "useful"
becomes more stringent. This is due to a special kind of judgment omitted from the
analysis. My analysis is based on the expert judgments that changed from pretest to
posttest. This omits all assessments where the expert recommended making an
investment with the highest confidence in both pretest and posttests. In such cases, it is
impossible for an expert assessment to become more favorable. For instance, using the
most stringent criteria (k = 2, p = 5) 26 assessments defined an investment to be
"useful". In 13 of these, experts changed the judgment from pretest to posttest, and in 7
of those cases the expert judgment had become more favorable (7/13=0.54). However,
in 7 of the 26 assessments, experts had voted to make the investment with the highest
confidence in both pretest and posttest. If these judgments were included when testing
for hypothesis H2a, the proportion of changed judgments supporting the hypothesis
would have been (7+7)/(13+7) =0.70. Table 2-10 shows the proportion of judgments
supporting hypothesis H2a after including unchanged judgments that recommended
investment with the highest level of confidence. This range, 0.64 to 0.75, is still broad
but provides a strong support for the hypothesis regardless of the criteria used for
defining "useful" investments.
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Multiplier for proportion of points (k)
0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0
1.5 0.67 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.73 0.70 0.70
2.0 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.73 0.70 0.70
o 
cL 2.5 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.73 0.70 0.70
o o
0 0 3.0 0.69 0.71 0.70 0.71 0.75 0.72 0.72
M .L 0 3.5 0.69 0.71 0.70 0.71 0.75 0.72 0.72
0 *- 4.0 0.68 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.74 0.70 0.70
*4 - 4.5 0.68 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.74 0.70 0.70
S.L 5.0 0.68 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.74 0.70 0.70
Table 2-10: Proportion of judgments confirming hypothesis H2a after
including unchanged judgments for highest confidence
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Chapter 3
Two processes for creating scenarios: The
long and the short of it
This chapter presents two versions - a long and a short - of the scenario
creation process used in the Intuitive Logics School. This school provides
a generic process for creating scenarios, devoid of specific guidelines for
executing different steps in the process. The research work in this chapter
outlines two structured methods for creating scenarios. Their application is
demonstrated in two separate field studies. Both versions provide
detailed, replicable methods for performing each step, along with the
rationale for choosing the particular methods. To provide a foundation for
the scenario creation processes, this research also offers clear definitions
of the terms used in the process and grounds the terms in seminal
organization science works on organizational environments.
3-1 Introduction
Scenario planning is a long-range planning process that uses multiple, structurally
different descriptions of the future, i.e. "scenarios", to help planners envision different
environments their plans could encounter. Scenarios are described as "carefully
constructed plots that make the significant elements of the world scene stand out boldly"
(Schwartz, 1991). Government planning agencies and corporations have been using
scenarios to aid long-range planning (Schoemaker, 1991; Ringland, 1998; Cousens, et
al., 2002; Bradfield, et al., 2005; Royal Dutch Shell, 2005, 2008; Deutsche Post AG,
2012; etc.).
While widely used, scenario planning does not have a single philosophy. Rather,
it has become an umbrella term that encompasses at least three schools of thought,
each with a different underlying philosophy regarding the use of scenarios to prepare for
an uncertain future (Bradfield, et al. 2005). Reviewing the literature and practice,
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researchers have identified as many as ten approaches to creating and using scenarios
(Ringland, 1998; Chermack, 2011), and at least 23 variations of scenario creation
techniques (Bishop, Hines, & Collins, 2007). Despite this diversity, the scenario
planning method developed at Shell, known as Intuitive Logics, is the most widely used
method (Ringland, 1998; Bradfield, et al. 2005; Bishop, et al. 2007). The advantage of
Intuitive Logics over other methods is that it provides "the right mix of technical
sophistication and ease of use for a professional audience" (Bishop, et al. 2007).
Practitioners who use scenarios note that (Ringland, 1998, pp. 81-2) "the best overall
guide to process that I found was the checklist in Peter Schwartz's 'The Art of the Long
View'." Leading scenario planning scholars also recommend this method because it
offers a "codified step-by-step approach" that helps scenario creation team generate
challenging yet plausible scenarios (van der Heijden, 2005, p. 253).
The steps for creating scenarios using the Intuitive Logics method were first
articulated by Peter Schwartz (1991, pp. 226-234). Schwartz's book (ibid) is the primary
reference for this method (Ringland, 1998; Bradfield, et al., 2005). In this book, he
outlines a high-level process, but does not specify how each step in the process should
be performed. In fact, he discourages any structured approach to scenario creation by
arguing (p. 30) "you cannot create scenarios from recipes - but you can practice
creating scenarios." The published case studies of scenario creation and scenario
planning in the Intuitive Logics method (cf.: such as in Ringland 1998; Royal Dutch
Shell, 2005, 2008) describe the scenarios in detail, but do not elaborate the process
used for creating them. Scenario planning scholars note this prevalence of "highly
personalized practices" and lack of details as the limitations in scenario planning
literature (Wilkinson, 2009). Summarily, the scenario planning literature does not
provide a well-defined scenario creation process with specific instructions for performing
different steps. The research presented in study seeks to address the gap in the
literature, by providing of a detailed scenario-creation process.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the
scenario creation method presented by Schwartz (1991). Following this, the research
method used in this research work ("Action research") is presented in section 3.3. When
applying in the field, I encountered challenges in following the Schwartz process. These
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challenges became the stepping stones for the research work presented here, and are
presented in section 3.4. This is followed by the definitions of terms used in the scenario
creation processes presented in this chapter in section 3.5. Here, the terms are also
grounded in the seminal works on organizational environments from organization
science literature. The assumptions made in developing the scenario creation
processes as presented in this chapter, are also explicitly stated in this section. The
definition of terminology and elaboration of assumptions provide the necessary
foundation for developing a scenario creation process. Two versions of the scenario
creation process are formulated through application in two cases; the process used in
these two cases is elaborated in sections 3.6 and 3.7. Finally, section 3.8 discusses the
findings and provides guidelines for future work.
3.2 Scenario creation in Intuitive Logics School
The assumption behind scenario creation is that (van der Heijden, 2005, p. 105) "events
do not just happen at random, but they are related to each other through a structure
where causes drive effects and one event leads to another." Scenario creation is about
describing this structure and how it could lead to different events. "Some of these
events will be considered predetermined and will be reflected in the same way in all
scenarios. But the scenarios will differ in aspect that can be explained by different
alternative structures" (ibid, p. 102). Thus, different scenarios represent different
qualitative descriptions of the future an organization may encounter.
In the Intuitive Logics School, scenarios are generally created in a set and are
not stand-alone descriptions of the future. All scenarios in a set share common
elements (called "driving forces"), and are related to each other through these
commonalities. These driving forces could be predetermined events (also called
"trends") that remain identical in all scenarios in the set, or could be critical uncertainties
that take different values in different scenarios. All scenarios in a set are related
because they all are built using the same set of driving forces.
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3.2.1 Scenario creation process (Schwartz, 1991)
The scenario creation process recommended by Schwartz (1991) consists of eight
steps. The entire process is schematically presented in Figure 3-11 in the appendix of
this chapter. The process steps are described in sections 3.2.1.1 through 3.2.1.8 below.
3.2.1.1 Identify focal issue or decision
Scenarios are created to help an organization make a specific decision or deal with a
specific issue. This issue is the focal issue for the scenario creation and scenario
planning project. Because it starts with an issue intemal to the organization, scenario
creation is a process of going from inside out, with the focal issue or decision at its core.
3.2.1.2 Identify key factors in the local environment
Key factors are those aspects that influence the success or failure of the focal decision.
The key factors could be internal to the organization or be parts of the external
environment. They are described as (van der Heijden, 2005, p. 226) "relatively obvious,
relatively close-in issues that shape organizational success or failure" and are also
referred to as "business factors" or "business variables".
3.2.1.3 Identify driving forces
Schwartz (p. 227) says that "once key factors have been listed, the third step involves
listing driving trends in the macro-environment that influence the key factors identified"
in the previous step. He says that (p. 107) "driving forces are the elements that move
the plot of a scenario, that determine the story's outcome". He recommends looking for
driving forces in five domains of the environment - Society, Technology, Economy,
Environment, and Politics - abbreviated as STEEP.
Schwartz does not provide a definition of "driving forces". He describes them by
saying that (p. 113) "as individuals, or even as companies, we have little control over
driving forces. Our leverage with them comes from recognizing them, and
understanding their effect." A similar description is also provided by van der Heijden
(2005, p. 114), who calls them "circumstances in the environment that could have a
major impact on our business, but are essentially outside our own control."
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Identified driving forces are separated into two groups: predetermined factors
and critical uncertainties. Predetermined factors are the ones whose outcome is
inevitable and can be known fairly accurately over the planning horizon considered for
developing scenarios. These are (p. 117) slow-changing phenomena (e.g. population
growth), factors "in the pipeline" (e.g. population of teenagers in ten years from now), or
constrained situations (such as, arable land in Japan). Critical uncertainties are those
forces whose outcomes cannot be predicted over the planning horizon.
3.2.1.4 Rank by importance and uncertainty
This step involves ranking the key factors and driving forces by two criteria: first by the
importance for the success of focal issue / decision, and then by degree of uncertainty
surrounding it. The goal here is to identify (p. 228) "two or three factors or trends that
are most important and most uncertain" (emphasis in the original). These two or three
factors form the basis of scenario logic chosen in the next step.
3.2.1.5 Select scenario logic
Scenario logic is the set of "axes along which the eventual scenarios will differ'.
Schwartz argues that (p. 229) "determining these axes is among the most important
steps in the entire scenario-generating [sic] process." The scenario logic defines the
structure, which helps distinguish the scenarios in a set - and by doing so, also ties the
scenarios together as members of the set. Scenario logic could consist of one, two, or
three, factors or forces chosen in the previous step.
If the scenario logic consists of one factor, then between two and four scenarios
are created, with each scenario taking a different value of that single factor. Price of oil
could be a scenario axis used to create these scenarios. Shell's 2001 global scenarios
used this approach: the scenario logic was the force of globalization, which led to two
scenarios - one scenario in which "market efficiency" was the dominant factor, and
another scenario in which "social cohesion" was supreme (Royal Dutch Shell, 2005).
If the scenario logic consists of two factors, then four scenarios are created by
taking the combinations of low and high values of the two factors. MIT's Center for
Transportation & Logistics (CTL) created four scenarios to aid decision-making in the
U.S. freight transportation infrastructure using this method (Caplice & Phadnis, 2012).
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The two driving forces selected for the scenario logic were ''availability of resources"
and degree of "global trade". This is the most commonly used scenario logic by the
practitioners of Intuitive Logics School and is "assumed to be a kind of standard
method" (van 't Klooster & van Asselt, 2006, p. 19).
If the scenario logic consists of three factors, then typically three scenarios are
created. In each scenario, two of the factors take the high value and one takes its low
value. Factors could be replaced by stakeholders; in this case, in each scenario two of
the three stakeholders dominate the rule-making in the world. Shell (2005) created three
scenarios using this method, which they called "the Trilemma Triangle" or "two wins-one
loss". The three forces in this case were "market incentives", "coercion, regulation", and
"the force of community".
3.2.1.6 Flesh out the scenarios
Each scenario in the set is assigned a particular value for the key factors and forces that
constitute the scenario logic. In fleshing out the scenarios, the values of the remaining
key factors and driving forces are assigned in each scenario. These disparate pieces
are then weaved (p. 231) "together in the form of a narrative". This narrative should
describe the world in that scenario and explain how we transition from the present state
to that world.
3.2.1.7 Identify implications
In this step, the scenario team examines the implications of the scenario for the focal
decision or issue. The goal of this step is to contemplate whether different decision
choices or strategies for dealing with the focal issue are robust across all scenarios in
the set, or if vulnerabilities exist. In case of the latter, the organization may use
brainstorming and other creativity enhancement techniques to identify new strategies
that are robust across all scenarios. If such strategies were not found, a flexible strategy
could be developed by incorporating real-options into the portfolio of investments
(Bowman & Moskowitz, 2001).
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3.2.1.8 Select leading indicators and signposts
The leading indicators are (p. 205) "small specific signals that might indicate the
change" to a particular scenario. Schwartz recommends that after creating scenarios,
(p. 232) "it's worth spending time and imagination on identifying a few indicators to
monitor in an ongoing way." The use of leading indicators is tied to implementation of
options in the strategies. Leading indicators could suggest the shift in the environment
toward one particular scenario, and this gives the organization sufficient time to exercise
the options or to adapt its strategy to make it suitable for the impending scenario.
3.2.2 Qualities of good scenarios
One of the most difficult questions related to the scenario creation process is how to
evaluate the quality of scenarios created by the process. Some practitioners have
declared it futile to even ask whether a set of scenarios are "good": they argue that "it is
clearly not possible to validate any scenario set until after the time period they speculate
on has come to pass - and at that point it becomes irrelevant to know how accurate
they were since this predicts nothing in relation to other scenario sets" (Cousens, et al.
2002). In lieu of objective tests, scenario planning literature describes the attributes of
"good" scenarios. These desired attributes can be divided into two groups: qualities of
good scenario sets and qualities of good scenarios (Schwartz, 1991; Schoemaker,
1995; 1998; Mietzner & Reger, 2005; van der Heijden, 2005).
" Desired attributes of scenario sets
o Number of scenarios: Two to four
o Diverse: Scenarios in a set should be structurally different from each other
o Challenging: The scenarios should challenge the conventional wisdom
about future in the organization. This is typically achieved by having
multiple diverse scenarios in a scenario set.
* Desired attributes of scenarios
o Plausible: The users should believe that the scenario can "grow logically
from the past and the present" (van der Heijden, 2005).
o Internally consistent: The logic in the scenario should be consistent, i.e.
''events within a scenario must be related through cause/effect lines of
argument, which cannot be flawed" (ibid)
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3.3 Research method: Action research
The research method used in this work is "action research". Action research is a "family
of practices" (Raelin, 1999; Cassell & Johnson, 2006), founded in the seminal work of
Kurt Lewin (Lewin, 1945; 1946) at MIT, which "bring together action and reflection,
theory and practice, in participation with others, in the pursuit of practical solutions to
issues of pressing concern to people" (Reason & Bradbury, 2008). Action research
"takes its cues - its questions, puzzles, and problems - from the perceptions of
practitioners within particular, local practice contexts" (Argyris & Sch6n, 1989, pp. 612-
3). Action research was selected as the research method for this work because the goal
of the research was to develop a practical scenario creation process that could address
the specific challenges faced by a particular group of practitioners and was also
generalizable to other contexts. This required collaborating with practitioners to
understand their challenges in creating scenarios using the generic process provided by
Schwartz (1991) to choose appropriate methods for performing different process steps
through a learning cycle of action and reflection.
Because of the importance it places on solving practical problems, action
research could be misconstrued as "consulting". However, Lewin (1946, p. 36) himself
has noted that two research objectives - "study of general laws" and "diagnosis of a
specific situation" - are both necessary in action research. In the research presented in
this chapter, the output is a practical scenario creation process that can be generalized
to a wide variety of private- and public-sector contexts.
3.3.1 Application of scenario creation process: Two cases
The collaborative aspect of action research requires that research on scenario creation
be conducted with an organization whose members face practical challenges that could
be addressed using the scenario planning method. Finding a matching organization
willing to collaborate is not always easy. Through the efforts of the research team at MIT
Center for Transportation & Logistics (CTL), particularly Dr. Mahender Singh and Dr.
Chris Caplice, we had the opportunity to collaborate with two firms, referred to using
pseudonyms as Medford and Chembridge, for the scenario creation project. A high-level
comparison of the two cases is presented in Table 3-1.
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Industry
Project scope
Planning horizon
Project sponsor
Focal question
Project timeline
Duration of
scenario project
Pharmaceutical distribution
U.S.
5 years
Senior Vice President of
Supply Chain
What should be Medford's
supply chain strategy?
Jul 2010 - Sep 2011
Approximately I yeare
Chemical manufacturing
Latin America
Now through 2020 (8 years)
Director of Global Supply
Chain Strategy
What supply chain strategy
should Chembridge adopt to
support doubling of its
business in Latin America by
2020?
Jan 2012
2 days
Table 3-1: Comparison of two cases used for
process
application of scenario creation
Medford is a pharmaceutical distributor in the U.S. In 2010, Medford was facing extreme
uncertainty in its strategic planning horizon due to the uncertainty in and complexity
from intertwining actions of stakeholders to reduce healthcare cost, changes in
regulations, developments in information and medical technology, and changes in the
demographics. Medford sought to use scenario planning to help its supply chain
executive team fathom the nature of uncertainty it faced, understand different ways its
business environment could evolve, and test how different strategies would fare in
different future environments. Therefore, scenario creation process was applied to
create scenarios of the U.S. healthcare supply chains jointly with the project team.
Chembridge is a multinational chemical company headquartered in Europe. In
2012, a small portion of its revenue came from its Latin American businesses. The
2 The scenarios were written in June, 2011. The next three months were used for activities related to
strategy planning using scenarios.
(69)
company had set the goal of doubling its revenue from this region by year 2020, and its
supply chain group was tasked with building the necessary supply chain infrastructure
and capabilities to support this growth. Chembridge decided to use scenario planning to
unravel the uncertainties about the sources of business growth in this emerging
economic region, the nature of regulations and trade policies, state of logistics
infrastructure, the environmentalism of society, and so on. Therefore, scenario creation
process was applied to develop scenarios for the Chembridge (Latin America) team.
3-4 Application of scenario-axes technique: Challenges
In the process of applying the process provided by Schwartz (1991) to create scenarios
for Medford and Chembridge, this research encountered challenges that were not
anticipated, or even stated in the scenario planning guidebooks. In general, the
challenges encountered could be grouped into three types described below.
Challenge 1: Imprecise definitions and inconsistent use of terms
Schwartz (1991) uses various terms - such as key factors, driving forces, etc. - to
describe the environment, but does not provide definitions. In absence of precise
definitions, the authors of subsequent works have used various terms to illustrate the
same aspects of the scenario creation process. For instance, van der Heijden (2005),
one of the most prolific scholars of scenario planning (Varum & Melo, 2010), uses terms
"business factors" and "business variables" interchangeably to refer to (p. 226) the
"relatively obvious, relatively close-in issues that shape organizational success or
failure", which are called "key factors" and "key local factors" by Schwartz (1991). Van
der Heijden uses term "environmental factor to mean (p. 226) "contextual variables
related to environmental aspects driving business factors", which seems to parallel
Schwartz's description of "driving forces". Furthermore, Schwartz sometime uses terms
"driving forces" and "driving trends" interchangeably, while also using the term "trend" to
refer to predetermined factors of the environment, which is only one of the two different
types of driving forces (the other is "uncertainty"). This confusion has been described by
Bradfield, et al. (2005, p. 796) in their extensive review of the scenario planning
literature as "the literature reveals a large number of different and at times conflicting
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definitions." Later on Bishop, et al. (2007, p. 6) criticize the scenario planning literature
by noting that "even the most basic vocabulary is used every which way in this field".
While the essence of Schwartz's message can be understood from a close
reading of his book, the lack of precise and consistent definitions of terms made the
scenario creation process confusing for members of the organization we were
collaboratively creating scenarios for.
Challenge 2: Non-specification of methods to perform process steps
Schwartz outlines the process used for creating scenarios, and describes the steps
involved in it. The application of this process was often left wanting much more
information for performing each step than was provided in Schwartz (1991). More
specifically, the following questions were raised at each process step:
* Who should perform the step?
" What methods should be used for performing the step?
" What are the reasons for making the above choices?
Schwartz has noted that scenario creation is an art, and warned that (p. 30) "you cannot
create scenarios from recipes". While Schwartz's monumental contribution in
popularizing scenario planning (and for the right reasons) is undisputable, maintaining
the scenario creation process as an "art" has made it difficult to evaluate the method,
and possibly limited an even wider adoption of this practice. Scenario practices have
become highly personalized and the literature lacks "reliable accounts that render
explicitly what has worked and what has not, and why and for whom in what settings"
(Wilkinson, 2009, p. 107). While I acknowledge the inherently subjective nature of
scenario studies, we found it necessary to provide more objectivity in the scenario-
creation process for two reasons:
* Explicitly defined scenario-creation processes are more amenable to comparison
with each other, and to improvement of the process
" Making assumptions explicit in the choice of method and actor for performing
each step is necessary for testing validity of these assumptions.
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Challenge 3: Difficulty of choosing axes of scenario logic
Schwartz notes that choosing scenario logic and scenario axes is (p. 229) "among the
most important steps" in the entire scenario creation process. However, he provides
little guidance for doing so. While very little has been published about actual methods
used for creating scenarios, one ethnographic study of scenario creation by
"professional futurists'' revealed the struggles of these experienced futurists in creating
scenarios. This study showed that the futurist team could not agree to the choice of
scenario axes after several rounds of discussion, and when two driving forces out of
three competing candidates were chosen as the axes, some project team members
criticized the selection and expressed frustration that "the scenario axes were imposed
on them without their consent" (van 't Klooster & van Asselt, 2006, p. 21)!
Furthermore, Schwartz's recommendation for choosing scenario axes seems
inconsistent with his process. He recommends identifying key factors and driving forces
separately (steps two and three, respectively) and but suggests considering driving
forces and key factors, both, as candidates for forming scenario logic. If, according to
Schwartz (1991, p. 106), "driving forces are the elements that move the plot of a
scenario, that determine the story's outcome", it seems more appropriate to prescribe
the process to choose driving forces, and not key factors, as scenario axes. The
scenarios created in practice appear to be developed from scenario logics having
driving forces as their axes: the ethnographic account of van 't Klooster & van Asselt
(2006) states this explicitly, and descriptions of scenarios created using scenario-axes
technique suggest this (cf.: see scenarios in Shell (2005; 2008); Cousens, et al. (2002)).
3-5 Scenario creation framework and terminology
This section outlines the framework used for creating scenarios in this research. This
framework consists of specifying and defining the terms used in the conceptual model of
business environment (§3.5.1) and elaborating the assumption made in the proposed
scenario creation process (§3.5.2).
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3.5.1 Conceptual model of business environment
Scenario planning takes a systems perspective on organizational design and strategy,
treating organizations as being interdependent on their larger environment. The
Organization Science literature provides several characterizations of organizational
environments and describes their interrelationship with organizations. Three seminal
works from the organization science literature are used as the foundation for the
scenario creation process presented in this research: Emery and Trist (1965),
Thompson (1967), and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978).
Thompson (1967, p. 7) describes the external environment of an organization as
the set of "variables [that are] not subject to complete control by the organization and
hence not contained within a closed system of logic." Thus, the ability to control a factor
distinguishes an internal factor from an external factor. The terms "local factor" and
"driving force" in the scenario planning literature refer to the external factors. Pfeffer and
Salancik (1978) inform that while they cannot control any, an organization can influence
some external factors - by either bringing them under its control (using mergers, vertical
integration, etc.) or managing its dependence on them (via joint ventures, overlapping
boards of directors, etc.). Emery and Trist (1965) distinguish between the transactional
environment and contextual environment of an organization, which are later defined by
van der Heijden (2005, p. 115) as follows:
e Transactional environment: "Part of the environment in which the organization
is a significant player, influencing outcomes as much as being influenced by
them. This is the playing field for which the organization develops its strategy in
order to turn the game to its advantage."
e Contextual environment: "Part of the environment which has important
repercussions for the organization but in which it has little or no influence."
3.5.1.1 Definitions of terms used in scenario creation process
Building on this literature, this research uses the ability of an organization to control and
influence the business environment to define three terms used in the scenario creation
process.
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e Focal decision: A decision, which involves specifying the value(s) of a set of
internal factors that the organization can control, and which is to be made using
the scenarios.
* Local factor A factor of the organization's external environment (thus, not
amenable to the organization's control), which the organization can influence.
" Driving force: A factor of the organization's external environment (thus, not
amenable to the organization's control), which the organization cannot influence.
These definitions are depicted on a flowchart in Figure 3-1 below and illustrated using
an example in §3.5.1.2. Local factors lie in the organization's transactional environment,
and the organization's contextual environment contains the driving forces. Note that
some driving forces may lie in the organization's transactional environment.
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Figure 3-1: Terms used in scenario creation method
3-1.2 Example offocal decision, localfactors, and driving forces
An example of a focal decision is a firm's production strategy for a given product mix.
The components of the focal decision include internal factors the organization has to
specify, such as whether to make-or-buy each product in the mix, production technology
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(or vendors) to use, manufacturing capacity needed, location(s) of manufacturing
facilities (or vendors), etc.
These factors are affected by local factors such as demand for the product,
variation in demand over time (trend and seasonality), reliability of raw material and
component supplies, etc. The firm does not control these factors, but can influence
them. For example, demand can be influenced through advertising and pricing;
seasonal variation in demand can be influenced through sales promotions; reliability of
supply can be influenced by in-sourcing or creating long-term contracts with suppliers;
and so on.
These local factors are affected by driving forces, such as environmental
consciousness of society, business tax policies, trade regulations, advances in
information technology, etc. These are the macro forces that the firm cannot influence
and they generally affect the firm indirectly by influencing the local factors. For instance,
environmental consciousness of the society can determine the demand for the firm's
product, availability and locations of raw material suppliers (especially if the production
process is harmful to the environment); tax policies can influence product demand,
firm's cost structure; trade regulations can influence the access to foreign suppliers, the
cost of supplies, and the reliability of supply; and so on.
3.5-1.3 Schematic representation of terms used
These three variables are shown graphically in Figure 3-2 below. The variables related
to the focal decision are contained in a black box. The black box contains the internal
factors that the organization has full control over and wants to define by making the
focal decision. The focal decision in the box is surrounded primarily - but not
necessarily entirely - by local factors (occupying the inner semicircle shown with a grid
pattern), which are then surrounded driving forces (occupying the outer circle). A part of
the black box is also exposed to the driving forces, where the organization experiences
a direct impact of the environmental elements it cannot influence.
The area between the box and the smaller inner circle with dashed
circumference is what van der Heijden (2005) calls the transactional environment; the
area between the inner circle and the outer circle with a thick circumference is what he
calls the contextual environment.
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The rationale behind showing the transactional environment as consisting mostly
of the local factors and a small portion of the driving forces is that the organization is
likely to have some way to influence most of the factors in its transactional environment,
but may also have some factors in the transactional environment that it has no way to
influence.
E Local factors N
Transactional environment Contextual environment
Figure 3-2: Schematic presentation of variables in scenario creation process
3.5.2 Assumptions underlying scenario creation process
This section makes explicit the assumptions behind the scenario creation process
described in this chapter. Some of these assumptions may seem obvious, while others
won't. Regardless, the goal in this section is to explicitly state the assumptions
underlying the scenario creation process.
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Assumption 1: The leader of the organizational unit responsiblefor the
focal issue should define the scope of the project.
It is well-known in management research that commitment and support from the top
leader(s) is necessary for the success of a major project in the organization.
Schoemaker (1998) lists "failing to gain top management support early on" as the first in
his list of twenty pitfalls that can derail a scenario project. The involvement of the leader
from the beginning ensures that the focal issue chosen for the scenario project is an
appropriate strategic issue for the organization to invest resources in. This is especially
important as scenario planning projects require commitment of time from senior
managers, and may not show immediate, tangible benefits. A post-mortem of failed
scenario projects showed that "the demands for firefighting" leading to focusing on
short-term issues is one of the main reasons for the projects' failure (Burt & van der
Heijden, 2003). Furthermore, a leader is also in a position to assemble an appropriate
group of people from the organization to participate in the project.
Assumption 2: Each manager has only a limited view of his/her
organization's environment.
Managerial attention is a scarce resource, and managers allocate their attention to only
a limited number of internal and external factors. The factors paid attention to by each
manager are determined by the demands of his/her job (Dearborn & Simon, 1958) and
professional background (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). The allocation of attention is "not
uniform throughout the [organization but] differentiated according to the division of labor
inherent in the firm's rules, positions, players, and resources" Ocasio (1997, p. 199).
Thus, different managers in the same organization are likely to notice different
environmental factors.
Assumption 3: Compared to an external expert, managers in the
organization have better knowledge of the "local factors" in their
organization's environment.
In making strategic and operational decisions, organization's managers encounter
different factors in the organization's transactional environment that influence those
decisions. Because of their routine interactions with it, the organization's managers are
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likely to have a more nuanced understanding of the transactional environment, and
hence the local factors, compared to an external expert.
Assumption 4: It is easierfor a manager to understand how a local
factor, rather than a driving force, affects the focal decision.
Local factors are in the immediate vicinity of the organization and have a direct impact
on it, whereas most of the driving forces are separated from the organization and affect
the organization by through the local factors. Thus, compared to a driving force, it is
easier to see how a local factor may affect a focal decision.
Assumption 5: Compared to an external expert, managers in the
organization have a better understanding of the effect of a "localfactor"
on the 'focal decision".
This assumption is based on the same rationale as assumption 3: organization's
managers encounter the local factors more frequently, especially in context of the
organization's decisions, than external experts.
The difference between assumptions 3 and 5 is as follows: Assumption 3 states
that the managers of an organization know better than external experts which local
factors affect the focal decision, whereas assumption 5 states that the managers are
better informed about what effect any given local factor has on the focal decision. Thus,
according to assumption 3, an organization's managers will identify more local factors
than an outside expert; according to assumption 5, an organization's managers will be
more accurate in judging the impact of local factor on the focal decision.
Assumption 6: Managers in an organization can correctly state whether
a particular "driving force" influences the magnitude and/or direction of a
particular "localfactor" in the organization's environment.
Identifying the relationship between driving forces and local factors involves answering
question "Does driving force X affect local factor Y?" To answer this question well, one
needs to have a good understanding of the respective driving forces and local factors. A
firm's managers dealing with the focal decision are familiar with the local factors, and
also understand the driving forces. Therefore, this research assumes that an
organization's managers can correctly state whether a driving force affects a local
factor.
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Assumption 7: Scenarios should be described using "driving forces"
only; they should not state how "localfactors" behave in the specific
scenarios.
Scenarios are descriptions of the external environment, which can be described in
terms of either driving forces, local factors, or both. In scenario planning, decision-
makers have to take scenarios as given and conceive or evaluate strategies for
addressing the focal issue in context of them. Driving forces are those factors of the
environment which the firm has no ability to control or influence, and the organization
needs to accommodate its strategy to them. Therefore, they are ideal candidates for
developing scenarios. On the other hand, a firm has the ability to influence local factors.
Describing specific values of local factors in the description of a scenario rules out the
decision-makers' ability to identify strategies to influence them, if needed. Therefore,
local factors should not be mentioned in the description of a scenario.
Assumption 8: For it to be judged plausible, a scenario should (i) be
internally consistent and (ii) describe how we transitionfrom today to
that scenario using the socioeconomic and technical artifacts present
today, which are not disputed by the organization's managers.
For a scenario to be useful, decision-makers have to believe that their organization
could exist in the world described in the scenario in future. This world has to be
internally consistent to be believable. Describing how the world can transition from
today to the world described in the scenario using the artifacts that exist today (e.g.
technologies, policies, economic systems, etc.) draws a path from today to the future,
making the future look plausible.
3.5.2.1 A note on the scenario creation process
In the scenario process presented in section 3.2.1, the first six steps describe how to
create scenarios, and the last two describe how to use scenarios to evaluate strategies
and tie strategies to environmental changes through identification of sensors.
Schoemaker (1993) has shown that one does not have to create scenarios to benefit
from using them. Thus, scenario creation can be separated from scenario use, without
any loss of benefit from the use of scenarios. Separating scenario creation from
scenario-based evaluation also allows using a smaller team for creating scenarios,
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which can then be used by a much larger group of people dealing with the focal issue.
The scenarios created by MIT's Center for Transportation & Logistics for the "Future
Freight Flows" project are an example of this (Caplice & Phadnis, 2012). A relatively
small group of researchers and field experts were involved in creation of the scenarios
for this U.S. National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP) project; the
scenarios are then used by several transportation planning organizations in the U.S.,
ranging from state Departments of Transportation (e.g. Washington State Department of
Transportation, Minnesota Department of Transportation, etc.) to metropolitan planning
organizations (e.g. Delaware Valley Regional Planning Corporation). The scenario
creation process presented in this chapter parallels the first six steps presented in
section 3.2.1.
3.6 Scenario creation process (Case 1): Medford
Medford is a distributor of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies, operating mostly in
the U.S. The scenario planning activity was conducted with the pharmaceutical
distribution business of the firm. In 2010-11, Medford was (and still is) operating in a
highly complex business environment defined by a diverse set of driving forces. There
was high uncertainty about how some of these driving forces would evolve over the five
year planning horizon considered in the study. For instance, the U.S. economy was
weak and its recovery was hard to predict. The fate of some of the major regulations in
the U.S. healthcare sector was uncertain: the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act had been challenged in courts, it was not clear if most U.S. states would enact
pedigree regulations and if they would be different from the two state regulations
already slated to come in effect (Florida and California). The nature of pharmaceuticals
was changing. The proportion of branded drugs was certain to reduce, and the growth
in volume of biologic drugs was uncertain. All these driving forces would shape the local
factors in Medford's local environment depending on how they evolved, and the supply
chain assets needed for different environments could be different. For this reason,
Medford's Senior Vice President of pharmaceutical distribution supply chain decided to
use scenario planning to gain some clarity over how the firm should think about its
supply chain strategy over the five-year planning horizon.
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3.6.1 Define project scope
In accordance with Assumption 1, the scope of the project was defined jointly with the
Senior Vice President of Medford's pharmaceutical distribution supply chain, who
sponsored the project, in a face to face meeting. The scope of the project was limited to
on the pharmaceutical distribution business of the firm in the U.S. The focal question for
the scenario planning project was: what supply chain strategy should Medford adopt for
pharmaceutical distribution to support the business over next five years (year 2015).
In the two weeks following the above meeting, the project sponsor identified a
diverse group of 25 mid- and senior-level managers to participate in the project.
According to Assumption 2, each manager can be expected to know only a subset of
factors in Medford's environment. Therefore, having managers from all supply chain
functions and related areas, as well as different levels in hierarchy that could have a
view of the organization's environment, is necessary to produce a holistic picture of
Medford's environment. The participants in this study came from 11 different functions
and from four hierarchical levels in Medford. "Operations" was the single largest function
represented on the team; although, it constituted less than a third of the group. About
half the participants in the team were "Vice Presidents". The distribution of participants
by function and hierarchical position is shown in Table 3-2.
In summary, five variables related to the scenario projects were specified in this
stage:
" Business and market to focus: Pharmaceutical distribution in the United States
e Focal decision: Supply chain strategy
" Planning horizon: Five years
" Functional areas to include: Core supply chain functions (operations,
procurement, transportation, etc.) and related functions (See Table 3-2)
e Project team members: 25 mid- and senior-level managers from 16 functional
areas in the organization
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Account management 1 1
Communications 1 1
Corporate Ethics & 1 1
Compliance
Environment, Health & Safety 1 1
Finance 1 1
Human Resources 1 1
Inventory management 1 1 2
IT {1 3
Operational excellence 1 1
Operations 4 3 7
Procurement 1 1
Quality and regulatory 1 1
Repackaging 1 1
Sales 1 1
Strategic planning 1 1
Transportation
Total 2 12 7 4 25
Table 3-2: Team members in Medford scenario project
3.6.2 Identify local factors in the organization's environment
According to Assumption 3, organization's own managers have a better understanding
of the specific local factors relevant to the organization than an external expert.
Therefore, local factors are identified using open-ended qualitative interviews with the
25 team members. The following three-step procedure (interview, coding, and
validation) was used.
3.6.2.1 Data collection: Open-ended interviews
All interviews were conducted over phone by one researcher and recorded with explicit
consent of each respondent. Before interviewing the Medford managers, the interview
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protocol was tested and refined in four interviews conducted over phone with supply
chain practitioners in firms other than Medford. To identify environmental factors, one
seeding question was used:
Describe the business environment in which Medford would operate five
years into the future?
No probes were used during the interviews. The interviewer listened to the conversation
carefully, noted down all the "markers" (Weiss, 1994) in the information provided by the
respondents when answering the open-ended questions, and explored each marker
further through follow-up questions using the "breadth-first" approach described below.
Breadth-first approach to qualitative interview
The interview began by asking each respondent to describe the business environment.
In reply, the respondents typically stated a few factors of the environment (e.g. "demand
for drug at hospitals will increase greatly", "few independent pharmacies will remain in
business", etc.). The interviewer listened to the respondent carefully and noted each
environmental factor mentioned. When the respondent stopped talking, the interviewer
narrated him/her all the factors s/he had mentioned, and asked how else s/he would
describe the future business environment. These questions were often met by long
moments of silence as the respondent started thinking. In these moments, the
interviewer remained silent and patiently waited for the respondent to speak again.
Almost invariably, the respondent provided more environmental factors. Again, the
interviewer listened attentively and noted all markers, narrated the list of markers after
the respondent stopped talking, and asked if s/he would like to add more. This
procedure was repeated until the respondent mentioned that s/he had nothing more to
add. From this point on, for each marker captured, the interviewer asked the respondent
clarification questions, such as: "what do you mean by...", "why would... happen?", etc.
After exploring all the markers, the respondent was asked one more time again if s/he
had any more environmental factors to add. The interview concluded when the
respondent said s/he had nothing more to add.
Following the recommendations of Lofland, et al. (2006, pp. 103-6), at the
beginning of each interview the respondent was told that the interviewer was not looking
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for any right or wrong answers in the interview but was interested in knowing about the
respondent's perspective (Lofland, et al., 2006). The respondent was informed that
confidentiality of the interview would be maintained, and any data from the interview will
be shared only anonymously. Interviews were scheduled for 1 hour, and lasted from 33
minutes to 98 minutes (average 60 minutes). In three interviews, all markers could not
be explored within one hour. The responded were asked for, and the granted, more time
to explore them fully. After each interview, the interviewer wrote a memo describing his
overall impressions of the interview.
3.6.2.2 Data analysis: Qualitative coding
The interviewer himself coded all interviews, one at a time, by listening to the recording
of each interview using the procedure described by Strauss and Corbin (1990). The
coding progressed in three stages. First in initial coding of each interview, the
interviewer listened to every statement made by the respondent-in line with Charmaz's
(2006) recommendation to code line-by-line-and generated substantive codes. This
was followed by focused coding of each interview to identify categories, their properties
and dimensions (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). After coding all interviews individually, the
codes were compared across all interviews. The constant comparison of data and
emerging codes took place at two levels: within each interview, which helped refine the
open codes, and across interviews, which helped refine the categories and properties.
The coding process was highly iterative, and the codes - the categories, properties, and
dimensions - evolved through constant comparison. The coding exercise produced a
total of 621 open codes related to the business environment from 25 interviews (ranging
from 12 to 41 per interview; median 24).
3.6.2.3 Validation of environmentalfactors gathered from interviews
To validate the coded interviews, mental maps were developed for each respondent's
interview. Each map shows the concepts the respondent had expressed in the
interview. For validation, each respondent was sent three mental maps and asked to
identify his/her map. For identifying own map, the respondents were asked to allocate
100 points among the three maps so that the points assigned to each map indicate the
likelihood that the said map belong to him/her. Each set of three maps sent to a
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respondent included his/her own map, and two other maps chosen randomly from the
remaining 24 maps. The maps within each set were randomly labeled either A, B, or C.
17 out of 25 (68%) respondents correctly placed all 100 points on their own map.
Six more (24%) placed between 70 and 90 points on their own map. Thus, 23 out of 25
(92%) correctly identified their own mental map from the set. One respondent assigned
20 points to his map and 80 points to another, but later admitted to making a mistake in
voting and mentioned that he should have placed 80 points on his own map. One
person assigned 33.3% points to each map. The validation results are summarized in
Figure 3-3. In the figure, the legend keys are of format x-y-z, where x represents the
number of points assigned by a respondent to his/her own map, and y and z represent
the points assigned to the remaining two maps. The numbers inside the pie chart
indicate the number of respondents whose votes are of the particular x-y-z type.
Number of respondents by points assigned to three maps
E 100-0-0
90-10-0
E3 85-10-5
E 80-20-0
370-30-0
-370-25-5
033-33-33
M 20-80-0
Figure 3-3: Results of vote on validation of mental maps
After correctly identifying their map, each respondent was sent his/her own mental map,
and asked if s/he would add anything to the map. Only one person added a few more
variables, which was incorporated those into his map.
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3.6.2.4 Result: Localfactors (and some driving forces)
Coding of the interviews produced a list of 55 environmental factors. Among those, 37
were identified as local factors and the remaining 18 described aspects of different
driving forces. These factors fit nicely into the categories in two standard and widely
used frameworks: Five Forces (Porter, 1980) and STEEP (cf.: Schwartz, 1991; van der
Heijden 2005). Table 3-3 presents the number of local factors and aspects of driving
forces identified by Medford respondents by different categories of these frameworks.
Porter's framework describes five aspects of the environment that influence an
industry's profitability: industry's suppliers, customers, competitors within the industry,
threats of new competitors, and threat of substitute products. The respondents
described various factors related to four of these categories except "substitute
products"; the respondents did not see any factors that would substitute transportation
of pharmaceuticals from manufacturers to patients over the five year planning horizon.
The STEEP framework is commonly used in the scenario literature and identifies five
domains in the environment: Society, Technology, Economy, Environment, and Politics
& regulation. The respondents described codes from all five categories.
Category Local Aspects of
factors driving Forces
Society, demographics 3 1
Technology: Medical, information 1 2
Economy (macro) 3 4
Environment 1
Politics and regulation 10 1
Suppliers of goods and services: 4 4
Pharmaceutical manufacturers, carriers
Competition: Current and new competitors 6
Customers: Pharmacies, hospitals, new 10 5
customers, etc.
Totam numner ofeactors 37,
Table 3-3: Number of environmental factors identified by Medford
managers
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3.6.3 Identify driving forces shaping the organization's environment
Two sources were used to gather an exhaustive list of driving forces for the U.S.
pharmaceutical distribution industry.
" Industry research databases
* Medford project team members
3.6-3.1 Source for driving forces: Industry research database
IBISWorld, founded in 1971, is "the largest provider of industry information in the U.S."
according to its websites. In 2010, IBISWorld published reports for 681 industries in the
U.S. classified by 5-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes.
Among 681 industries, 15 industries were related to pharmaceutical distribution (shown
in Table 3-4). IBISWorld reports for each industry list the Key External Drivers for that
industry. Each of these drivers is a macro-level environmental factor that influences the
evolution of the industry. All key external drivers from the industry reports of all above-
mentioned 15 industries were compiled. This exercise produced a total of 47 unique
drivers from the industry reports.
Table 3-13 in the appendix lists these drivers. This table also shows the
industries, shown by 5-digit NAICS code, affected by each driver4, and the IBISWorld
prediction of how that driver would evolve in the future. IBISWorld predictions for most
of the drivers were available only for next one year.
3 http://www.ibisworld.com/about/default.aspx
4 Industries affected by a particular driver are the IBISWorld industry reports in which the particular driver
is listed as a key external driver.
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32541a Brand name pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturing
32541 b Generic pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturing in the U.S.
42221 Drug, Cosmetic & Toiletry Wholesaling in the U.S.
44611 Pharmacies and drug stores
52411 a Life insurance and annuities in the U.S.
52411 b Heath and medical insurance
52512 Health and welfare funds in the U.S.
62111 a Primary care doctors in the U.S.
62111 b Specialist doctors in the U.S.
62161 Home care providers in the U.S.
62211 Hospitals in the U.S.
62231 Specialty hospitals in the U.S.
62311 Nursing care facilities
62331 Retirement and assisted living communities
NNO01 Biotechnology
Table 3-4: Industries researched to compile driving force for Medford
3.6.3.2 Source for driving forces: Medford project team members
Members of the project team had alluded to different driving forces during their
interviews. Therefore, this source also tapped to obtain a list of driving forces. This was
accomplished using the flip-the-factor method developed by Dr. Mahender Singh of
CTL (Sheahan, 2008). In this method, each local factor is assigned to one of the project
team members. Two extreme values of the factor are identified. The team member is
asked to identify the driving forces that will move the local factor from its present value
to each of the two extreme values identified.
To identify driving forces from the Medford team members, each team member
was assigned two local factors, provided with the two extreme values for each, and
asked to identify driving forces that moved the local factors towards either of the
extreme values. Team member completed the exercise using a template developed by
Dr. Singh (shown in Figure 3-12 in the appendix). The team members individually
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completed the template for their assigned local factors. This method also produced 47
unique drivers.
3.6.3.3 Driving forces shaping Medford's environment
The key drivers from the IBISWorld industry reports and those provided by the project
team members were compiled into a single database. If a driver described by a Medford
team member very closely resembled a driver in the IBISWorld list, they were listed
together as one entry in the table. The source of each driver was also noted in this
table. The reason for identifying the drivers by the sources was to understand the
relative contribution of IBISWorld databases and Medford managers, as sources of
driving forces. As mentioned above, both sources produced 47 unique drivers, with 11
of them bore very similar descriptions in the two sources. Thus, each source provided
36 unique drivers, and 11 additional drivers that were also mentioned in the other
source. While the exact number of drivers from each source is not important, these
numbers show that both sources were equally important in identifying drivers.
Many drivers in the above list were similar and were rather nuances of a larger
driving force. The similar items were grouped to identify macro-level driving forces. This
exercise produced a list of 16 unique driving forces that shape Medford's external
environment. Table 3-5 presents these driving forces. A complete list of the driving
forces, with the underlying drivers and their sources, is presented in Table 3-14 in the
appendix for this chapter.
3.6.3.4 Classification of driving forces as trends or uncertainties
The IBISWorld industry research databases described how each environmental driver
would evolve into the future. Based on the information from industry research about
various drivers combined under each driving force as well as from interviews with the
Medford team members, each driving force was judged to be either a trend (predictable
over 5-year planning horizon) or an uncertainty (not predictable over 5-year planning
horizon). The driving forces in Table 3-5 are grouped according to this dichotomy: this
list includes are 14 uncertainties and 2 trends.
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Uncertainties
e Availability of healthcare workers 5 1
e Availability of information and technology solutions for 3 2
healthcare management
* Climate-sensitivity of drugs and treatments 1 2
* Complexity of US healthcare supply chain 0 6
e Consolidation within healthcare sector 6 4
* Cost pressure in the healthcare sector
* Health of the overall U.S. economy 7 1
* Health-consciousness of average citizen 3 4
* Location where majority of healthcare is provided 1 1
* Nature of reimbursement policies 0 4
e Overall focus on drug security and safety 0 1
e Participation of government in the healthcare sector 4 4 7
" Proportion of generic drugs in the volume of drugs 6 6 9
consumed
" Volume of drugs sold in the US 1 3
Trends
" Average age of the US population 6 1 6
e Environmental consciousness of the society 0 1 1
Table 3-5: Driving forces in Medford's environment and underlying drivers
Relative importance of two sources of driving forces
Table 3-5 shows that Medford project team members had identified at least one driver
for each driving force. Furthermore, the team members had also identified drivers
categorized under four driving forces that were not listed in the IBISWorld databases
used. At least two of these driving forces - "Complexity of US healthcare supply chain"
and "Nature of reimbursement policies" - were important for Medford's revenue and
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profitability, but not considered drivers in the industry research database. Thus, Medford
project team members-who were mid- and senior-level executives-had highlighted
them as macro forces that would shape its future environment.
On the other hand, the drivers listed in IBISWorld database were more macro-
level and covered areas that Medford team members did not cover. The description of
drivers in IBISWorld database was also much richer, and was provided with verifiable
references, than what was obtained from Medford team. This rudimentary result
suggests that to identify driving forces we should rely on both external expert sources
(such as industry research databases) and executives of the organization.
3.6.4 Rank driving forces by impact and uncertainty
The method for identifying the impact of driving forces used in this case is based on
assumptions 4, 5, and 6 (see §3.5.2). This method first evaluates the impact of each
local factor on the focal decision (per assumption 4). This evaluation is performed by the
organization's managers, as they are assumed to be the best source of information
about how a local factor affects the focal decision (assumption 5). Following this, the
managers state whether each of the driving forces affects each local factor (per
assumption 6). The impact of driving force is calculated using the impact of each local
factor and the strength of the relationship between the corresponding local factor and
the driving force, as explained below.
Let,
{1, ... L : Set of local factors (indexed by 1)
{1, ... , D} : Set of driving forces (indexed by d)
0 la E [0,1]: Strength of association between driving for d and local factor 1
Old = 0 : No relationship , i. e. driving force d has no influence on local factor 1
= 1 : Strongest possible relationship; d has a very strong influence on 1
a, : Impact of local factor 1
ad : Impact of driving force d is calculated as follows
L
aid ZOlddl ,Vd = [,..., D) 1
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The external source used for gathering driving forces, IBISWorld databases, did
not predict how each driving force would evolve over the five year planning horizon. In
lieu of that information, the uncertainty in a driving force's evaluation was computed
using the same approach as that used for evaluating its impact. Medford managers
were asked to evaluate the likelihood of each local factor moving in a particular
direction. This uncertainty in the local factor was relayed to the driving forces using the
strength of association between the corresponding driving force and the local factor.
Thus,
for ou : Uncertainty about the future value of local factor 1
0-d : Uncertainty about the future value of driving force d is
L
oUd 0,45a , V d = 1 .,D} (2)
3.6.4.1 Evaluating impact (a) and uncertainty (a) of localfactors
28 local factors and 4 driving forces5 were selected for evaluating impact on the focal
decision and uncertainty about the value over the 5-year planning horizon. The four
driving forces selected for the survey were mentioned in several interviews and
appeared to be part of Medford's transactional environment. The impact and uncertainty
evaluations were gathered using two separate questionnaires administered to the
Medford project team during a workshop. Team members completed the questionnaires
individually. In each questionnaire, each item was described as taking a particular value
(e.g. "Customers will choose distributor based only on price", "Pharmacies will bypass
distributors and buy directly from manufacturers", etc.). The impact questionnaire was
administered first. Team members were asked to assume that the environmental factor
had taken the value as described in the questionnaire, and then rate the impact of it on
the focal decision, using a 5-point Likert scale. After evaluating the impact of all selected
items, the uncertainty questionnaire was administered. The team members were
5 Only a subset of local factors was chosen for this exercise to limit the amount of work for the Medford
team members. When this evaluation exercise was performed, the distinction between local factors and
driving forces was still not clear in my mind. Therefore, I had considered evaluating impact of all 55
factors of Medford's environment, and chose 32 (about 58%). Now that I have a better understanding of
these different aspects of the business environment, I would evaluate the impact of all 37 local factors
and 4 driving forces that lie in Medford's transactional environment.
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instructed to state their confidence that the environmental factor would take the
described over the planning horizon, using another 5-point Likert scale. The scales used
for evaluations of impact and uncertainty are presented in Table 3-6 below. Both
questionnaires allowed the respondents to skip questions.
-2 Extremely hurtful Strongly disagree
-1 Somewhat hurtful Disagree
o Neutral Neutral
+1 Somewhat beneficial Agree
+2 Extremely beneficial Strongly agree
Table 3-6: Scales used for capturing impact and uncertainty
20 team members were present for the workshop and completed paper-based
questionnaires. Five members joined the workshop remotely via telephone conference
as they were located in different states from the rest of the group; they completed the
questionnaires using an online survey tool. Before completing the questionnaire, the
participants were informed of the purpose of the exercise and then given instructions for
completing the questionnaire. Some of the team members working remotely did not
hear the instructions completely due to difficulties in the connection of the conference
call. Therefore, it was decided to exclude the input from all five remotely completed
questionnaires, and perform the analysis using 20 completed in person.
3.6.4.2 Calculation of impact of localfactors
For the purpose of scenario exercise, the absolute value of the impact is important. We
care more about the local factors (and then driving forces) that have higher - either
negative or positive - impact on the focal decision. The absolute impact was calculated
from the evaluations using two different metrics.
* Absolute of average (a-A VG): The average impact of the local factor was
calculated by adding the 20 impact evaluations and dividing the sum by 20. The
absolute value of this average was the impact of the local factor using this metric.
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* Average of absolutes (a-ABS): Each individual evaluation was converted into
its absolute value, and the impact of the local factor was equal to the average of
the 20 absolute impact values.
These two methods could produce very different results. For instance, if the members of
a 5-person team evaluated the impact of a local factor as -2, -1, -1, 0, 2, then the
"absolute of average" impact of that factor is abs = abs(-0.4) = 0.4 and
the "average of absolutes" impact is abs(-2)+abs(-1)+abs(-1)+abs(O)+abs(2) = 1.2. Thus, if
5
there is a general consensus within a group about the direction of a local factor's impact
(i.e. whether it is an opportunity or threat) but disagreement exists about the magnitude
of it, both methods would produce similar results. However, if there is disagreement
about the direction of the factor's impact (i.e. the team is evenly divided about whether a
factor is an opportunity or a threat), then the two values will provide very different
results: the "absolute of average" would be very small indicating that the factor was not
important but the "average of absolute" can be quite high depending on the magnitude
of individual evaluation.
Figure 3-4 shows the correspondence between the values calculated using these
two methods. The points of this scatterplot lie close to a straight line, suggesting a good
correspondence between the two methods. The correlation between the two vectors is
high (Pearson's r = 0.85). Furthermore, the top eight (25%) factors6 with most impact
produced by both methods are identical. This suggests a high correspondence between
the two methods. Therefore, either of these metrics can be used as the measure of
impact of the local factors on the focal decision. In this case, average of absolute
impact values (a-ABS) was chosen. Algebraically,
{1, ... , L} Set of local factors (indexed by 1)
{1, ... , N} Set of respondents (indexed by n)
x C- { -2, -1,0,1,2, 0}: Evaluation of impact of local factor I by respondent n
Then, the average absolute impact of local factor 1 (a,):
6 These are the factors corresponding to the dots inside the oval with thick black line. In Figure 3-4, you
see only seven dots in the oval because two dots are lying at one point (1.75, 1.75).
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a, 
- N
Figure 3-4: Impact of local factors calculated using two different metrics
A note on two metrics for impact
It is important to calculate the impact using both metrics. A low correlation between
them suggests the presence of local factors whose impact on the focal decision is not
uniformly understood within the team. In such situations, the team members need to
discuss the implications of these factors and understand how they affect the decision.
The team members should do this also for the individual factors whose impact values
using the two metrics vary to apprehend the basis for different interpretations by
different team members. In a chart like above, these factors would be farthest from the
best-fit line passing through the dots (e.g. factors corresponding to the dots inside the
dotted oval in Figure 3-4).
We recommend the average of the absolute values measure to be used for
calculating the impact of driving forces using the method presented here. When the two
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metrics do not produce similar results, the absolute of averages metric cancels out
some positive and negative impact scores, giving an artificially lower importance to the
factors whose direction of impact on the focal decision is debated within the team. The
average of the absolute metric does not have this limitation.
3.6.4.3 Calculation of uncertainty offuture values of localfactors
The questionnaire evaluations provide two types of uncertainty regarding the future
state of a local factor: uncertainty perceived by an individual respondent and expressed
in his/her evaluation, and uncertainty within the group as expressed in the spread of
evaluations. A metric that combined both these uncertainties into one, coefficient of
variation (COV), was used. COV was calculated for each local factor by taking the ratio
of standard deviation of uncertainty ratings and the average uncertainty based on 20
responses. Both, higher standard deviation and lower average indicate higher
uncertainty about the future state of the local factor. Therefore, large values of this
metric indicate more uncertainty. Algebraically,
{1, ..., L} Set of local factors (indexed by 1)
1, ... , N:J Set of respondents (indexed by n)
y, E {-2, -1,0,1,2, 01: Evaluation of uncertainty of local factor I by respondent n
Then, the modified COV of local factor I (a,):
EN - 1 N 2
3.6.4.4 Selecting key localfactors
The purpose of computing the impact and uncertainty of local factors is to transfer those
values to driving forces, so that the driving forces can be ranked to choose two to form
the scenario axes. This requires establishing a relationship between driving forces and
local factors. To reduce the workload on the project team members, it was decided to
conduct the subsequent analysis using a subset of local factors that that had the most
impact on the focal decision and were most uncertain over the five-year planning
horizon. Figure 3-5 shows the impact and uncertainty (COV, on log scale) values of all
factors surveyed. 13 of these factors stand out as being most impactful as well as most
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uncertain. These are the key local factors affecting Medford's supply chain strategy. The
dots representing the key local factors are enclosed in an oval in the scatterplot shown
in Figure 3-5. The impact and uncertainty of driving forces is calculated using the impact
and uncertainty values of these 13 key local factors.
Impact and uncertainty of local factors
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Figure 3-5: Impact and uncertainty of local factors
3.6.4.5 Key localfactor - Driving force matching
To transfer the impact and uncertainty values from local factors to driving forces, we
need to know the strength of the relationship between local factors and driving forces.
This relationship is evaluated by Medford project team members by answering a series
of questions, with "Yes" or "No" answers, of form:
"Does driving force DF affect key local factor KLF?"
To prevent the biases of individual managers from affecting the output of the matching
exercise used for creating scenarios, more than one manager was asked to answer the
above question for each driving force - key local factor pair. 24 managers were
available to complete this match exercise. Six randomly-selected driving forces were
assigned to each manager to evaluate whether they affect each of the 13 key local
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factors. Thus, each manager answered above question 6 (driving forces) x 13 (key local
factors) = 78 times. The relationship of a given driving force with the 13 key local factors
was evaluated by between 5 and 8 managers (average 6.9, median 7).
The strength of relationship between a driving force and a key local factor is the
proportion of the respondents evaluating the relationship who voted that the driving
force does affect the key local factor:
Number of respondents answering
Strength of relationship between driving "Yes" to question if DF-X affects KLF-Y
force DF-X and key local factor KLF-Y Number of respondents evaluating
whether DF-X affects KLF-Y
Table 3-15 in the appendix of this chapter shows the results of this evaluation. The first
column list the 14 driving forces (uncertainties), followed by the number of respondents
who evaluated whether that driving forces affected the selected key local factors. The
key local factors are listed in the top row in the next 13 columns. The value (in range [0,
1]) in a cell shows the strength of the relationship between the driving force and key
local factor in the corresponding row and column, respectively.
3.6.4.6 Calculate impact and uncertainty of driving forces
The impact of each driving forces is calculated using the strength of relationship
between it and each of the 13 key local factors, and the impact of the corresponding key
local factors, as described in equation (1). The uncertainty of each driving force is
calculated similarly using equation (2). The last two columns in Table 3-15 show the
impact and uncertainty of each driving force.
3.6.5 Select scenario logic
The 14 driving forces (uncertainties) were ranked by their impact to select two as the
scenario axes. Instead of blindly using the numbers to choose the two most impactful
forces, the numeric values were used to select the five most impactful forces. Different
pairs of driving forces chosen from these five were evaluated as potential scenario
logics. The five driving forces of most impact and uncertainty are:
e Cost pressure in healthcare sector
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" Complexity of U.S. healthcare supply chain
e Participation of the government in the healthcare sector
e Consolidation within healthcare sector
e Health of the overall U.S. economy
CTL research team conducted a panel session with the Medford project team. In this
session, the project team members considered the four pairs of scenario axes as the
basis for creating scenarios. In each case, team members gave a brief description of
the four scenarios created by taking combinations of high and low values of the two
scenario axes.
After doing this for four pairs, the team
decided that the following two driving forces High High
complexity, complexity,
had the best potential to generate four Weaker Stronger
scenarios that were most different from economy economy
each other and could provide interesting
insights: Low Low
complexity, complexity,
" Complexity of U.S. healthcare supply Weaker Stronger
chain economy economy
* Health of the overall U.S. economy
Figure 3-6: Scenario logic and seeds
Thus, the logic for developing scenarios for Medford consists of these two driving
forces. The combinations of the high and low values of these drivers provide four
scenario seeds as shown in Figure 3-6.
3.6.6 Flesh out scenarios
This step consists of specifying high and low values of driving forces, defining and
validating scenario structure, and writing scenario narratives.
3.6.6.1 Define high and low values ofdrivingforces
Of Medford's 16 driving forces, 14 were classified as uncertainties over the planning
horizon of the scenario study. Since they are "uncertain", we have to define the range of
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values each driving force can take. This is done by specifying an appropriate "high" and
"low" value for each uncertainty. The appropriateness of the high and low values is
defined by the plausibility of attending that value in the planning horizon. At this time,
the values are defined only broadly and qualitatively; they are elaborated when writing
scenarios. Based on the industry research, the high and low values for each uncertainty
and the two trends were specified as shown in Table 3-7. For driving forces where
"high" and "low" are mentioned as the high/low values of the driving force, "high" and
"low" were elaborated in the scenarios write-ups.
Uncertainties
Complexity of US healthcare supply high low
chain
Health of the overall U.S. economy stronger weaker
Availability of healthcare workers_
Availability of information for managing
healthcare
Climate-sensitivity of drugs and
treatments
Consolidation within healthcare sector
Cost pressure in the healthcare sector
Health-consciousness of average citizen
Number of locations where majority of
healthcare is provided
Nature of reimbursement policies
abundant
abundant
temperature-
sensitive drugs
high
high
high,
much higher than
today
Outcome
focused
scarce
not much different
than today
temperature-
insensitive drugs
low
low
low
lower or about the
same as today
Treatment focused
Overall focus on drug security and safety high low
Participation of government in the hinh
healthcare sector
Proportion of generic drugs in the volume much higher than
low
not much different
of drugs consumed today than today
X/nlium nf drin noldi in the US much higher than not much different
Trends
than today
Average age of U.S. population higher than today higher than today
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Environmental consciousness of the higher than today higher than today
society in the U.S.
Table 3-7: High and low values of uncertainties in Medford's environment
3.6.6.2 Define scenario structure
The scenario structure defined thus far specifies the values of only two driving forces in
each scenario. In defining scenario structure, the remaining driving forces are described
in each scenario. Each driving force should take both the high and the low values, in at
least one of the four scenarios. Two additional criteria were used when prescribing the
values taken by each uncertain driving force in every scenario:
" Internal consistency
e Variation among highly-correlated driving force pairs
Internal consistency: One of the essential qualities of good scenarios is internal
consistency. The high or the low value of each uncertain driving force was assigned to
each scenario by judging which value would be consistent with the already specified
driving forces in the scenario. After values of all driving forces were specified in each
scenario, the complete structure was validated by the Medford project team members
for internal consistency (see §3.6.6.3 for details), to correct any judgmental errors in the
initial assignment.
Variation among highly-correlated driving force pairs: This criterion is not specified
in the scenario planning literature. However this additional condition was used to
purposefully generate cross-scenario variation in two highly-correlated driving forces.
Two driving forces are considered to be highly correlated if they influenced a similar set
of local factors. For such pairs of driving forces, an attempt was made to assign each of
the four high-low value combinations to one of the four scenarios. Pearson's correlation
was calculated for every pair of driving forces using the strength of association between
a driving force and the vector of local factors (values shown in Table 3-15). Correlations
between driving forces are presented in Table 3-16 in the appendix of this chapter.
Starting with the highest correlation (0.92, between "Consolidation within
healthcare sector" and "Cost pressure in the healthcare sector"), each of the four
combinations of the correlated pairs - (high, high), (high low), (low, high), (low low) -
was assigned to one of the four scenarios, while maintaining internal consistency of the
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scenarios. It was possible to create all four combinations of the six pairs of highly-
correlated driving forces, shown in Table 3-8, among the four scenarios.
"Consolidation within healthcare sector" & "Cost pressure in the healthcare sector .92
"Climate sensitivity of drugs and treatments" & "Volume of drugs sold in the US" 71
"Climate sensitivity of drugs and treatments" & "Number of location where majority .67
of healthcare is provided"
"Health consciousness of average citizen" & "Number of location where majority .63
of healthcare is provided"
"Availability of healthcare workers" & "Cost pressure in the healthcare sector" .61
"Participation of government in the healthcare sector" & "Volume of drugs sold in .58
the US"
Table 3-8: Highly correlated driving forces
It was not always possible to create such combinations for highly-correlated driving
forces because of the violation of internal consistency. Some examples of such cases
are:
e "Consolidation within healthcare sector" & "Health of the overall US economy"
(correlation .70)
e "Complexity of US healthcare supply chain" & "Participation of government in the
healthcare sector" (correlation .69)
* "Nature of reimbursement policies" & "Participation of government in the
healthcare sector" (correlation .68)
e "Proportion of generic drugs in the volume of drugs consumed" & "Volume of
drugs sold in the US" (correlation 0.60)
The initial scenario structure developed using this procedure, where high and low
values of all uncertain driving forces were assigned to the four scenarios by iteratively
creating variation among highly-correlated pairs of driving forces and checking internal
consistency, is presented in Table 3-17 in the appendix of this chapter.
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3.6.6.3 Validation of scenario structure
At this point, the project team at Medford was divided into four sub-teams, one for each
scenario. The objective of assigning each individual to one scenario only was to help
him/her focus on the development of one scenario to gain deep understanding of it.
Each project team member was allowed to choose the scenario s/he wanted to work on,
as long as all four teams were of roughly the same size.
The initial structure of each scenario developed above was sent to the sub-team
working on the corresponding scenario via email. Each team was asked to critically
check the scenario structure for two types of issues:
. Implausibility of values taken by driving forces
e Violation of internal consistency within the scenario
All four sub-teams identified issues and informed me. In some instances, information
from industry research was available to support the initial scenario structure, despite the
objection(s) raised by the team. In those cases, the team was informed how the
proposed scenario structure could come about, using the factual information obtained
from industry research. In most cases, the team members agreed with the plausibility
and/or internal consistency of the scenario structure upon seeing this additional
information. If no information from industry research existed to resolve the conflict,
necessary changes were made to the scenario structure as recommended by the team.
Table 3-18 in the appendix shows the final structure of Medford's four scenarios.
The cells with green background are the ones where the team had asked to change the
value in the initial structure, but later agreed to keep the original value based on the
additional information. The cells with red background are the ones where the value of
the driving force was changed on the team's recommendation. The remaining cells are
the ones whose value was not disputed.
One notable result of this exercise is that driving force "Overall focus on drug
security and safety" changed from being an uncertainty to a trend! All four teams
strongly argued that over the five-year planning horizon, the "Overall focus on drug
security and safety" in the socio-political environment could be only "High".
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3.6.6.4 Write scenarios
After finalizing the scenario structure, scenarios stories were written. For this, additional
industry research was conducted. This research, however, was different from the one
conducted at the beginning of the project. This research sought to find specific
examples to argue how a driving force can take a specific value in each scenario. This
is done to make sure that the scenarios seem plausible (per assumption 8). Note, that
each uncertain driving force takes two opposite value. Therefore, it was necessary to
find cases to argue how a driving force can evolve, from its present state, in either
direction. For example, driving force "Climate-sensitivity of drugs and treatments" takes
value "temperate sensitive drugs" in scenarios 1, 2, and 3; and value "temperate-
insensitive drugs" in scenario 4. Given below is an example how an argument is made
in favor of both these cases:
Description in scenarios 1, 2, and 3:
"The crowning glory of the second decade of this millennium has been the
innovations in biotechnology. Combined with the advances in the related fields
such as genetics and computational biology, biotechnology has produced a vast
array of biopharmaceuticals that target the underlying targets - not mere
symptoms - of many serious diseases. The fruits of mapping of the human
genome completed more than ten years ago are also beginning to pay off in the
form of gene therapy products. The biologic products contain living organisms
and need to be maintained in controlled climate from the time they are
manufactured toll they are introduced into a patient's body."
Description in scenario 4:
"While many biopharmaceuticals require cold chain transportation, not all do. In
fact, today a significant proportion of biopharmaceuticals can be delivered
without refrigerated transportation. This innovation has come from an
unexpected quarter - Africa. The supply chain innovations for delivering vaccines
without a cold chain, such as sugar drying technology developed by Nova Bio-
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Pharma7 and University of Oxford, have been successfully used in tropical
African nations that lack a reliable cold chain network. These technologies have
made their way into the biologic supply chains in the U.S. Biotech companies
continue to spend research dollars on making their products amenable to sugar-
drying storage and distribution. Because of this, a very small fraction of the
volume of drugs delivered needs cold chain transportation."
When writing the scenarios, the list of individual drivers combining to form each driving
force (see Table 3-5) was highly useful! This helped the scenario writer perform a
targeted search and provided keywords to search for. The descriptions of these
individual drivers were key ingredients in the scenarios written for Medford.
3.6.6.5 Choose meaningful names for the scenarios
The last step in the scenario creation process is to assign a meaningful name to each
scenario. The names should be vivid and represent the essence of the scenario
(Schwartz, 1991). Each sub-team was asked to read their scenario, and brainstorm
names for their scenario. I myself also did brainstorm names. The results of the two
were combined; one name for each scenario was chosen as the provisional name from
this combined list. The complete lists of names gathered for each scenario was
delivered to the project team. The team was also advised to remain open to renaming
the scenario after developing a better understanding of the scenario. At this point, our
engagement with Medford ended. The provisional names of Medford's four scenarios
are shown in bold-lettered words in Figure 3-7.
7 See http://www.redorbit.com/news/health/1 824836/makinq vaccines stable at tropical temperatures/
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Frenzy Innovo-
Nation
High complexity, High complexity,
Weaker economy Stronger economy
Hiber- Zen
Nation
Low complexity, Low complexity,
Weaker economy Stronger economy
Figure 3-7: Four scenarios for Medford and their names
3.6.7 Lessons learned from Medford case
At the beginning of the project, it was decided to apply the scenario creation process
proposed by Schwartz (1991), which is the standard process used for creating
scenarios in Intuitive Logics School. During the application of this generic process, three
categories of challenges surfaced. To address these challenges, the terms used in
scenario creation process were defined and integrated into a conceptual model of
business environment. We also explicitly stated, with appropriate justification, the
assumptions influencing the scenario creation process. Finally, a structured approach
was developed to create scenarios using the generic process described by Schwartz
(ibid). The overall process is summarized in Table 3-19 in the appendix.
3.6.7.1 Comment on the role of quantitative analysis
Quantitative analysis applied in the scenario creation method presented above is a
double-edged sword. It is important to understand its role. The strength of quantitative
analysis used here is that it provides more objectivity to a highly subjective process. The
numeric values of impact, uncertainty, correlations, etc. provide an objective basis to
prioritize the discussion within the team. The limitation of quantitative analysis is that it
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is easy to get lost in numbers and lose sight of the bigger picture. The numeric analyses
used here are far from perfect, and it is dangerous if one were to go about the process
by using the numbers alone. The best way to use numeric analysis is to find a balance
between numeric data and qualitative judgment. In the process described above, this
balance was achieved by allowing numbers to prioritize issues to discuss within
the team, and then relying on the knowledge and experience of the project team
members to make choices from the priorities identified using numeric analyses.
3-7 Scenario creation process (Case 2): Chembridge
Chembridge is a large multi-national chemical company headquartered in Europe, and
owns a diverse portfolio of businesses in the chemical industry. The scenario planning
project was initiated by the supply chain function of the firm's Latin American business
in January 2012. Majority of Chembridge's revenue in Latin America was generated in
four countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia) by three businesses (Agriculture
Products, Basic Chemicals, and Building Paints). At the time of the project, Chembridge
had set the goal to double its revenue from the emerging Latin America market by year
2020. The supply chain function was about to undertake a "network design and
optimization project" to design its distribution network to support the growth. However,
before embarking on a full-fledged optimization project, the firm decided to explore the
uncertainties underlying the business of chemical manufacturing in Latin America, to
define a suitable distribution strategy to support the business. Scenario planning was
considered an appropriate method to structure the problem better for subsequent
mathematical optimization, as the uncertainties involved - such as rates of growth in
different countries, growth potential of different existing and new businesses, availability
of transportation infrastructure, nature of regulations, etc. - were difficult to characterize,
and their implications had not been well understood.
3.7.1.1 Important contrast between Chembridge and Medford projects
Unlike Medford, Chembridge wanted to conduct a two-day scenario workshop to expose
the members of its mathematical modeling and supply chain planning teams to the
complex character of problem they faced, so they are more cognizant of the reality of
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the business environment when making simplifying assumptions in their optimization
models. The project sponsors described what they wanted to accomplish as follows...
"Show the supply chain people to think beyond cost and service... Show how
issues like regulations, import/export restrictions,... are related to supply chain
strategy.
The research team at the MIT Center for Transportation & Logistics (CTL) developed
and proposed a two-day scenario creation workshop to Chembridge. The process
followed in this workshop is described in the following sections.
3.7.2 Define project scope
The scope of the project was defined jointly with Chembridge's Director of Global
Supply Chain Strategy and the Director of Strategic Supply Chain Management for
Latina America, over two phone calls and several emails. Since the goal of the
workshop was to explore how uncertainties in the emerging Latin American market can
influence Chembridge's supply chain strategy, the expected output of the workshop was
to define scenario structures, but not write scenario stories, and evaluate the strategies
for the selected focal issues in each scenario. The following were chosen as the focal
issues, regarding the doubling of the revenue from the region, to explore:
* Which countries and businesses will Chembridge generate Exxx8 revenue in
Latin America in year 2020?
e How will Chembridge manufacture the products to satisfy this demand?
e To support this business and production footprint, what supply chain strategy
should Chembridge adopt?
Planning horizon considered in the project was from now until year 2020 (eight years).
Chembridge's Director of Strategic Supply Chain Management for Latin America
selected 24 supply chain professionals to participate in the project. The participants
were drawn from three levels of supply chain organization within Chembridge: supply
chain functions at individual businesses (9 participants: 3 each from Agriculture, Basic
8 Deliberately obscured to protect the organization's identity
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Chemicals, and Paints), regional supply chain platform operating within each country (5
participants), and corporate supply chain functions (10 participants: 6 with Latin
American scope, 4 with global scope). The participants were selected to provide a
diverse perspective of Chembridge's business environment (assumption 2). In
summary, five variables related to the scenario projects were specified in this stage:
* Business and market to focus: Chemical industry in Latin America
e Focal decision: Distribution strategy
e Planning horizon: Now through year 2020 (eight years)
" Functional areas to include: Distribution and transportation network
e Project team members: 30 supply chain professionals
3.7.2.1 Scenario planning workshop: A broad overview
All remaining steps in the scenario creation process followed with Chembridge
(presented in sections 3.7.3 through 3.7.7) were conducted during the two-day
workshop. The workshop was held at an offsite facility in one of the Latin American
countries. Four members of MIT CTL research team travelled for the meeting and
facilitated different parts of the workshop.
At the beginning of the workshop, the senior CTL researcher gave a presentation
on scenario planning, describing its philosophy and role in long-range planning.
Following this, MIT researchers conducted a scenario planning session using existing
CTL scenarios to give participants a first-hand understanding of what scenario planning
is, what scenarios are, and how they are used to make long-range, strategic decisions.
Different steps in the scenario creation process were conducted in different
sessions of the workshop. Before delving into it, the scenario-creation process was
presented to the entire group of workshop participants, so that they knew how different
sessions in the workshop fit into the larger picture and advance towards the goal. In this
presentation, the terms "focal decisions", "local factors" and "driving forces" were
defined. The participants' understanding of these terms was tested with examples
specific to supply chain strategy and using an electronic audience response system,
which allows individuals to vote on multiple-choice questions using wireless clickers and
shows the results of the vote for a subsequent discussion.
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For most of the subsequent sessions, the group of workshop participants was
divided into three subgroups. Each subgroup followed the same scenario creation
process, under the guidance of one CTL facilitator.
3.7.3 Identify local factors in the organization's environment
Organization's own managers have a better understanding of the specific local factors
relevant to the organization than an external expert (assumption 3). Hence, local factors
were identified from Chembridge workshop participants, working in three subgroups.
3.7.3.1 Data collection: Brainstorming in subgroups
The facilitator for each subgroup conducted nominal-group brainstorming followed by
real-group brainstorming to identify the key factors (Osborn, 1957). The reason for
following this procedure is that brainstorming in nominal groups, where group members
work individually without communication, results in generation of more ideas than
brainstorming in real groups, where group members verbalize their ideas (Taylor, Berry,
& Block, 1958; Diehl & Stroebe, 1987). For nominal group brainstorming, each
participant was asked to write down the "local factors" pertinent to Chembridge's supply
chain strategy in Latin America on a sticky note, and post the notes on a poster board.
The participants were asked to identify as many factors as they could and not rule out
any for the fear of criticism. They were also encouraged to read the ideas posted by
other group members and build on those. After about 10 minutes, the facilitators
engaged the group into a real-group brainstorming where he read the ideas posted on
the board, and asked the group to elaborate and advance them. During the entire
brainstorming session each facilitator strictly refrained from using any probes and
facilitated real-group discussion using only the information provided by the participants,
so as not to bias the participants' output with his own ideas. At the end of the session,
each subgroup summarized the "local factors" it had identified.
3.7.3.2 Result: Localfactorsfor Chembridge
The MIT CTL facilitators compiled the list of local factors produced by the three
subgroups. The three subgroups identified a total of 30 local factors, with many
common factors among subgroups. These factors could be grouped into eight
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categories. Table 3-9 shows the categories and the number of local factors in each
category. The complete list of local factors is presented in Table 3-20 in the appendix.
Society, demographics 3
Technology solutions 2
Regulations and international standards 4
Logistics infrastructure 6
Customers 6
Supply chain partners 4
Industry profitability 2
Factor prices 3
Tota*tnumber of factors 30
Table 3-9: Number of local factors identified by Chembridge subgroups
3.7.4 Identify driving forces shaping the organization's environment
Driving sources for Chembridge were primarily identified by the external experts: two
MIT CTL researchers. Both are supply chain experts with extensive field experience in
Latin America, and one of the two is based in a Latin American country.
In the weeks leading to the workshop and from their prior research, the experts
identified seven driving forces present in Latin America, having potential to influence
supply chains. They presented the driving forces to the workshop participants in a
session following the identification of local factors. The presentation included an
elaborate description of each driving force, how it is manifested in Latin America, how it
has influenced other industries, and whether the experts consider it to be a trend
(predictable) or an uncertainty over the planning horizon reaching out to year 2020.
Following this presentation, the workshop participants were asked if any driving
forces relevant to Chembridge were missing. This open discussion led to identification
of two more driving forces: Economic volatility and Availability of (logistics) talent. These
two were added to the list of driving forces. The participants argued that "Cloud
computing" was not a relevant driving force for supply chains in chemical industry. The
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experts disagreed. Finally, a mutual agreement was reached to consider "Cloud
computing" and "Mobile telephone" as one driving force, as they both were related to
advances in information technology and had related implications. Table 3-10 presents
the final list of driving forces and the degree of uncertainty about their direction and/or
magnitude over Chembridge's planning horizon.
Urbanization
Mobile
Telephony
Logistics
infrastructure
Trading Blocs
Sustainability
Social fabric
Driving forces ad
Availability of M
talent
Economic
volatility
Low Continue to increase.
Low Continue to improve. Fast innovation, increased coverage,
proven technology platform
Medium Policies unclear. Affected by political willingness and
economic growth. Past record is mixed
High Could rise or vanish. Affected by changing political
landscape and weak institutions
Medium Divided vision of future. Global agreements have failed,
economy trumps environment; but corporate commitment is
growing
Low Societal characteristics (age, wealth, regional values, etc.)
will continue to change according to current trends
ded
edium Literacy will continue to improve, will have better logistics
operators; unclear if will have better logistics planners,
managers, and leaders
Low Economies in Latin America will remain volatile, due to
emerging markets and shifting political landscape
Cloud Medium Could improve and stall. Recent trend suggests growth, but
computing cyber-warfare presents risk
Table 3-10: Final list of driving forces for Chembridge
3.7.5 Rank driving forces by impact and uncertainty
The driving factors were ranked using an approach similar to that used in Medford case.
This methods includes evaluation of impact of each local factor on the focal decision
(assumption 4) by the workshop participants (assumption 5), followed by the
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participants mapping the relationship between driving forces and local factors
(assumption 6). The impact of driving force is calculated using equation (1), based on
the impact of each local factor and the strength of the relationship between the
corresponding local factor and the driving force (see section 3.6.4 for details).
3.7.5.1 Evaluating impact of localfactors
The workshop participants evaluated impact of 30 local factors using questionnaires
completed individually. The questionnaire asked the participant to rank the impact of
each factor using 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 0 (denoted as "No effect") to 4
(denoted as "Very strong effect"). Unlike in case of Medford, this questionnaire asked
for only the magnitude of impact, and not the direction.
3.7-5.2 Calculation of impact of localfactors
Questionnaires completed by 22 of the 24 participants were usable. The complete
results are presented in Table 3-21 in the appendix of this chapter. The average impact
varies from a low of 1.77 to a high of 3.23.
3.7.5.3 Selecting key localfactors
For computing impact of driving forces, we need to establish a relationship been local
factors and driving forces. To conduct the matching exercise expeditiously, the ten most
impactful local factors were first chosen for this exercise. However, notice that while the
average impact of the factors ranked 10 th and 11th are similar (2.60 and 2.57), the 1 1th
ranked factor had received more votes for impact of values 4 and 3, both compared to
the 10 th ranked factor. Therefore, the list of 10 local factors chosen as key local factors
consists of top nine factors and the 1 1th ranked factor, as ranked by average impact.
The key local factors are highlighted in blue font in Table 3-21.
3.7-5.4 Key localfactor - Driving force matching
Before mapping key local factors and driving force, the list of key local factors was
presented to the entire group of participants, and instructions for the matching exercise
were given to the participants. The matching exercise consisted of identifying the
strength of relationship between each of the 8 driving forces and the 10 key local
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factors: total 80 relationships. To specify the relationship, the participants were asked to
answer the question:
Does driving force X affect key local factor Y?
X and Y are the variable representing the driving force and key local factor to match.
The answers were collected on a 3-point scale: Has a strong effect (2), Has a weak
effect (1), or Has no effect (0).
For matching, the individuals worked in the same three subgroups which they
had worked for identifying the local factors. Each subgroup had 8 participants, and the
breakout exercise in each subgroup was facilitated by the same MIT CTL facilitator who
had worked with them for identifying local factors. Each subgroup was further divided
into four pairs of individuals; each pair was asked to answer the above question for two
driving forces, covering all eight driving forces in the group. After all pairs in a subgroup
completed the voting, the facilitator asked each pair to present the driving force-key
factor strength they had identified and a brief rationale for it to the entire subgroup.
Other members of the subgroup were asked if they agreed with the specified
relationship. When disagreements occurred, the disagreeing members were asked to
provide the rationale. Thus, the members of the subgroup got to hear different
perspectives about how a driving force may affect a key local factor. If disagreements
still persisted after hearing different reasoning, the facilitator asked the subgroup to vote
on the relationship between the driving force and the key local factor. All 80
relationships were assessed in this manner. The advantage of this approach of mapping
is that it forces the group members to explicitly state their assumptions about how a
driving force may affect a local factor, and let the mutually inconsistent assumptions
compete so that the more robust assumption is used in defining the relationship.
Table 3-22 in the appendix of this chapter summarizes the results. The key local
factors are presented in the rows, and the impact of each factor is listed in the second
column. The driving forces are listed in columns. Each driving force has two columns
underneath it: the first column indicates the strength of relationship between the driving
force and key local factors indicated by each subgroup; the second column shows the
average of the strength by the three subgroups.
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3.7-5.5 Calculate impact and uncertainty of driving forces
The impact of each driving forces is calculated using the average strength of
relationship between it and each of the 10 key local factors, and the impact of the
corresponding key local factors, as described in equation (1). The last row in Table 3-22
shows the impact of each driving force thus calculated.
3.7.6 Select scenario logic
The key results of impact estimation of driving forces are presented in Figure 3-8 below.
Four driving forces stand out as having the most impact: Trading blocs, Economic
volatility, Logistics infrastructure, and Sustainability. They all had average impact values
that were fairly close to each other (between 30.5 and 34.5) and separated from the
rest. Furthermore, each of them was estimated to have at least a weak effect on eight or
more of the 10 key local factors by at least two of the subgroups. They present ideal
candidates to be chosen as scenario axes.
Impact of Driving Forces (Chembridge)
36.0 34:5 12
33.2 E Average impact
31.1 30.5 -4-Number of key local factors impacted
30.0 - 10
27.2
E 18.3l
213.
12.0 K
E
0.0 0
Trading Blocs Economic Logistics Sustainability Urbanization Social Fabric Availability of Mobile
volatility infrastructure talent Telephony
Figure 3-8: Impact of Chembridge driving forces
Among these four, "Economic volatility" in Latin America was judged to be high over the
planning horizon, as it is an emerging economy. Thus, there is little uncertainty about
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"Economic volatility": the economy will be volatile. However, there was uncertainty about
the magnitude and direction of evolution of each of the three remaining three driving
forces. Therefore, the following three were chosen as the scenario axes:
" Trading blocs
* Logistics infrastructure
" Sustainability
As three driving forces formed the scenario logic, we chose to use the "Two-wins one-
loss" approach for creating scenarios for Chembridge. As mentioned in §3.2.1.5, the
use of this approach produces three scenarios, such that in each scenario two of
scenario axes take a "high" value and the third takes a "low" value. Shell (2005) has
used this approach to create three global scenarios of 2025.
Trading blocs
HIGH Sustainability
Logistics infrastructure
I
Scnai
HIGH Logistics
7 infrastructure
%4*~ f
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Susitainability
HIGH Trading blocs
Figure 3-9: Logic of Chembridge scenarios
3.7.7 Flesh out scenarios
Fleshing out scenarios involves specifying high and low values of driving forces and
defining scenario structure. The steps are presented in the detail below.
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3.7.7.1 Define high and low values of driving forces
After defining the scenario logic and before creating scenario structure, the high and low
values of each driving force need to be defined. These values need to be based on the
input of both, the external researchers and the project team members. The external
researchers are more familiar with the domain of driving forces than the project team
members, and are better positioned to describe how driving forces may vary over a
long-range future. On the other hand, the project team members need to find scenarios
plausible for using them in the long-range planning process. Therefore, the high and low
values of driving forces used in Chembridge's scenarios were jointly determined by the
external researchers and the workshop participants.
Driving forces High value Low value
Uncertainties
Trading blocs
Logistics
infrastructure
Sustainability
Availability of
talent
Trends
Economic
volatility
Mobile telephony
Urbanization
Social fabric
Little global trade; free trade
within Latin America
Adequate to meet demand
Consumers and businesses
highly environmentally conscious
Qualified logistics employees will
be easily available
High due to emerging economy
Continue to improve. Fast
innovation, increased coverage,
proven technology platform
Urban areas will continue to grow
Continuation of current trends
Free global trade; no special
treatment to Latin American countries
Inadequate to meet demand
Environmental consciousness
secondary to economic goals
Qualified logistics employees will be
in short supply
High due to emerging economy
Continue to improve. Fast innovation,
increased coverage, proven
technology platform
Urban areas will continue to grow
Continuation of current trends
Table 3-11: High and low values of uncertainties in Medford's environment
over planning horizon (2020)
3.7.7.2 Define scenario structure, name the scenarios
After creating three scenario seeds, the three subgroups were asked to choose one of
the three scenarios to develop further. The participants then broke into three subgroups.
The facilitator for each subgroup led the discussion to specify how the remaining five
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driving forces would look in each scenario, so that the resulting scenario structure is
logically internally consistent. The resulting structure for each scenario is presented in
Table 3-12 below.
Driving forces Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Trading blocs
Logistics
infrastructure
Sustainability
Availability of talent
Low
Free global trade; no
special treatment to Latin
American countries
High
Adequate to meet
demand
High
Consumers and
businesses highly
environmentally
conscious
Low
Qualified logistics
employees in short
supply
High
Little global trade; free
trade within Latin
America
Low
Inadequate to meet
demand
High
Consumers and
businesses highly
environmentally
conscious
Medium
Qualified logistics
operators available,
managers in short supply
High
Little global trade; free
trade within Latin
America
High
Adequate to meet
demand
Low
Environmental
consciousness
secondary to economic
goals
High
Qualified logistics
employees easily
available
The following trends remain the same in all three scenarios
Economic volatility
Urbanization
Social fabric
Mobile telephony
High due to emerging
economy
Urban areas continue to
grow
Continuation of current
trends
IT advances continue to
improve information
availability in supply
chains
High due to regional
growth
Urban areas continue to
grow
Continuation of current
trends
IT advances continue to
improve information
availability in supply
chains
High due to regional
growth
Urban areas continue to
grow
Continuation of current
trends
IT advances continue to
improve information
availability in supply
chains
Table 3-12: Structure of Chembridge scenarios
The last step in the scenario creation process is to assign a descriptive name to
each scenario. Schwartz (1991) suggests that the name should be memorable and
convey the essence of the scenario. After defining the structure of their scenario, the
facilitator of each subgroup conducted a brainstorming session to generate ideas for the
name of the subgroup's scenario. Each subgroup chose a name for their scenario from
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........ .... ... .....
the candidate names it had ideated using brainstorming. The names selected by the
subgroups for three scenarios are shown in Figure 3-10 below.
Trading blocs
HIGH Sustainability HIGH Logistics
Al 7 infrastructure
I :
-
- I %%
LatiGree
Logistics infrastructure Sustainability
HIGH Trading blocs
Figure 3-10: Chembridge scenario names
3.7.8 Summary of Chembridge case
The scenario creation process created for Chembridge helped a group of individuals
with no prior experience in creating scenarios develop scenarios customized to address
the long-range decision they faced, in two days. Clear definitions of the terms and
elaboration of assumptions to guide selection of appropriate methods to perform various
steps helped develop this condensed version of the scenario creation process. All the
information used for developing scenarios, except for the driving forces, was solicited
from Chembridge workshop participants. The short duration of the workshop (and its
scope) did not provide adequate time to write scenario stories, but was sufficient to
provide a structure for writing the stories. Based on my experience of writing scenarios
for Medford, a story for one scenario could be written by a story-writer in approximately
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one week using the scenario structure. In summary, the Chembridge case describes an
instance of development and application of rapid scenario-creation process.
3.8 General discussion
Scenario creation is described as a "practitioner's art" (van der Heijden, 2005). Peter
Schwartz (1991, p. 30) has argued that "you cannot create scenarios from recipes - but
you can practice creating scenarios." Unfortunately, this emphasis on it being an art has
led to a proliferation of methods for creating scenarios with no easy way to compare
different methods, turning scenario planning into somewhat of a pseudoscience. This is
why the topic of scenario planning "leaves many academics uncomfortable"
(Schoemaker, 2004, p. 288). The scenario creation process presented in this chapter
takes a step in addressing this limitation. Two versions of the Intuitive Logics scenario
creation process - and extensive version (Medford) and an abbreviated version
(Chembridge) - are developed in this chapter. The methods for performing all steps in
each version are specified, along with the assumptions behind choosing those methods.
The two versions are summarized in Table 3-23 in the appendix of this chapter.
3.8.1 Contributions
The research presented in this chapter makes contributions to the literature on scenario
planning as well as business practice.
3.8.1.1 Contributions to scenario planning literature
This research makes at least two contributions to the scholarly literature on scenario
creation.
It provides a detailed and transparent process for creating scenarios
The biggest contribution of this chapter is that it provides a detailed process, with
explicitly stated assumptions, for creating scenarios. Scenario planning literature
describes a generic scenario-creation process with some variations and plenty of
examples of applications of that process (Ringland, 1998; Cousens, et al., 2002; Royal
Dutch Shell, 2005, 2008; etc.). However, two things are generally lacking from these
accounts: detailed descriptions of the methods used for performing different steps in the
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process and the rationale for using those methods. Hidden under a shroud of mystery,
the scenario creation is often thought of as an "art". The research presented in this
chapter takes a small step towards engineering this art. The benefit of a transparent and
clearly defined process, as presented in this chapter, is that it makes the process
amenable to testing and comparison against alternate processes. Currently, several
scenario creation processes exist in the literature (Bishop, et al., 2007); however, to my
knowledge there is not a single study that has compared different scenario creation
processes. A well-defined, detailed process is one step in filling this gap in the literature.
It defines terms and grounds them in organizations literature
Schwartz (1991) and subsequent important works in the intuitive logics school (e.g.
Schwartz & Ogilvy, 1998; van der Heijden, 2005) have not provided consistent, precise
definitions of terms - such as key factors, driving forces, etc. - used in the scenario
creation process. This proliferation of "different and at times conflicting definitions" has
been noted (Bradfield, et al. 2005) and criticized by arguing that "even the most basic
vocabulary is used every which way in this field" (Bishop, et al. 2007). The research
presented in this chapter makes a contribution by clearly defining the terms used to
describe various aspects of the business environment, and grounding them in the
seminal organization science works dealing with organizational environments (Emery &
Trist, 1965; Thompson, 1967; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
3.8.1.2 Contributions to business practice
The scenario creation processes presented in this chapter also make at least four
practical contributions.
It provides two methodsfor creating scenarios
This chapter presents two applications of the Intuitive Logics School scenario creation
process: an extensive version (Medford) and an abbreviated version (Chembridge).
Both these versions have been described in detail so that an organization's manager
him/herself may conduct the process to create scenarios for the organization. Managers
in an organization new to scenario planning may start with the abbreviated version to
see if scenario creation and scenario planning is useful in their organization. If/once
they realize the benefits, they may engage in the extensive scenario creation process.
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The processforces participants to think about the relationship between
driving forces and localfactors
Both versions of the scenario creation process presented in this chapter require the
managers to make explicit connections between the driving forces and the local factors.
This step forces the participants to explore how macro-level environmental factors-
which may get left out of scope of a quantitative planning process due to their unwieldy
nature-can change the micro-level environmental factors that are easier to define in a
quantitative model. The participants in the Chembridge case mentioned that the
discussions within the subgroup, when the members debated the nature of relationship
between different pairs of driving forces and key local factors (§3.7.5.4), were especially
enlightening. Although based purely on anecdotal account, the participants noted that
requiring them to explore the relationship between the driving forces and local factors
was.
The processes leverages internal and external expertise
Both versions of the scenario creation process in this chapter provide a systematic
process to combine the knowledge of an organization's managers with the expertise
outside the organization to help the managers systematically develop a set of scenarios
customized for a specific long-range decision.
Finally, it provides a "recipe"for creating customized scenarios
We disagree with Peter Schwartz's claim (1991, p. 30) that "you cannot create
scenarios from recipes". The process of creating scenarios itself is insightful, as it
provides a firm's managers a systematic way to explore and understand their
organization's environment. While it has not been tested empirically, participating in a
scenario creation process - similar to the ones described in this chapter - may help an
organization's managers become more sensitive to "weak signals" in the organization's
environment (Schoemaker & Day, 2009a; 2009b), because of the systematic
exploration of the environment carried out in several steps. We agree with the scenario
practitioners that "as scenario planning becomes more widely used [routinizing it
through...] the right structured process can certainly help teams to extend their
capabilities" (Ringland, 1998, p. 191).
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A set of scenarios manufactured using a "recipe" may not be as good as those
created intuitively by scenario experts. However, we do not have a way to compare the
quality of different sets of scenarios. Even if we had such a capability, having a recipe
will make it only easier to identify a better process for creating scenarios.
3.8.2 Limitations of the proposed process
Two methods of generating scenarios developed and demonstrated in Medford and
Chembridge cases are not without limitations. The process has at least three limitations:
e Following the process mechanically, without mentally engaging in it: The
biggest limitation of these methods is the flip-side of their strength: these
methods provide a step-by-step guide for creating scenario. Given such a
systematic process, it is easy to get into an "auto-pilot" mode and go through the
motions of completing various process steps without fully engaging in the
process. Users of these processes should guard against this.
e Getting enamored by quantitative analysis: Another limitation of the
processes is also a flip-side of one of their strengths: the quantitative methods.
Managers and planners love numbers; converting an amorphous continuum of
qualitative data into a number simplifies analysis. There is a danger of losing
sight of the larger picture by focusing on the numbers alone. The quantitative
methods used in two scenario creation processes presented here should be used
only to guide discussion. For instance, use the numbers to separate the four
most impactful driving forces from the four least impactful; but, do not outright
discard a driving force from consideration as a scenario axis because its impact
is 0.023 lower than the second most impactful driving force.
e Forgetting to get a diverse group of people to participate: The saying
garbage-in-garbage-out applies here. The quality of the data - both qualitative
and quantitative information about environment, analyses, insights, etc. -
generated and captured in this process is a function of the people participating in
it. It is important to get a diverse perspective. After all, scenario planning is a
frame-braking exercise; the scenario creation process itself should have included
people with a diverse set of viewpoints.
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3.8.3 Future research
Many opportunities for further research lie in the area of scenario creation. Given below
is a short list containing some opportunities. This list is by no means exhaustive.
Compare different methods of creating scenarios
This research provides two methods for creating scenarios, but does not compare their
performance. Comparison of scenario-creation processes can inform us the relative
merits of different scenario creation processes. However, such a comparison is difficult:
One cannot compare two sets of scenarios and judge which will lead to better decisions.
However, one can compare two sets of scenarios by testing which set produces more,
and/or higher quality of insights. One can also compare the output of various steps in
the process by judging the quantity and/or quality of output (e.g. local factors identified,
driving force-local factor associations made, etc.). Future research may perform
empirical tests of the different scenario creation methods.
Explore the benefits ofparticipating in the process
Anecdotal evidence suggests that participation in the scenario creation process itself
has benefits. One may test how participating in different steps of the scenario creation
process (such as mapping driving forces to local factors) influences the participants'
understanding of their organization's business environment and whether it makes the
participants more sensitive to small changes (i.e. weak signals) in the environment. This
can be tested empirically.
Engineer new processes for creating scenarios
The research work in this chapter presented two variations of the Intuitive Logics
scenario creation process. We used the generic process provided by Intuitive Logics
School for two reasons: it is the most commonly used scenario creation process, and in
absence of any evaluation criteria it is hard to tell if one process for creation scenarios is
better than another. However, it is not necessary to restrict ourselves to the Intuitive
Logics School. By gaining better understanding of the process, one could engineer new
processes for creating scenarios. Furthermore, presenting those processes in an
objective, replicable manner can make them amenable to comparison against other
scenario-creation processes.
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3.9 Appendix for Chapter 3
Identify key factors in
the local environment
'WV
ISelect leading indicatorsand signposts
Figure 3-11: Generic scenario creation process (Schwartz, 1991)
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3.9.1 Summary of key external drivers from IBISWorld database
Ke Exera Drve Inutre afece IB l predictio
Age group (50+)
Availability of nurses
Ban on creating or expanding existing
physician-owned specialty hospitals
Consolidation in reaction to pricing pressures
Consolidation in the pharmacy industry
Cost of hiring nurses (wages, etc.)
"Creation of ""medical homes"" in PPACA"
Demand for Medicare
Development of biosimilars
Disintermediation (retailers integrating
backwards)
Dow Jones Industrial Average
Downstream demand from Pharmacies & Drug
Stores in the US
Electronic medical records
Federal funding for Medicare and Medicaid
House price index
Improvements in industry systems and
NNO01
62211
32541 b
42221
62211
62111a
52411b
32541b
42221
52411a, 52512
42221
62211
32541a, 32541b, 44611, 62111a, 62111b,
62161, 62211, 62231, 62311, 62331
62331
32541b
Increase
Decrease
Industry is consolidating
Continued consolidation
Increase
Increase (due to aging population)
Biosimilars will dominate portfolio, although a
low contributor to growth through 2015 due to
12 year exclusivity period
Not a major threat in next 5 years as
wholesalers present many services that are
critical to manufacturers and providers
Increase
Increase slowly
increase
Increase slowly
Improve slowly
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Key External Driver Industries affected IBISWorld prediction
technology - Medical and pharma prod mfg
Industry profit margin (for pharmaceutical
wholesalers)
Industry systems and technology - Medical and
pharma prod manufacturing
Internal and external competition (for generic
manufacturers)
Investor uncertainty
Key attitudinal changes - Health and safety
awareness
Legislative compliance requirements
Median age of population
Number of adults over 65 years old
Number of births
Number of employees
Number of non-profit hospitals
Number of people with private health insurance
Number of physician visits
Number of specialty hospitals
Number of wholesalers in the industry
OveraI growth of the industry (generic
42221
32541a, 44611
32541b
NNO0
62111a,
Increase to 1.7% of revenue through 2016
(due to increase in proportion of generics in
the mix)
Improve slowly
Increasing
62211, 62311 Increase slowly
32541 a, 32541 b, 62111 b, 62231, NNO01 Increase in regulation about mfg, pricing,
marketing, etc.
32541a, 32541b, 42221, 52411a, 52411b Increase slowly
44611, 62111a, 62111b, 62161, 62211, 62231, Increase
62311, 62331
62111a, 62111b Increase slowly
52411a, 52411b, 52512 Increase slowly
62211 Decrease
32541a, 32541b, 42221, 44611, 52512, Increase slowly
62111a, 62111b, 62161, 62211, 62231, 62311
42221, 44611 Increase slowly
62231 Decrease through 2015
42221 Decrease by 1.6% per year through 2016
32541b Revenue growth expected at average of 7.5%
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Ke Exera Drve Inutre afece IBsl prediction
per year through 2015manufacturing)
Per capita disposable income
Population
Prescription drug expenditure
Prime rate
Proportion of generic drugs in the mix
Proportion of workforce in service jobs
Recovery time in long-term acute care
Research and development expenditure
Revenue growth of generic pharmaceutical
market
Subsidies - R&D (general)
Total health expenditure
Trend: Patent expirations
Union membership
World price of crude oil
Yield on 10-year treasury bond
Increase slowly42221, 44611, 52411a, 52411b, 52512,
62111a, 62111b, 62161, 62211, 62231, 62311,
62331
52411b
52411b, 52512
52512
42221
52411b, 52512
62231
42221, NNO01
32541b
32541b
52512
32541b
52411b, 52512
62161
52411a, 52411b, 62331
Weaken somewhat through 2016
Increase
Rise
Table 3-13: Summary of key external drivers from IBISWorld for 15 industries
(128)
Increase
Increase at 7.8% annually through 2016
Increase
Increase
Increase through 2016
Reduce
Increase
Slowing
Increase
U Market share of generic dIruigs by volume
What will the volume of generic drugs, as a percentageof all drugs being
distributed within the US, be in five years?
Significantly
higher I1
No significant
change
wrTE
41
-
I
Figure 3-12: Template used in flip-the-factor method
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C
STU
Driving forces in Med ford's environment
Availability of healthcare workers
Availability of nurses
Availability of pharmacists
Cost of hiring nurses (wages, etc.)
Number of employees
Proportion of workforce in service jobs
Union membership
Availability of information and technology solutions for healthcare management
Advances in diagnosis, cure, and health management
Electronic medical records
Importance of information and IT in SC
Industry systems and technology - Medical and pharma prod
manufacturing
Average age of the US population (Trend)
Age group (50+)
Demand for Medicare V
Median and average age of population V V
Number of adults over 65 years old
Number of births
Population
Climate-sensitivity of drugs and treatments
Development of biosimilars / Volume of biosimilars and specialty
drugs in market
Innovation in climate-sensitivity of drugs and treatments
Complexity of US healthcare supply chain
Complexity of US healthcare supply chain
Cost advantage of selling drugs via mail-order
Cost of developing a good distribution network like Big-3
Manufacturers' choice of distribution mode
Retailer actions to drive sale of drugs
Retailers' choice of distribution mode
Consolidation within healthcare sector
Consolidation in reaction to pricing pressures T
Consolidation in the pharmacy industry
Disintermediation (retailers integrating backwards) V v
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Number of group purchasing organizations
Number of non-profit hospitals
Number of specialty hospitals
Number of wholesalers in the industry
Cost pressure in the healthcare sector
Industry profit margin (for pharmaceutical wholesalers)
Power of GPO's
Pressure to reduce healthcare costs
Profitability and growth of pharmaceutical companies
Profitability of healthcare sector
Research and development expenditure
Sublisidies - R&D (general)
Total health expenditure V
Environmental consciousness of the society (Trend)
Environmentalism V
Health of the overall U.S. economy
Dow Jones Industrial Average
House price index
Investor uncertainty
Per capita disposable income
Prime rate
World price of crude oil
Yield on 10-year treasury bond
Overall US economy
Health-consciousness of average citizen
Consumers' willingness to pay for service in drug deliveryV
Importance of relationship between patient and pharmacist
Key attitudinal changes - Health and safety awareness
Market: Consumer-driven or business-driven
Number of people with private health insurance
Number of physician visitsV
Location where majority of healthcare is provided
Location where majority of healthcare is provided
Recovery time in long-term acute care
Nature of reimbursement policies
Insurance companies lowering reimbursement rates
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iayment Tor outcome
Preferential treatment to mail-order and internet pharmacies
Reimbursement rates
Overall focus on drug security and safety
Overall focus on drug security and safety
Participation of government in the healthcare sector
Ban on creating or expanding existing physician-owned specialty
hospitals
Creation of "medical homes" in PPACA
Desire for creating laws standard across legislations
Federal funding for Medicare and Medicaid
Legislative compliance requirements
New government regulations struck down by courts
Socio-political preference for access to healthcare
Proportion of generic drugs in the volume of drugs consumed
Average value of drugs and treatments
Internal and external competition (for generic manufacturers)
Number of generic manufacturers
Overall growth of the industry (generic manufacturing)
Prescription drug expenditure
Proportion of generic drugs in the mix
Reputation of quality of generic products
Revenue growth of generic pharmaceutical market
Trend: Patent expirations
Volume of drugs sold in the US
Downstream demand from Pharmacies & Drug Stores in the US
Number of people in the US healthcare system
Volume of drugs sold globally
Volume of drugs sold in the US
Table 3-14: Driving forces of Medford's environment
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Driving forces
availability of healthcare workers
availability of IT solutions for healthcare management
climate-sensitivity of drugs and treatments
complexity of US healthcare supply chain
consolidation within healthcare sector
cost pressure in the healthcare sector
health of the overall U.S. economy
health-consciousness of average citizen
location where majority of healthcare is provided
nature of reimbursement policies
overall focus on drug security and safety
participation of government in the healthcare sector
proportion of generic drugs in the volume of drugs consumed
volume of drugs sold in the US
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0.86 0.29 0.57 0.71 0.29 0.29 0.431 0.00 0.14 0.43 0.29 0.43 0.00
0.43 0.86 0.43 0.43 0.00 0.57 0.14 0.71 0.71 0.4310.57 0.43 0.57
0.00 0.88 0.38 0.88 0.75 0.75 0.88 0.25 0.88 1.00 0.63 1.00 0.25
0.60 0.80 1.00 1.00 0.60 1.00 0.80 0.40 1.00 0.60 1.00 0.80 0.80
1.00 1.00 0.71 0.71 0.57 0.71 0.71 0.29 0.86 0.71 1.00 0.71 0.14
1.00 1.00 1.00 0.86 0.71 0.86 0.71 0.29 1.00 0.86 1.00 1.00 0.29
1.00 1.00 0.63 0.38 0.50 0.75 0.75 0.75 1.00 0.50 0.88 0.63 0.25
0.00 0.14 0.14 0.71 1.00 0.14 0.14 0.29 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.29 0.29
0.43 0.71 0.29 1.00 1.00 0.71 0.71 0.43 0.57 0.71 0.71 0.57 0.29
0.50 0.83 0.33 0.67 0.50 0.67 0.67 0.17 0.50 0.33 0.50 0.83 0.50
0.00 0.57 0.14 0.43 0.43 0.57 0.71 1.00 0.71 1.00 0.57 0.71 1.00
0.43 1.00 0.57 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.71 0.14 1.00 0.43 1.00 0.86 1.00
0.17 1.00 0.67 0.50 0.50 0.83 0.67 0.50 0.67 0.00 0.67 0.67 0.33
0.14 1.00 0.14 0.57 0.71 0.86 0.86 0.57 1.00 0.57 1.00 0.86 0.43
Table 3-15: Driving force impact and uncertainty based on relationship with key local factor
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Driving forces
Availability of healthcare workers
Availability of IT solutions for healthcare management
Climate-sensitivity of drugs and treatments
Complexity of US healthcare supply chain
Consolidation within healthcare sector
Cost pressure in the healthcare sector
Health of the overall U.S. economy
Health-consciousness of average citizen
Location where majority of healthcare is provided
Nature of reimbursement policies
Overall focus on drug security and safety
Participation of govemment in the healthcare sector
Proportion of generic drugs in the volume of drugs consumec
Volume of drugs sold in the US
Table 3-16: Correlations between driving forces (Medford case)
(134)
Uncertainties
Complexity of UShihiglolw
healthcare supply chainhihiglolw
eono weaker stronger weaker stronger
economy __ ____ ____
Availability of healthcare abundant scarce abundant
workers scarce
Availability of information not much not muchAvr aai o raltionr different than different than abundant abundantfor managing healthcare today today
Climate-sensitivity of drugs temperature- temperature- temperature- temperature-
and treatmentsinsensitive sensitive drugs insensitive sensitive drugsan team tsdrugs drugsdrg
Consolidation within
healthcare sector high low high low
Cost pressure in the high high low lowhealthcare sector
Health-consciousness of
aveag ctienhigh high low lowaverage citizen
Number of locations where lower or about lower or about
majority of healthcare is much higher the same as the same as tuch higher
provided today today
Nature of reimbursement Outcome Outcome Treatment Treatment
policies focused focused focused focused
Overall focus on drug high high low low
security and safety
Participation of
government in the high high low low
healthcare sector
Proportion of generic not much h hih h hih not much
drugs in the volume of different than muc iger muc iger different than
than today than todaydrugs consumed today today
not much not muchVolume of drugs sold in much higher much higher nt th
the US different than than today than todaytoday today
Trends
Average age of U.S. higher than higher than higher than higher than
population today today today today
Environmental
consciousness of the higher than higher than higher than higher than
society in the U.S today today today today
Table 3-17: Initial scenario structure presented to Medford
(135)
Driving forces Scen-1 Scen-2 Scen-3 Scen-4
Availability of healthcare
workers
Availability of information
for managing healthcare
Climate-sensitivity of drugs
and treatments
Consolidation within
healthcare sector
Cost pressure in the
healthcare sector
Health-consciousness of
average citizen
Number of lcations where
majority of healthcare is
provided
Nature of reimbursement
policies-
Overall focus on drug
security and safety
Participation of
government in the
healthcare sector
Proportion of generic
drugs in the volume of
drugs consumed
Volume of drugs sold in
the US
Average age of U.S.
population
Environmental
consciousness of the
society in the U.S
Overall focus on drug
security and safety
Uncertainties
I1
abundant
not much
different than
today
high
high
high
much higher
than today
Outcome
focused
I
scarce
low
high
high
Outcome
focused
I
abundant
f
scarce
low
low
lower or about
the same as
today
Treatment
focused
low
much higher
than today
Treatment
focused
Became a trend (see under "Trends" below)
high
not mucn
different than
today
higher than
today
higher than
today
high
high
much higher
than today
much higher
than today
Trends
higher than
today
higher than
today
high
much higher
than today
much higher
than today
higher than
today
higher than
today
low
not much
different than
today
not much
different than
today
higher than
today
higher than
today
Table 3-18: Final scenario structure for Medford's scenarios
(136)
II
-I -
Assumption Case 1: Medford
behind E
Tasks in scenario creation process choice of Method of data
source and c collection and analysis
method
1.1 Specify business and market to focus
1.2 Specify focal decision
1.3 Specify planning horizon
1.4 Specify functional areas to include and exclude
1.5 Choose project team members
Assumptions I
and 2
Identify environmental factors important for focal
decision from project team members
2.2 Identify local factors and driving forces mentioned in
interviews; develop mental maps
Validate environmental factors gathered from
2.3 . .interviews
2.4 Compile a complete list of local factors
3, ient ify driving forces shaping the organization's environment
3.1 Identify driving forces from external data sources
3.2 Identify driving forces from project team members
Compile list of driving forces collected from internal
and external sources
3.4 Classify driving forces as trends or uncertainties
4. Rank driving forces by impact and uncertainty
4.1 Evaluate impact of local factors Assumptions 4, 5
4.2 Calculate metrics for impact of local factors
4.3 Estimate uncertainty of future values of local factors
4.4 Identify key local factors
4.5 Map key local factors to driving forces Assumption 6
4.6 Calculate impact and uncertainty of driving forces
5. Select scenario logic
5.1 Choose two driving forces as scenario axes Assumption 7
6. flesh out scenatios
6.1 Define high and low values of uncertain driving forces
6.2 Define scenario structure
6.3 Validate scenario structure
6.4 Write scenarios
6.5 Name the scenarios
Assumption 8
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x x
Discussion with project
sponsor
Open-ended interview
x Qualitative coding
x x Questionnaire
x
x
x x
x Qualitative coding
x Industry research
x Structured questionnaire
x
x x Structured questionnaire
x Most impact & uncertainty
x Structured questionnaire
x
x x Focus group
x Industry research
x
x
x
x
x
Table 3-19: Scenario creation process used with Medford
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Industry research
Open-ended questionnaire
Correlation matrix
Open-ended questionnaire
Industry research
Brainstorming
2. Identify local factots in the'organization's environment,
Level of talent available in industry
Availability and wages of logistics workers
Strikes / lack of drivers
Technological solutions available for communication, visibility, and control
Adaptation of barcoding, RFID
Incoterms for inbound and outbound
Import / export regulations
EHS regulations for transportation and warehousing
Regulations specific to industry Chembridge is in
Infrastructure availability of various transportation modes
Traffic restrictions in big cities
Availability of warehousing infrastructure
Availability of containers
Availability of qualified logistics service providers
Logistics services offered by service providers
Customers,
Type of customers (big firms vs. small shops vs. individual
Customer preference for products
Customer locations where Chembridge has to delivery
Demand ordering patterns
Customer service requirements / levels demanded
Packaging standard for customers
Suppl",han partners
Supplier (raw material) network
Type of raw material suppliers (big firms vs. small firms)
Distribution channels primarily used in industry
Willingness of supply chain partners to collaborate
Industr prftabilit
Product prices and variations
Profit margin in the industry Chembridge operated in
Price of diesel, and variation in price
Prices of logistics services
Price of logistics land
consumers)
(138)
Table 3-20: Local factors identified by Chembridge
Votes by individual participants
Local factors P01 P02 P03 P04 P05 P06 P07 Po8 PO9|P1O P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19P20 P21|P2
Infrastructure availability of various transportation modes
Type of customers (big firms vs. small shops vs. individual consumers)
Customer locations where BASF has to delivery
Customer service requirements / levels demanded
Regulations specific to industry BASF is in
Availability of warehousing infrastructure
Import / export regulations
Availability of qualified logistics service providers
Technological solutions available for communication, visibility, and control
Demand ordering patterns
Level of talent available in industry
Prices of logistics services
EHS regulations for transportation and warehousing
Profit margin in the industry BASF operated in
Traffic restrictions in big cities
Strikes / lack of drivers
Logistics services offered by service providers
Adaptation of barcoding, RFID
Availability of containers
Willingness of supply chain partners to collaborate
Supplier (raw material) network
Product prices and variations
Price of diesel, and variation in price
Customer preference for products
Availability and wages of logistics workers
Distribution channels primarily used in industry
Price of logistics land
Type of raw material suppliers (big firms vs. small firms)
Packaging standard for customers
Incoterms for inbound and outbound
4 4
1 2
4 3
2 3
1 2
3 4
1 4
2 2
0 2
3 2
0 2
2 2
o 2
1 2!
1 2
1 3
3 2
0 1
2 3
4 3
3 1
0 1
1 3,
2 2
1 2
2 2
0 1
0 1
1 2
1 1
Table 3-21: Results of survey of impact of local factors (Chembridge)
(139)
I
Number of votes
by value of
2 0 1 2 3 4
4 0 0 3 109
4- 0 1 3 8
3 0 0 3 11.
40 2 4 7,
4 0 1 4w 4
3 N 0 4
4 0 1 7 10 4
3 0 1 9 7 5
4 17 7 6
4 0 1 8 9 2
4 2 5 10 3
4 0 3 8 7 4
3 16 9 4
4 0 : 7 10 2
2 0 2 10 8 2
4o 1 8 4
3 0 9 9 1
4 6 8 3
10 9 7 2
4 0T 9 7 2
4 5 6 4
4 6 4 5
2 0 6 4 4
4 0 11 6 1
10 7 5 3
2 2 13 5 0
4 3 9 6 2
3 2
4 6 5 1
Avg
imp-
act
3.27
3.23
3.23
3.05
2.91
2.86
2.77
2.73
2.73
2.60
2.57
2.55
2.55
2.50
2.45
2.41
2.36
2.36
2.32
2.32
2.29
2.27
2.24
2.18
2.18
2.15
2.14
2.14
1.86
1.77
0 C1 
.2 -0 .+j 4-- DI -:3.cb U (.2.-
Key Local Factor 013 W iC. .- 0 M o'.
O. 1 Of 0 .0 hm C(f
Infrastructure availability of various subG-1 1 0 0 1013.27 subG-2 2.00 0 0.33 0 0.00 2.00 *1 1.67 0 0.67 10 1.33 0 1.00transportation modes ubG3 0 0
sub- 0 0 0 0 0 0 1IType of customers (big firms vs. small I * 1 03.23 subG-2 0 0.67 0 0.00 0 0.33 W1 0.67 1.00 *1 1.00 0.0 0.33 i 1.33
shops vs. individual consumers) subG-3 1 0 1 1 1 0 1.0
Cutmrlctosuhr AFhsbG-1 i n1* 0 1 1 1 1.01
Cutoerloatos hee AS hs 3.23 subG-2 1.67 0 0.33 0 0.33 1.67 fl 1.00 1.33 *10 1.00 1 1.00
to dehver subG-3 1 0 1 1 1 1__*
subG-1 0 11 1.01
Customer services rerement s . --
3.05 subG-2 0.67 1 0.33 1 1.33 1 1.33 1.00 1.00 1 133 1.33
levels demanded 
-0 _NW_[" 0*
Regulations specific to industry BASF subG-1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
2.91 subG-2 1.33 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.33 1.33 0 033 200 1 033
iinsubG-3 1i 0 0 *1 1 *1____ 0
Availability of warehousing subG-1 E1 0 0 1 0 10~o 1
2.86 subG-2 1 1.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 1.67 1 1.33 0 000 *10 1.00 1 1.33
subG-3 1 0 0 0 *1.0
subG-1 0 0 0 0 0 *10
Import / export regulations 2.77 subG-2 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.33 2.00 0 0.33 0 1.00 1 1.67
subG-3 0 0 0 1 1 1.0
Availability of qualified logistics service ubG1 0 0 0 1 1.0 1
2.73 subG-2 0 0.33 2.00 1 0.33 1 1.00 1 0.67 1 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.67
subG-3 1 0 0 0 M1. 0
Technological solutions available for subG-1 0 1 1 0 E1.01 1i
. . . 2.73 subG-2 0 0.00 1.67 2.00 0 0.67 1 1.00 1 0.33 E 0 1.00 1 0.67
communication, visibility, and control subG-3 0 110 U 10
subG-1 1 0 0 1 00 1
Level of talent available in industry 2.57 subG-2 1.33 2.00 1 0.33 1 0.67 1 0.67 W 2.00 o 0.33 1 1.00
subG3 _1 E 0 1 0 0 
_0
DrIvIng force impact 27.19 18.32 13.43 31.06 34.46 23.43 30.49 33.21
Table 3-22: Strength of relationship between driving forces and key local factors (Chembridge)
(140)
Case 1: Medford Case 2: ChembridgeAssumption
behind choice of E .ETasks in scenario creation process s 2 Method of data 2 2 Method of data collection
source and a)M(
method collection and analysis and analysis
1.1 Specify business and market to focus x x x X
1.2 Specify focal decision x X x x
Assumptions 1 and Discussion Wth project Discussion wth project1.3 Specify planning horizon x x1. onon2 Xsponsorspno
1.4 Specify functional areas to include and exclude x x x
1.5 Choose project team members x x
2.LIde ntify, loc 1'.kPrs in the organlization's environme nt
2.1 Identify environmental factors important for focal decision from team members Assumption 3 x x Open-ended interview x x
2.2 Identify local factors and dring forces in intenew data; develop mental maps x Qualitative coding
2.3 Validate envronmental factors gathered from interviews x x Questionnaire
2.4 Compile a complete list of local factors x x
3. 1dentfYddY' J& inighe organization's environment
3.1 Identify diving forces from external data sources x /ndustry research x /ndustry research
3.2 Identify driving forces from project team members x x Open-ended questionnaire x x
3.3 Compile list of driAng forces collected from internal and external sources x Qualitative coding x
3.4 Classify driving forces as trends or uncertainties x Industry research x Industry research
4. Ranik drivin ib inpatantncrait
4.1 Evaluate impact of local factors Assumptions 4, 5 x Questionnaire x Questionnaire
4.2 Calculate metrics for impact of local factors x x
4.3 Estimate uncertainty of future values of local factors x x Questionnaire
4.4 Identify key local factors x Most impact & uncertainty x
4.5 Map key local factors to driving forces Assumption 6 x Questionnaire x
4.6 Calculate impact and uncertainty of driving forces x x
5.1 Choose scenario axes Assumption 7 x x Focus group x x Focus group
6.1 Define high and low values of uncertain driving forces x Industry research x Industry research
6.2 Define scenario structure x Correlation matrix x
6.3 Validate scenario structure Assumption 8 x x Open-ended questionnaire x x
6.4 Write scenarios x Industry research x
6.5 Name the scenarios x Brainstorming x Brainstorming
(141)
Table 3-23: Summary of scenario creation processes for Medford and Chembridge
Chapter 4
Seeing and believing: Managerial cognition
in strategic thinking
The research presented in this chapter explores the relationship between
managers' perceptions and beliefs about their firm's future business
environment, and the strategies they recommend. The research uses
prospective research design, which allows us to examine the aspects of
managerial cognition that are difficult to study using retrospective designs
(e.g. future outlook) typically employed in research on managerial
cognition. Using a mixed-methods approach, this research first tests three
hypotheses about the general characteristics of managerial cognition. A
closer look at the cognitive profiles of different managers in this data
reveals unsuspected variation in strategic thinking of managers of different
profiles. Using this inherent variation in data, a typology of managerial
cognition is inductively generated. The inductive analysis shows that
managers of different cognitive types, as determined by their perceptions
and beliefs about the future, envision very different types of strategies.
4.1 Introduction
The research presented in this chapter seeks to answer a simple question: how does a
manager's strategic thinking relate to his/her perception of the business environment?
The goals of this research are two-fold: understand how managers perceive the
business environment pertinent to their firm's future strategy, and how the strategies
they recommend relate to their perception of the business environment. The goal is to
explore strategic thinking (Mintzberg, 1994). This research is motivated by the fact that
managers "at all levels make choices on a daily basis that may have long-term
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consequences for the organization. The quality of all these choices is determined by the
quality of the strategic thinking process in which they are made." (Liedtka, 1998, p. 34).
While strategy has traditionally been studied from an economics perspective,
empirical evidence of the importance of managerial thinking in the strategy process has
emerged in past few years. Studies of leading firms that failed to adapt to structural
changes in business environment show that the failures cannot be explained using only
the economic factors-such as asset lock-in and incentives-and without considering
the role of managerial cognition (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000; Kaplan, 2011). While the
economic factors affect if and how quickly a firm can make necessary changes in its
strategy in response to changes in its environment, the cognitive factors determine if the
firm's top managers can recognize the need to change the firm's strategy in time, ideate
and choose a strategy that is appropriate for the environment (Eggers & Kaplan, 2009).
The interpretive perspective on organizations started emerging in 1980s. The
early work (Kiesler & Sproull, 1982; Dutton, Fahey, & Narayanan, 1983; Daft & Weick,
1984; Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Stubbart, 1989) focused on building a theoretical
foundation. The ensuing empirical work started shedding light on managers' perception
and interpretation of their firm's environment. This work, generally employing cross-
sectional research with field subjects either in class-room settings or using field surveys,
showed that managers' cognition influences how they categorize environmental factors
into opportunities or threats (Jackson & Dutton, 1988; Milliken, 1990; Thomas, Clark, &
Gioia, 1993), and that the features of the environment hitherto considered to be
objective characteristics-such as competitor landscape-are actually cognitive
constructions of managers in that industry and can differ in minds of managers across
and within firms (Porac, Thomas, & Baden-Fuller, 1989; Hodgkinson & Johnson, 1994).
Researchers since the turn of the 2 1st century have started exploring the link
between managerial cognition and strategy through in-depth field studies. Kaplan
(2011) calls this the third phase of research in cognition and strategy, where
researchers have started connecting cognition with strategy and strategic outcomes.
Two dominant themes can be seen in this research. One research stream explores how
the cognition of a firm's managers leads to some strategically important event at a firm
using extensive field studies (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000; Rerup, 2009). These studies
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typically use data gathered from semi-structured interviews and firm archives to
retrospectively explain how managerial cognition led to the focal event, such as
bankruptcy of Polaroid Corporation (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000) or Novo Nordisk's FDA-
compliance failure (Rerup, 2009). The second research stream seeks to explain
variation in firm strategies based on the variation in their CEO's cognition. These
studies take publically available documents, such as letters to shareholders in a firm's
annual reports, as the proxies for strategic thinking of the CEO and employ content
analysis to uncover themes pertaining to managerial cognition and strategy (Nadkarni &
Barr, 2008; Eggers & Kaplan, 2009). Both these streams of in-depth field research have
enriched our understanding of the link between cognition and strategy.
These two approaches have different strengths and weaknesses. The use of
semi-structured interviews in retrospective studies afford researchers the flexibility to go
beyond what is contained in a published document to explore different facets of
executives' thinking, and gather perspectives of multiple managers, first-hand. However,
the retrospective nature of accounts of past strategies is affected by biases of recall
(Kaplan, 2011), and these inaccuracies are even more likely to affect the accounts of
"past beliefs and intentions, which are more subjective and perhaps more vulnerable to
the effects of cognitive biases and faulty memory" (Golden, 1992, p. 855). Thinking
backward in time from the focal event may make the strategic decisions that led to the
event easier to recall and ignore other strategic options the firm may have considered at
the time as "it is much easier after the event to sort the relevant from the irrelevant
signals" (Fischhoff, 1975, p. 292). The field studies using firm's annual reports are not
affected by distortions of memory over time (Kaplan, 2011), as the information about
managerial thinking is recorded closer in time to the thought. They also have the
advantage of being readily accessible. However, the primary limitation of using annual
reports as measures of managerial cognition is that the reports are written knowing that
they "are subject to careful scrutiny by outsiders", and hence actual managerial thinking
may not have been accurately represented (Bettman & Weitz, 1983). The reports may
have been written to set appropriate expectations, may contain instances of self-serving
attributions, and in some cases may even have been prepared by outside consultants
(ibid). Furthermore, firms are unlikely to reveal insights and information they consider of
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strategic value if that disclosure could diminish their competitive advantage. Finally, a
common feature of both these methods is that they measure cognition at the
organizational-level, not at the individual-level.
Using a research design that borrows the strengths of these two approaches and
avoids their weaknesses, this research examines the relationship between a manager's
perception of the business environment and his/her ideas about strategy. Prospective,
semi-structured interviews are used to capture the cognition and strategic ideas of each
manager. Each manager participating in the study is asked to describe the environment
the firm would encounter over a certain future planning horizon and the strategy s/he
recommends the firm should take. The prospective design is not affected by the biases
of retrospective recall, and the characterization of perception and strategy of each
manager obtained from semi-structured interviews is based only on the narrative of that
individual manager.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The literature pertinent to
managerial cognition is reviewed in section 4.2. Three hypotheses about the general
characteristics of managerial cognition are advanced using this information in section
4.3. The research method is elaborated in section 4.4, followed by the results of the
tests of the hypotheses in section 4.5. The findings of this deductive analysis provide
foundation for the inductive analysis presented in section 4.6. This analysis reveals the
variation in patterns of strategic thinking across the managers with different cognitive
profiles, and spawns a typology of managerial cognition, which is presented in section
4.7. Finally, section 4.8 discusses the results in context of the extant literature.
4.2 Managerial cognition
Managerial cognition has been studied by researchers over 30 years since the work of
Kiesler and Sproull (1982), who called it "a necessary precondition for managerial
activity directed toward organizational adaptation" (p. 548), and characterized
managerial cognition as noticing stimuli, interpreting them, and incorporating the
meaning with other relevant information to make strategic decisions. The ensuing
research has referred to the general idea of managerial cognition using various terms,
such as problem sensing (Kiesler & Sproull, 1982), strategic issue diagnosis (Dutton, et
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al., 1983), organizational interpretation (Daft & Weick, 1984), sensemaking (Weick,
1993; 1995), managerial attention (Ocasio, 1997), or cognition (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000;
Gavetti & Rivkin, 2007; Kaplan, 2008; 2011; Eggers & Kaplan, 2009). Generally, these
terms are used to indicate that in strategic thinking managers have to make sense of
the environment around them. They are not handed a list of environmental factors that
affect their firm and in the ways they affect. Instead, the "phenomena have to be forcibly
carved out of the undifferentiated flux of raw experience and conceptually fixed and
labeled so that they can become the common currency for communication exchanges"
(Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005, p. 411). Weick, et al. call the process of attending to
the parts of the events around them and interpreting of the observed "bracketing and
labeling". This cognitive process helps extract relevant pieces of data out of an
amorphous, continuum of environment the firm operates in, and gives concrete and
possibly actionable meaning to them.
Because of their limited capacity to pay attention all stimuli, the boundedly
rational managers can pay attention to only a subset of the relevant information. The
issues managers pay attention to are determined by how the firm's organizational
structure directs the managers' attention (Ocasio, 1997), and are influenced by the
demographic characteristics of the managers (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). While
scholars in the tradition of upper echelon theory (ibid) have studied the relationship
between managers' demographic characteristics and firm strategies (cf: see Hambrick
2007 for review), Hambrick (2007, p. 335) acknowledges that the demographic
characteristics are "valid, albeit incomplete and imprecise, proxies of executives'
cognitive frames" and "the use of demographic indicators leaves us at a loss as to the
real psychological and social processes that are driving executive behavior." Thus,
measuring managerial thinking using a direct approach is beneficial.
In this research, an individual manager, as opposed to a firm, is chosen as the
unit of analysis to study the relationship between strategic thinking and strategic choice.
Individual knowledge forms the basis from which organizations create knowledge
through organizational processes. An individual manager is "the prime mover in the
process of knowledge creation" (Nonaka, 1994, p. 21) because (p. 17) "at a
fundamental level, knowledge is created by individuals. An organization cannot create
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knowledge without individuals. The organization supports creative individuals or
provides a context for such individuals to create knowledge."
In summary, the managerial cognition literature identifies two cognitive processes
as relevant for strategic thinking: attention and interpretation. The former relates to the
type of information a manager brings into strategic thinking, and the latter relates to how
s/he interprets the information available to him/her. In addition, studies of decision-
making under uncertainty suggests that decision-makers' expectation about the future is
an important factor as well, since the strategic decisions are shown to be affected by
managerial optimism (Camerer & Lovallo, 1999; Simon & Houghton, 2003). Therefore,
this research work examines the role of three cognitive processes: managerial attention,
interpretation, and prediction.
4.2.1 Managerial attention
Ocasio (1997) proposed an attention-based view of the firm, which (p. 189) "views firms
as systems of structurally distributed attention" and proposes that (p. 202) "the ability of
the firm to adapt successfully to a changing environment is conditional on whether the
firm's procedural and communication channels focus the attention of the organizational
decision-makers on an appropriate set of issues and answers." It states that managers
are (pp. 189-90) "selective in the issues and answers they attend to at any one time"
and "what decision-makers do depends on what issues and answers they focus their
attention to". The subsequent empirical research shows that the attentional perspective
can explain firm strategies and actions, such as speed of response to changes in the
industry (Nadkarni & Barr, 2008), timing of entry into a new product market (Eggers &
Kaplan, 2009), or ability to detect weak signals leading to a crisis (Rerup, 2009).
The two most fundamental factors determining what managers pay attention to
are the activities performed by the manager's department (Dearborn & Simon, 1958),
and goal and rules of the department (Cyert & March, 1963). This is intentional:
organizations are designed to restrict the attention of its members to specific parts of
the environment to reduce the complexity of the context in which they have to make
decisions. Additionally, attention is influenced by characteristics of managers-such as
their demographic characteristics, strategic orientation of managers (Starbuck &
Milliken, 1988; Hambrick, 2007; McMullen, Shepherd, & Patzelf, 2009)-as well as the
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characteristics of issues themselves, such as the relative importance issues for firm's
sensemaking (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988; Thomas & McDaniel, 1990), or the overall mix
of issues managers have to attend at any given time (Sullivan, 2010).
4.2.2 Managerial interpretation
Strategic issues that managers attend to do not arrive at the managers' desk
predefined. Rather, the "data and stimuli [gathered from the environment] must be
infused with meaning by decision makers" through judgment and interpretation (Dutton,
et al., 1983, p. 80). This "process of translating data into knowledge and understanding"
(Thomas & McDaniel, 1990) is called managerial interpretation. Interpretation is an
important part of strategic thinking, and organizations are often viewed as "interpretation
systems" (Daft & Weick, 1984). Empirical studies of managerial interpretation try to
understand how managers make sense of the abundant and unstructured information
they receive for making strategic decisions (e.g. Jackson & Dutton, 1988; Porac &
Thomas, 1990; Porac, et al., 1995; etc.).
Research shows that different managers may interpret the same issue differently.
One way to interpret issues is to label them as either opportunities or threats (Dutton &
Jackson, 1987), which are individual managers' subjective interpretations of
environmental factors. The "variations in interpretations of issue-related data among
individuals are brought about, in part, by differences in their cognitive maps, not solely
by differences in data available to them or by failures in being logically consistent"
(Dutton, et al., 1983, p. 313). These cognitive maps or cognitive frames are unique to
individuals and are influenced by their "previous experiences - including individual
career histories, project experience, functional membership, position in the hierarchy -
and contexts - including the firm, the industry and the prevailing technological
paradigm" (Kaplan, 2008, p. 738). The contextual factors shown to induce variation in
issue interpretation include manager's cultural background (Barr & Glynn, 2004),
perceived effectiveness of the organization and the strength of its identity (Milliken,
1990), whether the issues are core to the firm's identity (Sharma, 2000), and the firm's
strategic posture (Thomas & McDaniel, 1990).
Research has started connecting an organization's interpretation to its strategic
actions, as observed in the field. Field research shows that an organization directs
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actions externally when faced with a threat of likely loss and internally when faced with
a threat of reduction in its control over its actions (Chattopadhyay, Glick, & Huber,
2001). Other field research linking interpretation to strategy, where the factors are not
restricted to be interpreted as threats or opportunities, shows that a firm's actions are
affected by how it interprets factors such as technological change and the needs of its
customer (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). Research also shows that firms that are ambivalent
about the implications of relevant environmental issues take bolder and more wide-
scoping actions in response to those issues (Plambeck & Weber, 2009).
4.2.3 Managerial prediction
Strategic thinking that precedes strategic planning involves making predictions, either
implicit or explicit, about the future in which the strategy will play out (Hogarth &
Makridakis, 1981; Ghemawat, 1991; Courtney, Kirkland, & Viguerie, 1997; Liedtka,
1998). While different schools of thought disagree about the usefulness of explicit
predictions and formal planning (Mintzberg, 1990; Ansoff, 1991), making assumptions
about the future is essential when an organization needs to develop a strategy and
commit resources to implement it (Mintzberg, 1978), which is why strategic planning is
also referred to as "anticipatory decision making" (Ackoff, 1970). Despite its importance,
the managerial cognition literature pays much less attention to the aspect of prediction
compared to attention and interpretation. With the exception of rare empirical studies in
laboratory (Camerer & Lovallo, 1999; Bukszar, 2003) and field (Simon & Houghton,
2003), the link between prediction and strategy has been confined to theoretical papers
(Hogarth & Makridakis, 1981; Barnes, 1984; Zajac & Bazerman, 1991; Kahneman &
Lovallo, 1993). One possible reason for this meager field examination of managerial
prediction is that empirical studies in managerial cognition have tended to be
retrospective. The theoretical papers unanimously claim, and empirical evidence
supports, that managers are overconfident in their forecasts and hence are optimistic
about the success of their strategies. The sparse empirical evidence, however, does not
unanimously state whether the optimism is helpful or not. Studies show that optimism
leads to excess market entry and thus lowers profitability (Camerer & Lovallo, 1999;
Simon & Houghton, 2003); however, optimism is also associated with firms introducing
more pioneering, as opposed to incrementally improved, products (Simon & Houghton,
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2003). Finally, as predicted by Kahneman and Lovallo (1993), subjects are "timid" and
conservative when it comes to implementing their "bold" forecasts (Bukszar, 2003).
4.2.4 Distinguishing design features of this research
Three features of the design of this research distinguish it from the large body of the
extant literature on managerial cognition. First, the research explores how managers
think about the future and how their strategies relate to their strategic thinking using a
prospective, instead of retrospective, research design. Second, it studies managerial
attention and interpretation together, by examining how managers interpret the factors
they attend to. The extant research has largely studied these two processes separately.
Third, it studies managerial prediction and interpretation together, by examining how
managers interpret the future environment they predict their firm is likely to experience.
4-3 Hypotheses of managerial cognition
As reviewed in the previous section, the empirical research in attention and
interpretation has studied these two constructs separately-generally at the firm level-
and related them to firm strategies. However, relationship between managerial attention
and interpretation is not explored. We hypothesize two relationships between
managerial attention and interpretation.
First, given that attention is a scarce resource and that managers are selective in
issues they attend to (Ocasio, 1997), managers are likely to focus their attention on
issues they consider having the most impact on the organization (Starbuck & Milliken,
1988). So, when comparing a manager's interpretation of the magnitude of impact of the
issues s/he attends to with the ones she overlooks, we can expect that:
Hypothesis 1: Managers interpret the environmental factors they pay
attention to as having a larger impact (either positive or negative) on the
organization, compared to the factors they do not pay attention to.
Second, empirical evidence shows that managers are more likely to interpret a given
ambiguous issue as a threat rather than as an opportunity, and are more likely to hold
on to the belief that the issue is a threat, as opposed to an opportunity (Jackson &
Dutton, 1988). Managerial actions are also more likely to be taken when issues are
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interpreted as threats instead of opportunities (Chattopadhyay, et al. 2001). But, the
literature does not say whether managers are more likely to pay attention to threats than
opportunities. Given that people are generally loss-averse (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979), it seems likely that managers would direction greater portion of their scarce
attention to protect their organization against issues they interpret to be threats,
compared to the issues they interpret as opportunities, which the organization can
benefit from. So, when comparing a manager's interpretation of the nature of impact of
the issues s/he attends to with the ones she overlooks, we can expect that:
Hypothesis 2: Managers interpret a greater proportion of environmental
factors they pay attention to as having negative impact on the firm,
compared to the factors they do not pay attention to.
The theoretical arguments and empirical evidence from psychology suggests that
people are optimistic about the future (Weinstein, 1980; Kunda, 1987; Peterson,
Seligman, & Vaillant, 1988). At first, this seems to contradict the hypothesis about
greater attention to threat. However, attention and prediction happen in two separate
time spans: attention pertains to the issues in the present, whereas prediction pertains
to the issues in the future. It is possible for a manager to pay greater attention to threats
in the present, and expect that future will be more positive.
Hypothesis 3(a): Managers believe that the environmental factors they
interpret as positively impacting the firm are more likely to occur compared
to the factors they interpret as negatively impacting the firm.
Hypothesis 3(b): Managers believe that the environmental factors they
interpret as negatively impacting the firm are less likely to occur compared
to the factors they interpret as positively impacting the firm.
4.4 Research method
This section describes the research method. Note that a part of the data gathered in this
study was also used in the study presented in Chapter 3. Therefore, description of the
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research method in this chapter is also presented in Chapter 3. Instead of asking the
reader to refer back to Chapter 3, the research method is presented in its entirety here.
4.4-1 Research context
The research was conducted a U.S. pharmaceuticals distributor, nicknamed Medford.
This study is restricted to the managers in only one firm to avoid any industry and firm
effects. The distributors "primarily distribute medicines intended to diagnose, treat or
prevent diseases" (IBISWorld, 2012); they acquire pharmaceuticals from the
manufacturers, and deliver them to a complex network of hospitals, clinics, and
pharmacies, where they are sold or administered to patients. Medford's competitive
advantage is its supply chain: its extensive network of physical assets that allows
Medford to deliver pharmaceuticals quickly to the remotest populations in the U.S. and
the operating processes that allow it to do this in a highly cost-effective and safe
manner. The managers participating in this study were the mid- and senior-level
managers in Medford's supply chain group that met once a month. The leader of the
group was a Senior Vice President and the firm's top executive for the pharmaceutical
distribution supply chain. Our engagement with Medford began when the group invited
us to facilitate its discussions about the preparedness of its supply chain for the future.
The data used in this study was collected with the intent to understand how the team
members perceived and interpreted the business environment and the appropriate
supply chain strategies for the firm.
4.4-1.1 Why study managerial cognition at Medford?
U.S. pharmaceutical distribution industry provides an ideal setting for studying
managerial cognition. In 2010, the U.S. pharmaceutical distributors were operating in a
highly competitive market. Despite being the third largest industry (by revenue) in the
U.S. healthcare sector, the industry had a profit margin of mere 1.5%, the lowest among
all 32 industries (by NAICS codes) in the U.S. healthcare sector (See Exhibit 1). The
distributors were anticipating further cost pressure as the healthcare costs in the U.S.
were under public and government scrutiny: the specter of government action and loss
of negotiating power of distributors due the consolidation among manufacturers,
pharmacies, and hospitals was looming over their head. Furthermore, a confluence of
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changes in industry-increase in the proportion of generic medicines; pharmacies
souring pharmaceuticals directly from manufacturers; increase in personalized
medicine, which is shipped directly from manufacturers to patients; etc.-was
portending an "intermediating change" (McGahan, 2004), where industry's core assets
(distribution assets, knowledge, etc.) were not threatened, but its core activities
(distribution of medicines from manufacturer to pharmacies, hospitals) were. This is
considered "the most challenging [change] because companies must simultaneously
preserve their valuable assets and restructure their key relationships" (ibid, p. 90).
In addition to these somewhat certain challenges, the industry also faced
ambiguity about regulations and technology. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act of 2009 (the "Healthcare Reform"), which promised a significant increase in the
volume of drugs consumed in the U.S., was challenged for its constitutionality and it
was uncertain if its provisions will go in effect. The nature of pharmaceuticals carried by
the distributors was changing. While the proportion of branded drugs in the mix of
pharmaceutical consumed was certain to drop sharply, the growth in volume of biologic
drugs and their generic versions was uncertain. The volume of biologic drugs in the total
mix was an important factor for the distributors as these drugs need to be maintained in
a temperature-controlled environment throughout the supply chain, which requires the
warehouses and vehicles be climate-controlled. An increase in the volume of biologic
drugs would require the distributors to make significant investments in new assets.
In summary, the Medford managers in this study faced the challenge of
maintaining profitability in extremely cost-competitive current business while exploring
new revenue sources for an industry anticipating an intermediating change, while the
future was highly uncertain.
4.4.1.2 Participants
The participants in the study were 25 mid- and senior-level managers in the supply
chain group at Medford that met once a month. The participants' included Senior Vice
Presidents (2), Vice Presidents (12), Directors (7), and Managers. These managers
were responsible for a broad spectrum of functions in the supply chain, such operation
of distribution centers, strategic planning, Information Technology, corporate ethics,
regulations, human resources, environment health & safety, etc. The geographic area
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under the responsibility of these managers covered all major regions in the U.S.:
Northeast, Southeast, Midwest, Southwest, and West.
4.4.2 Capturing managerial cognition
The following sections describe the methods used for collecting, coding, and validating
data about managerial cognition from the Medford managers participating in the study.
4.4.2.1 Data collection: Managerial attention
Semi-structured qualitative interviews (Weiss, 1994) were used for collecting
information about the environmental factors managers paid attention to. This type of
interview allows us to capture a manager's attention without imposing the interviewer's
knowledge structure on her (Carley & Palmquist, 1992), as it does not make "error of
commission" by providing information to the respondent s/he recognizes as relevant but
does not necessarily pay attention to (Hodgkinson, Maule, & Bown, 2004). All interviews
were conducted over phone by one researcher and recorded with explicit consent of
each respondent. Before interviewing Medford managers, the interview protocol was
tested and refined in four phone interviews with supply chain practitioners in firms other
than Medford.
The interviews used two seeding questions: What business environment Medford
would operate in five years into the future, and what strategy should it pursue. The
interviews did not use any probes, and relied on the "markers" in the information
provided by the respondents when answering the open-ended questions. Weiss (1994,
p. 77) suggests that the interviewer "remember [the markers] and return to them when
possible". Instead of relying on memory, the interviewer jotted down all markers in the
respondent's descriptions of the environment (e.g. "environmental regulations will be
stricter") and the strategy (e.g. "we will need to track each pill from producer to patient"),
and explored each marker further through follow-up questions. The interviews were
conducted using a "breadth-first" approach for exploring the respondents' knowledge, as
describe below.
When answering the open-ended question about the business environment (or
strategy), the respondents typically described a few aspects of the business
environment (strategy). The interviewer listened to the respondent carefully and jotted
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down each marker mentioned. When the respondent stopped talking, the interviewer
narrated him/her all the markers s/he had mentioned, and asked how else s/he would
describe the future business environment (strategy). These questions often produced
long moments of silence, suggesting that the respondent was thinking. In these long
pauses, the interviewer remained silent and patiently waited for the respondent to speak
again. Almost invariably, this tactic led the respondent to describe more features of the
business environment (strategy). Again, the interviewer listened carefully and jotted
down all markers in the respondent's reply. This procedure, of alternating between
attentive listening and asking for further exploration, was continued until the respondent
mentioned that s/he had nothing more to add. At this point, a number of markers
describing the business environment (strategy) had been gathered, and thus had
covered the "breadth" of the respondent's attention. From this point on, the interviewer
asked the respondent to explore each marker in more detail ("depth") by asking
questions such as "what do you mean by...", "why would... happen?", etc. After
exploring all the markers, the respondent was asked one more time if s/he had any
more environmental factors (strategies) to add to what was shared until that point. The
interviewer moved to the next question or concluded the interview if the respondent had
nothing more to add.
The rationale for using the breadth-first procedure described above was to
explore the span of respondent's managerial attention. To capture the thinking fully, it
was necessary that the respondents were in a place where they could do such
exploratory thinking. For this reason, each respondent was reminded via email one day
before the telephone interview to set the time aside where s/he can think about the
future business environment and strategy of the firm without getting interrupted. The
text of the reminder email is presented in Exhibit 2 in the appendix (§4.10). At the start
of the interview, the respondent was told that the interview questions had no right or
wrong answers, and the interviewer was interested in the respondent's perspective
(Lofland, et al., 2006). Respondents were also informed that their answers would be
shared only anonymously with the rest of the group, and encouraged to be open.
All interviews were scheduled for 1 hour, and they lasted from 33 minutes to 98
minutes. In cases where all markers gathered in an interview could not be explored in
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the scheduled time, the interviewer either continued the call or asked for additional time.
The average interview time was just over one hour. At the conclusion of each interview,
the interviewer detailed his overall impressions of the interview in a memo.
4.4.2.2 Data analysis: Qualitative coding
All interviews were digitally recorded. The interviewer himself coded all interviews, one
at a time, by listening to the recording of each interview using the procedure described
by Strauss and Corbin (1990). The coding progressed in three stages: initial coding,
focused coding, and axial coding (Charmaz, 2006). In initial coding, the interviewer
listened to every statement made by the respondent-in line with Charmaz's
recommendation to code line-by-line-and generated substantive codes. These codes
are close to the data. This was followed by focused coding, in which all substantive
codes were reviewed, grouped into categories and their properties and dimensions
were identified (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). This procedure of initial and focused coding
was followed for all 25 interviews. The coding process was highly iterative, and the
codes - the categories, properties, and dimensions - evolved through constant
comparison. The comparison of data and codes took place at two levels: within each
interview, which helped refine the open codes, and across interviews, which helped
refine the categories and properties. The coding exercise produced a total of 1235 open
codes across 25 interviews (average of 49.4 codes per respondent; range 33 to 64).
4.4.2.3 Validation
The goal of validation was to ensure that the interviews and the coding process had
correctly and exhaustively captured and represented the span of each manager's
attention and beliefs. Three steps were taken to ensure this. First, after each interview,
a brief questionnaire was sent to each respondent asking whether s/he had "sufficient
time to explore all aspects of Medford's business environment (or business) that you
think of naturally and in sufficient detail." 15 out of 25 returned the questionnaire;
everyone, except one person, answered affirmatively. The person who answered
negatively made the following comment:
"There was sufficient time for our discussion, but not enough for me to have
given proper "soak" time to think through the questions posed." The respondent
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further remarked that "due to my schedule, I didn't have a ton of time to put some
extra thought prior to the call which is my fault."
Second, a mental map was created for each respondent; each map shows all the
concepts the respondent expressed in the interview. Each manager was sent three
maps, including his/her own, and asked to allocate 100 points among the three maps so
that the points assigned to each map indicate the likelihood that the said map belonged
to him/her. The triplet sent to each manager contained his/her own map and two other
maps chosen randomly from the remaining 24. Within the triplet, the maps were
randomly labeled either A, B, or C. 17 out of 25 (68%) respondents correctly placed all
100 points on their own map. Six more (24%) placed between 70 and 90 points on their
own map. Thus, 23 out of 25 (92%) respondents correctly identified their own cognitive
map from the set. One respondent assigned 20 points to his map and 80 points to
another, but later admitted that he made a mistake in voting and should have placed 80
points on his own map. One person assigned 33.3% point to each map. When
answering a one-question survey after the validation exercise about why each person
voted as such, the respondents made the following remarks:
"I think about this stuff all the time so I wasn't just pulling random thoughts out of
the air then having to remember. Second, I think you captured our conversation
perfectly." (Placed 100 points on own map)
"I saw specific things I had talked with you about in ... I saw pieces and parts of
what I said in A and B, but saw a lot of what I told you in C" (Placed 100 points
on own map)
"I remembered the items I highlighted during our conversation, there were a few
from B that resonated as well, I knew the key themes person A highlighted were
not from our conversation. I started out putting 100% on C but backed off a bit."
(Placed 80 points on own map C)
Third, each manager his/her own mental map after validation and asked if s/he would
add anything to the map. Only one person added a few more variables, which were
incorporated into the person's map. In this research, the cognitive map of each
respondent is treated as the description of that person's managerial attention.
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4.4.3 Data collection: Managerial interpretation
The interviews with 25 managers provided a rich description of business environment
and strategies of Medford. The qualitative coding exercise produced 55 factors related
to the business environment and 42 related to the strategies. 32 of the environmental
factors were chosen for capturing the interpretation of the business environment of the
managers. The 32 factor were chosen by the Supply Chain 2020 research team of CTL,
such that all aspects of the environment identified by the managers were represented in
them. The only reason for choosing a subset, and not all 55, of the environmental
factors for this exercise was to minimize our demand of the managers' time.
Managerial interpretation of these 32 environmental factors was captured using a
questionnaire, which asked each manager to rate each factor as either beneficial or
hurtful to the firm using a five-point scale. The beneficial-hurtful dichotomy parallels two
of three dimensions of opportunity-threat identified by Dutton and Jackson (1987),
namely whether it leads to gain or loss and whether it is positive or negative. The third
dimension in the Dutton and Jackson's opportunity-threat dichotomy is the firm's ability
to control that dimension. The questionnaire did not evaluate controllability of the
environmental factors as the majority of the dimensions in the questionnaire were
related to the factors perceived to be outside the control of Medford (e.g. technological
advance in biotech, regulations, reimbursement policies, societal preferences, etc.)
Questionnaires completed by 20 managers could be used in the analysis. Every
environmental factor included in the interpretation questionnaire came from the
interviews with, and thus attended to by, one or more manager in this study. Each factor
on the questionnaire was attended to by between one and ten (average 4.7) managers.
The number of factors attended by each manager and included in the questionnaire
ranged between 2 and 14 (average 7.5, median 8).
4.5 Tests of hypotheses
The questionnaires asking for impact of 32 environmental factors on the firm were
completed by 20 managers. Out of total 640 evaluations, 629 were rated on the five-
point scale. The qualitative coding method used allowed us to identify the factors
attended by each manager. In 167 out of 629 completed evaluations, a manager had
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paid attention to the particular environmental factor whose impact on Medford s/he
evaluated. The distribution of factors, by their impact on Medford as interpreted by a
manager and separated into factors attended and overlooked by the corresponding
manager, is presented in Table 4-1. The table shows the number and proportion of
factors for each impact level among those attended and overlooked. For instance, the
managers interpreted 43 out of 167 (0.26) factors they attended to as being "Extremely
hurtful" for the firm. Figure 4-1 shows the proportion for each impact level graphically.
Interpretation of Attended Overlooked
impact on firm Nbr of factors Proportion Nbr of factors Proportion
Extremely hurtful (-ve) 43 0.26 73 0.16
Somewhat hurtful (-ve) 42 0.25 110 0.24
Neutral 15 0.09 65 0.14
Somewhat beneficial (+ve) 43 0.26 145 0.31
Extremely beneficial (+ve) 24 0.14 69 0.15
167 1.00 462 1.00
Table 4-1: Distribution of factors by interpreted impact on firm
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Figure 4-1: Proportion of environmental factors by impact
Figure 4-2: Proportion of environmental factors by the severity of impact
Figure 4-3: Proportion of environmental factors by the nature of impact
(160)
Proportion of environmental factors by
SEVERITY of impact
0.6 -------------------- 549------------------ mAttended0.518
0 Overlooked0.5 ------------------------------------ . 1 ,..... -- overlooked--
0.3930.4 -- - -------- ---- --- -
0.310
0 .3 -- ---- ------ ---- - -----
0.23 4
0.2 - -- 0:4
0.089
0. ::....... .....
0 0.... .. ... .
Strong impact Weak impact No impact("Extremely..." ("Somewhat." ("Neutral")
hurtful or beneficial) hurtful or beneficial)
Proportion of environmental factors by NATURE
of impact
0.6 t------------------Atended
0.5 -- -- DOverlooked -- 0.64 -
0.395 0.399
0.4--
0.3 ----
0.2 -4
0.1 0.089.
0.0...
Negative (Extremely Neutral Positive (Extremely
or Somewhat or Somewhat
..hurtful") "...beneficial")
4.5-1 Test of Hypothesis 1: Attention to more impactful factors
Figure 4-2 shows the proportion of environmental factors attended and overlooked by
the managers by the severity of their impact on the firm, as interpreted by the individual
manager. Among the 167 evaluations for the factors attended, 67 (40.7%) were
interpreted as having strong impact and 85 (50.9%) as having a weak impact. Among
the environmental factors overlooked by the managers 142 (30.7%) were evaluated as
having a strong impact and 255 (55.2%) as having a weak impact on the firm. The
proportion of factors attended and interpreted as having a strong impact (40.7%) is
greater than the proportion of factors overlooked that were interpreted as having a
strong impact (30.7%) (p=0.014; z-test for two independent proportions). The proportion
of factors interpreted as having no impact on the firm among the factors attended by
managers (15 out of 167; 9%) is also smaller (p=0.045) than among those overlooked
by managers (65 out of 462; 14.1%). This result supports the albeit unsurprising
Hypothesis 1 that managers pay more attention to the environmental factors they
consider as having a greater impact on the firm, and overlook the factors they
consider as having no impact.
4.5.2 Test of Hypothesis 2: Attention to negative-impact factors
Figure 4-3 shows the proportion of environmental factors attended and overlooked by
the managers by the nature of their impact on the firm, as interpreted by the individual
manager. Among the 167 evaluations for the factors attended, 85 (50.9%) were
interpreted as being hurtful and 67 (40.1%) as being beneficial to the firm. Among the
environmental factors overlooked by managers 183 (39.6%) were evaluated as being
hurtful and 214 (46.3%) as being beneficial for the firm. The proportion of factors
interpreted as hurtful for the firm among the factors managers attended (0.509) is larger
than among the factors they overlooked (0.396) (p=0.006). This difference is even
stronger among the factors interpreted as "Extremely hurtful". A significantly larger
proportion of attended factors (43 out of 167; 0.257) were interpreted as "extremely
hurtful" than the proportion of factors s/e overlooked (73 out of 462; 0.158) (p=.002).
This result supports Hypothesis 2 that managers pay disproportionately more
attention to the negative factors.
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4.5.3 Test of Hypothesis 3: Prediction about the future
After evaluating the impact of environmental factors on Medford, the managers in this
study were asked to estimate the likelihood of the 32 environmental factors coming true
during the planning horizon of the study. In 608 out of 640 evaluations, the managers
rated the likelihood on the five-point scale, ranging from "Extremely likely" to "Extremely
unlikely". Table 4-2 shows the distribution of 608 evaluations by the nature of impact
and likelihood of occurrence of the environmental factors on the firm. For each type of
impact, the first row shows the number of evaluations corresponding to the impact type
and the likelihood of indicated in the column. The second row shows the proportion of
evaluations for that particular impact type for the corresponding likelihood. The number
of assessments for unlikely and likely evaluations are added together and shown in the
two columns titled accordingly, before the last column that shows the total number of
evaluations for each impact type. For instance, in 62 out of 260 evaluations, where an
environmental factor was considered "Hurtful" to the firm, the managers judged the
factor to be unlikely to happen over the planning horizon.
The proportion of factors considered "Likely to happen" among the factors judged
to be beneficial to the firm (216/273 =0.791) is higher than that among the factors
judged to be hurtful to the firm (165/260 =0.635) (p<.001; z-test for two independent
proportions). Symmetrically, the proportion of factors considered "Unlikely to happen"
among the factors judged to be hurtful to the firm (62/260 =0.238) is higher (p<.001)
than that among the factors judged to be beneficial to the firm (32/273 =0.117).
The likelihoods of hurtful and beneficial factors are shown graphically in Figure
4-4, which clearly shows the differences in likelihoods. The proportions of hurtful factors
considered either "Extremely unlikely" (0.027) or "Somewhat unlikely" (0.212) are both
significantly higher than those for the beneficial factors (0.004 and 0.114, respectively)
(p=.014 and p=.001, respectively). Among the factors "somewhat likely" to occur, the
proportion of beneficial factors (0.505) is also higher (p=.001) than among hurtful factors
(0.377). However, the differences between the two proportions of factors "extremely
likely" (0.258 for hurtful, 0.286 for beneficial) are not statistically significant (p=.234).
These results provide support to the hypothesis 3, that the managers are likely to
believe that good things are more likely to happen to them compared to bad things.
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Impact
Hurtful 7 55 33 98 67
0.027 0.212 0.127 0.377 0.258
62
0.2381
165
0.635
260
2 6 8 35 24 8 59 75Neutral
0.027 0.080 0.107 0.467 0.320 0.107 0.787
1 . 31 25 138 78 32 216 273Beneficial--
0.004 0.114 0.092 0.505 0.286 0.117 0.791
Table 4-2: Distribution of likelihood of environmental factors by impact
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Figure 4-4: Distribution of likelihood of environmental factors by impact
4.5-4 Summary: Typical managerial cognition
The results of the tests of three hypotheses can be summarized to describe the
cognition of a typical manager: managers primarily focus attention on environmental
factors they consider to have a greater impact on the firm, pay greater attention to the
threats, and are optimistic about the future.
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4.6 Cognition and strategic thinking: Inductive research
The above empirical results characterize managerial cognition at an aggregate level.
However, differences exist among individual managers regarding the factors they pay
attention to and their predictions about the future: not all managers are more attentive to
threats or are optimistic about the future. Table 4-3 shows the number of hurtful and
beneficial factors attended and predicted as likely by the respondents in this study.
Three types of cognition are present in this data:
" Type-1: Pay more attention to the factors they interpret as beneficial to the firm,
and are optimistic about the future
* Type-2: Pay more attention to the factors they interpret as hurtful to the firm, and
are optimistic about the future
e Type-3: Pay more attention to the factors they interpret as hurtful for the firm, and
are pessimistic about the future
Nbr of factors attended Nbr of factors predicted likely Cognition
Respondent Hurtful Beneficial Hurtful Beneficial type
Dennis Nelson 2 5 6 14 Type-1
Larry Wright 1 3 8 11 Type-1
Walter Mitchell 3 4 6 9 Type-1
Ryan Campbell
Greg Green
Patrick Roberts
Barbara Baker
Josh Adams
Arthur Phillips
Jason Hall
Tim Young
Peter King
Jerry Gonzalez
Susan Carter
Carl Turner
Eric Hill
Ray Scott
Jose Hernandez
Jeff Lopez
3
3
4
4
3
5
6
6
4
4
3
5
6
4
1
3
3
3
3
2
31
12
10
6
10
6
10
9
12
10
4
4
10
9
7
5
9
5
77
Type-2
Type-2
Type-2
Type-2
Table 4-3: Managers by cognitive type
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Note: Table 4-3 lists respondent names. All names used here are pseudonyms created
by me for the managers participating in this study. The association between the
pseudonym and the corresponding manager is known only to me.
4.6.1 Research approach for inductive research
A natural question is whether managers of different cognitive type envision different
types of strategies.9 The review of the managerial cognition literature presented in §4.2
shows that the direct relationship between a manager's perception of the business
environment and the strategies s/he advocates has not been explored in the extant
literature. Noted management scholars (Edmondson & McManus, 2007) advice that the
appropriate research strategy for such "nascent" topics is to ask "open ended questions"
and answer those by identifying patterns in qualitative data. The output of such a
research approach is a "suggestive theory" presented as a system of propositions (ibid).
The inductive analysis presented here takes this approach.
To answer the question whether managers of different cognitive types envision
different types of strategies, the strategies advocated by the 11 managers of three types
of cognition in their qualitative interviews are examined to detect the presence of
systematic patterns. For doing this, the managers of each type are treated as multiple
cases (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). The strategies proposed by all
managers of one type of cognition are examined to find "cross-case patterns"
(Eisenhardt, 1989), which are the "unique dependent variables [i.e. proposed strategies]
resulting from the same condition [i.e. type of managerial cognition]" (Yin, 2003).
The appropriate strategy for presenting inductive research is "to develop a theory
in sections or by distinct propositions in such a way that each is supported by empirical
evidence" (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007, p. 29). This approach is taken in this research
for unraveling the relationship between managerial cognition and strategic thinking. The
9 The claim that a particular manager stated a particular strategy in his/her interview is subject to
individual interpretation. To ensure that the results are not biased by my interpretation of interview data, I
performed a cross-coder analysis with another MIT CTL researcher, who is also familiar with the Medford
industry, but was not aware of the purpose of cross-coder analysis. The first round of coding produced a
77.8% match between my codes and those assigned by the cross-coder (Cohen's K, which is an "overly
conservative measure" (Rust & Cooil, 1994), was 0.55). I discussed each instance where my code did not
match the cross-coder's, and we mutually resolved all except 4 disagreements, producing a match of
98.3% (299 out of 303). The results presented here use the final list of codes resulting from the above
discussions between me and the cross-coder.
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analysis presented in sections 4.6.2 through 4.6.4-as a set of propositions-shows
striking similarities in the strategies envisioned by managers of the same type and large
differences in the strategies of managers of different cognitive types. In addition to this
data, the complete text of evidence-managers' narratives of their strategies-is
presented in "construct tables" (ibid) in the appendix of this chapter (§4.10)
4.6.2 Managerial attention and novelty of recommended revenue sources
The difference between the revenue sources recommended by the managers who
interpreted the factors they pay attention to primarily as beneficial (Type-1) and those
who interpreted them primarily as hurtful (Type-2 and -3) was vivid. Managers attending
primarily to the hurtful factors suggested revenue sources that were either similar to the
ones used by Medford today, or were commonly known among the managers
participating in this research. In contrast, the managers attending primarily to the
beneficial factors suggested that firm to rely on novel revenue sources.
A total of 19 revenue sources were recommended by the 25 managers
participating in this study. Table 4-4 shows these revenue sources, the number of
managers who suggested each source, and the number of Type-1, 2, and 3 managers
suggesting the source. The bottom row of the table shows the Spearman's rho 0
coefficient of correlation between the number of managers suggesting a particular
revenue source, and the number of managers of a particular type suggesting that
source. The coefficient is highest (0.912) for Type-3 managers: this suggests that more
(fewer) managers of Type-3 were likely to recommend a revenue source when it was
also recommended by a large (small) number of all managers interviewed, i.e. when it
was a common (novel) strategy for generating revenue known within the executive
team. For instance, the most commonly suggested revenue strategies by the Type-3
managers (3 out of 4, each) are R03, R04, and R1 0, each of which was suggested by
about 12 members of the executive team. Spearman's rho is smallest for Type-1
managers (0.381): this indicates that the revenue-generation strategies recommended
by this group of managers were more likely to be novel within the executive group.
10 Spearman's rho is calculated from the ranks of the data in the two correlated vectors, and ranges from -
1 to +1. Rho of +1 indicates that the ranks of the data within the two vectors are identical, i.e. the two
vectors are perfectly monotonically related. A positive correlation indicates that the when one vector
increases, the other tends to increase as well, and vice versa.
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RO1
R02}
R03
R04
Become a healthcare SC services company:
Offer a portfolio of SC services, not just
distribution
Distribute non-healthcare products
Distributor of specialty medicines (e.g. biologics,
nuclear)
Expand outside the U.S. into healthcare SC
R05 Focus more on healthcare channels besides
warehouse pharmacies and hospitals
R06 Generate more revenue from manufacturers by
offering services
R07 Grow the share of generics in productsdistributed
R08
Build capabilities for, and contract work
performed by firm's supply chain partners (e.g.
manufacturing, warehousing)
Use excess warehouse capacity to generate
R09 revenue (e.g. by storing other products, offering
new services)
Remain in the core business of drug and
Ri0 medical supplies distribution
Consulting to get compliant with new
R1 1 regulations, and solutions to manage regulations
(e.g. pedigree, cold chain)
R12 Consulting to set up and manage pharmacies
and improve reimbursement
Data analytics about drug usage and
effectiveness
R14 Electronic healthcare solutions
R 15 .Management of customers' facilities andinventory
R1 6 Package and deliver direct to the patient (homei or bedside)
R17 Solutions and operational excellence consultingto improve SC efficiency
Solutions intended to help small customersR18 increase revenue
R19 Solutions to improve patient safety and drugsafety in SC
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9
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2
6
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1/3
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0/4
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Spearman Rho correlation coefficient 0.381 0.645 | 0.912
Table 4-4: Products and revenue sources suggested
different types
by managers of
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Exhibit 3 in the Appendix shows the revenue sources recommended by each of the 11
managers classified as Type-1, 2 or 3. Type-1 managers recommended programs such
as large-scale manufacturing of generic drugs, setting up pharmacies in grocery stores
and physicians' offices (both by Dennis Nelson), integrating patient care with drug
delivery by getting involved in patient diagnosis and treatment (Larry Wright), or creating
products using the information Medford already has (Walter Mitchell) such as predicting
diseases to prepare healthcare providers (Larry Mitchell).
The novel opportunities for generating revenue identified by the Type-1
managers were grounded in the reality of the capabilities Medford either possessed
today or was likely to have in future.
"We should be using our own solution that we already have. Instead of trying to
figure out how to sell more and penetrate more hospitals, we should be
penetrating these grocery stores that don't have a pharmacy in them" (Nelson)"I
"Because of Medford's current relationships with the manufacturers and
distributors globally, we have the ability to basically be on the forefront of
[developing] new standards or checklists ..." (Wright)
"We have capacity in our network to take on additional products and distribute...
things like veterinary products" (Mitchell)
"We will have potentially more information to capitalize on... sales information on
where our product is being distributed, whether it is temperature-controlled
throughout..." (Mitchell)
Some Type-1 managers expressed surprise that Medford was not taking advantage of
those revenue sources today, suggesting a disagreement with the firm's current
strategy:
"I don't know why we don't do this today... We can analyze, based on where we
are shipping that product... to make a predictive medicine..." (Wright)
"Instead of trying to figure out how to sell more and penetrate more hospitals, we
should be penetrating these grocery stores" (Nelson)
"I think Medford is taking the absolute wrong approach when it comes to generic
manufacturing..." (Mitchell)
Name in the parenthesis following a quote is the pseudonym of the manager who the quote belongs
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The revenue opportunities identified by Type-1 managers stand in stark contrast to
those recommended by the Type-3 managers, who recommended that Medford should
remain a distributor of pharmaceuticals.
"I see us as getting back to our core competency, which is really managing the
supply chain... " (Hill)
"...still being a primary provider of products and services. I think that will be our
value proposition: that's what we know best - management of supply chain end-
to-end." (Hill)
"... at the end of the day, I do envision us continuing to be a supplier of products
in the marketplace." (Turner)
It was not that Type-3 did not see the need to change; they did...
"I don't think we can survive just being a supply chain provider. I think that's the
cash cow, but in the current market conditions, the revenue, profit is not there."
(Scott)
But, they either did not have specific ideas about what the new revenue sources could
be...
"I don't have any sort of specific ideas of products or services, other than to say
whatever is necessary to fulfill..." (Hill)
"If you are asking me to identify those services today, I probably don't have a
list." (Scott)
"... being incredibly relevant to the healthcare marketplace... where all partners
up and downstream see the relevance, value the relevance and that we have a
sustainable economic model of continued growth." (Turner)
... or their recommended revenue sources that deviated from Medford's current
business model of being a distribution and Supply chain services provider were limited
to "Operational excellence consulting" and "Distribution of specialty medicines". Both of
these revenue streams are widely known within the executive team: they were
recommended by 13 and 12 managers, respectively, of the 19 managers in the study
(R1 7 and R03 in Table 4-4):
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"There is still growth opportunity for us to take what we have learned in our
operations excellence" (Hernandez)
"We will be a company that is more involved with the specialty products... So, I
believe that will be a fairly significant difference" (Hernandez)
"Expanding the space and getting into more of the oncology space and a few
other things that complement that..." (Hill)
Sometimes, a Type-3 manager even recommended not pursuing a revenue stream
suggested by a Type-1 manager:
"... I really think the generics are going to be so big that we really have to be at
least part ownership in generic manufacturing to really make significant money.
(Nelson; Type-1)
"I see us as getting back to our core competency... reducing our manufacturing
footprint to really focus on being more of a deliverer and purveyor of product and
services as opposed to manufacturer of products and services" (Hill; Type-3)
The Type-2 managers also thought that the primary revenue source for Medford was to
be the distributor of pharmaceuticals, and use its supply chain expertise to generate
revenue.
"I can see us kind of shifting our focus a little, but still our main business will be
distribution..." (Carter)
"So it's all around helping them manage their inventory to help them drive cost
out of their operation. And at the end of the day... improve the supply chain from
the manufacturer all the way down to the patient." (Young)
"The opportunity to increase the revenue is to be that supply chain expert to the
customer and... build the value around the fact that we can provide this expertise
that can allow them to be more profitable. " (King)
In addition to being a distributor, Type-2 managers also suggested generating revenue
through consulting to reduce cost (Operational excellence) and improve patient safety:
"There is a lot of opportunity within patient safety within the hospital that we as
consultants could help develop solutions... making sure that the drugs and the
supply that we sell, ultimately are being administered properly..." (Young)
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"... something where we are focused on improving patient safety within a hospital
as well as efficiencies within a pharmacy." (Carter)
"I'd say operational efficiency, financial efficiency, quality/regulatory, delivery
efficiency, inventory efficiency - those are the big ones." (Gonzalez)
The interviews reveal a clear pattern of ideas for the generation of revenue among the
three types of managers: the managers attending primarily to the beneficial
environmental features (Type-1) suggesting novel revenue streams for the firm, and
those attending primarily to the hurtful features (Type-2 and -3) suggesting traditional
revenue streams. This difference may be explained using a recent theory in psychology:
Regulatory Focus Theory (Higgins, 1998), which suggests that people go about
attending the desired and required goals differently. This theory suggests that people
use two types of regulatory focus: promotion-focus and prevention-focus. "The
promotion focus is concerned with accomplishments, hopes, and aspirations,
[whereas...] the prevention focus is concerned with safety, responsibilities, and
obligations" (ibid p. 16). In the management domain, regulatory focus is conjectured to
play different roles in the entrepreneurial process (Brockner, Higgins, & Low, 2004).
Brockner, et al. (ibid, p. 210) argue that "people in a promotion focus are eager for 'hits',
[whereas ...] people in a prevention focus are vigilant against making mistakes".
Above empirical findings parallel these predictions of the regulatory focus theory.
Type-1 managers, ebullient with novel revenue generation ideas for the firm, seem to be
promotion-focused. Eager for 'hits', they pay more attention to the environmental factors
they consider as beneficial to the firm. People with promotion-focus, compared to those
with prevention-focus, are more willing "to switch to a new activity or to substitute a new
object for an object they already possessed" (ibid, p. 209). This is evident in the data, as
all three Type-1 managers expressed surprise why Medford was not pursuing a
particularly novel revenue source. On the other hand, Type-2 and -3 managers,
preferring to remain with the known revenue sources, appear to be prevention-focused.
Being vigilant against making mistakes, they pay more attention to the environmental
factors they consider as harmful to the firm. It is also not a surprise that the Type-2 and
3 managers suggested ideas for generating revenue by selling services that improve
patient safety. The qualitative data, supported by quantitative evidence presented in
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Table 4-4, suggest the following two propositions about the relationship between a
manager's attention to environment and the revenue sources s/he considers the firm
should pursue:
Proposition 1a: A manager with attention to positive environmental
features will identify products and revenue sources that are novel to the
firm.
Proposition 1b: A manager with attention to negative environmental
features will identify products and revenue sources that are commonly
known in the firm.
4.6.3 Managerial outlook and environmental factors pertinent to strategy
Managerial outlook of the future emerges as a salient differentiator of the environmental
factors on which the managers base their strategies. A manager's outlook of the future
is measured by his/her interpretation of all environmental factors s/he considered likely
to happen, and is classified as either optimistic or pessimistic. Exhibit 4 provides the
quotations and the codes related to the environmental factors targeted in the strategies
advocated by the managers classified as either Type-1, 2 or 3.
When advancing a strategy, Type-1 managers referenced opportunities in the
environment that the firm could take advantage of. The strategies suggested by these
managers sought to generate revenue from the growth in the generics market (Nelson),
by serving new customers, such as grocery stores and physician offices (Nelson), from
medical tourism (Wright), from increase in cost pressure experienced by the branded
drug manufacturers (Mitchell), and various opportunities generated by the information
available to Medford (Wright, Mitchell).
"I really think the generics are going to be so big that ... to really make significant
money." (Nelson)
"In essence, we take this opportunity to the physicians and say 'hey, why aren't
you setting up distribution points for pharmaceuticals..." (Nelson)
"...we have the ability to basically be on the forefront of [developing] new
standards or checklists ... [to guide] somebody who is going overseas to have
some type of cure done by some physician" (Wright)
(172)
"... is creating this cost pressure for the branded manufacturers. [They could be]
potentially looking for ways to save on cost... We could be offering that service"
(Mitchell)
The strategies suggested by Type-2 managers also sought to generate revenue by
taking advantage of opportunities in the business environment. These managers
suggested that Medford could generate revenue by selling its operational excellence
capabilities to its vendors and customers. The opportunities that support these ideas for
revenue generation included operational inefficiency of Medford's vendors (King), cost
pressure experienced by its customers (King), suboptimal logistics processes of its
customers (Gonzalez, Carter, Young), and the opportunity to improve patient safety in
hospitals using lean/six sigma methods (Carter, Young).
"i... our operational excellence, lean/six-sigma... we have to take this thing back
to the vendor... that's the piece we have got the greatest opportunity to make
them better but also garnish some fees" (King)
"We have vested amount of money and time in these black-belts that we could
exploit into the hospital space... " (Gonzalez)
"The accidental deaths that occur within hospitals... There is a lot of opportunity
within patient safety within the hospital that we as consultants could help develop
solutions... " (Young)
In contrast, when suggesting strategies for Medford the Type-3 managers either
focused primarily on the challenging characteristics of the business environment...
"We may consolidate the number of couriers and transportation partners that we
can deal with because we will have higher expectations for security, higher
expectations for temperature control... which will be a challenge." (Hernandez)
"... pricing pressures because of consolidation in hospitals, GPOs, chain drug
stores, internet pharmacies. ..added to that, government takeover or
government's further involvement in healthcare industry will [put] additional
downward pressure on our pricing... We may have to go to [fewer] deliveries"
(Hernandez)
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"... but in the current market conditions, the revenue, profit is not there. So, if we
want to grow profitability, we're going to have to develop suites of service that
aren't in our normal market today..." (Scott)
... or mentioned no environmental factors to justify the strategy. When no environmental
justification was provided, the recommended strategy was about maintaining the status-
quo, i.e. remaining in the distribution business as done today. All strategy ideas of Eric
Hill and Carl Turner fall in this category (see Exhibit 4).
Even when a Type-3 manager identified a growth opportunity, he cautioned
about the challenges in turning that opportunity into a reliable source of revenue.
"There is still growth opportunity for us to take what we have learned in our
operations excellence... and potentially be able to package some of that... But,
in our industry a lot of things start out with that idea and then they become seen
by the competitors... and become a bargaining chip for the customer to utilize...
Doesn't mean it's not an opportunity to do so; you'd have to have it marketed
right ... you'd have to have a proof to show cost reduction..." (Hernandez)
The interviews show clearly that the managers with optimistic and pessimistic outlook
interpret the environment they perceive very differently. Type-1 managers primarily paid
attention to the beneficial features of the environment and spotted several opportunities.
The difference between the strategic thinking of Type-2 and Type-3 managers is
especially informative. Both these types of managers paid greater attention to the
negative aspects of the business environment, and thus saw their firm as operating in a
difficult context. However, the Type-2 managers still identified opportunities in the
environment to take advantage of, whereas Type-3 managers focused more on
challenges.
This difference between optimistic and pessimistic disposition has been observed
by psychologists in empirical studies of subjects facing distressful circumstances (such
as those undergoing treatment for heart disease, cancer or AIDS), "optimism [has]
predicted positive attitudes and tendencies to plan for recovery, seek information, and
reframe bad situations so as to see their most positive aspects" (Scheier, Carver, &
Bridges, 2001, p. 200). Unlike the pessimists, "coping behavior" of optimists facing
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difficult situations is characterized by "placing as positive a light on the situation as
possible" (ibid, p. 203). Reframing a challenging business environment to target its most
positive aspects through strategic intervention is what Type-2 managers did, and Type-
3 managers did not do. Overall, the data about strategies proposed by the managers
with optimistic (Type-1, 2) and pessimistic outlooks suggest the following:
Proposition 2a: A manager with optimistic outlook will identify
opportunities in the environment, and propose strategies to exploit them.
Proposition 2b: A manager with pessimistic outlook will identify
challenges in the environment, and propose strategies that mitigate them.
4.6.4 Managerial outlook and locus of action -
Another aspect distinguishing the strategies of managers with optimistic and pessimistic
outlook is the locus of action targeted by the strategy. All seven optimistic managers
(Type-1 and -2) suggested different ways in which Medford should influence and exploit
the environment for its own benefit. Contrary to their suggestions of advancing outwards
into the business environment, the pessimistic managers suggested retracting inwards
and making changes to the firm structure.
The Type-1 managers, who paid attention primarily to the beneficial aspects of
the environment, sought to generate more revenue by selling the firm's products. Their
way of influencing the environment included creating new customers...
"...we should be penetrating these grocery stores that don't have a pharmacy in
them... that's another channel we've got to be tapping rather than waiting for
them to figure it out... We should be driving them to that solution. " (Nelson)
"In essence, we take this opportunity to the physicians and say 'hey, why aren't
you setting up distribution points for pharmaceuticals, because in future - you
are going to have to look for all kinds of different revenues as your
reimbursement changes and how you get paid changes. And why not a better
point than immediately [after] a prescription is given, the patient picks it up right
there. "' (Nelson)
"Currently, our two biggest customers [distribute] generics on their own; they go
direct from the manufacturer... I think in next five years, you will see us spend
more time thinking about how we take some of that business, become the
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logistics providers for those generics as well for those two main customers."
(Mitchell)
"I don't know why we don't do this today... imagine going to a world in future
where you are supplying the doctor with that information..." (Wright)
The other types of optimists, Type-2 managers, who paid more attention to the
challenging aspect of the environment, also advocated environmental intrusiveness -
although of a different nature. Their strategies focused on changing the unfavorable
aspects of the environment to make it better for Medford. This included, persuading the
existing customers to adopt practices that are advantages to Medford...
'Mr. Customer, we want to be at the fact that you will be automated, you will use
[automated ordering technology] to put through your orders, so that we have
more predictable wave-drop time frames [and] we can build a much more leaner
organization around that predictability'... automation is not an option anymore in
2015, it should a requirement of our customer base to cooperate with what we
have as far as automation is concerned" (King)
"We will have an environment where there is an acceleration of theft... We will
start to have to look at modified delivery [time] windows that our customers will
have to embrace. We would have broader windows we would be delivering in
2015." (Gonzalez)
... getting customers into agreements that increase their dependence on Medford,
"We can provide options, we can provide solutions so that, it's essential for that
customer to rely on us... the more they penetrate with us, we would provide
either deeper discounts, or go back to the base price structure... so the revenue
stream would be contingent upon how deeply we are penetrated with the
customer." (Gonzalez)
... or even changing the norms and practices followed in the industry.
"...But, as an industry we don't ship drugs that have less than six months' dating,
and that creates a huge, huge waste... We hold [those drugs] in a warehouse
until it's fully expired ... and then the product gets destroyed. We have to be able
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to somehow influence the industry in such a way that we don't have this
significant amount of waste that occurs within our industry." (Young)
"... We're going to have to educate our customer better about the fee-for-
service... they are either going to have to abide by that, or we decide that that's
not the person we do business with." (King)
In suggesting all these actions, the optimistic managers had the aura of Medford's
efficacy of being able to shape its business environment, either by exploiting its
favorable aspects or correcting the unfavorable ones. The strategic actions suggested
by the pessimistic managers starkly contrasted this sense of being in control, and rather
focused on reducing the firm's exposure to the unfavorable environment.
"We may consolidate the number of couriers and transportation partners that we
can deal with because we will have higher expectations for security, higher
expectations for temperature control, higher expectations for driver capability.
So, I think that might reduce the number of different courier partners that we can
deal with, which will be a challenge. " (Hernandez)
"... the pricing pressures because of consolidation in hospitals, GPOs, chain
drug stores, internet pharmacies... added to that, government takeover or
government's further involvement in healthcare industry will [put] additional
downward pressure on our pricing due to lower reimbursement rates, etc... We
may have to go to [fewer] deliveries per week" (Hernandez)
"I see us as getting back to our core competency... reducing our manufacturing
footprint..." (Hill)
The difference in the strategies suggested by optimistic and pessimistic managers is
vivid. Type-1 managers, who pay attention to the favorable factors of the environment,
actively seek to modify that environment to exploit its potential benefits. The difference
between Type-2 and Type-3 managers, both of whom pay attention to the challenging
aspects of the environment, makes the distinction between the optimistic and
pessimistic outlook even clearer. The Type-2 managers actively seek to change the
adversity, whereas Type-3 managers seek to minimize the firm's exposure to it.
This behavior matches the findings from research on optimism, which shows that
"in general terms, optimists appear to be active copers and pessimists appear to be
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avoidant copers" (Scheier, et al. 2001, p. 199). A meta-analysis of over 40 empirical
studies shows that optimism is positively correlated with engagement in coping
strategies that seek to "reduce, eliminate, or manage the internal or external demands
of a stressor" and negatively correlated with strategies that "ignore, avoid, or withdraw
from the stressor" (Solberg Nes & Segerstrom, 2006, p. 236). Research shows that
''optimists are more likely than pessimists to take direct action to solve their problems,
are more planful in dealing with the adversity they confront, and are more focused in
their coping efforts" (Scheier & Carver, 1993, pp. 27-8). We find similar behavior in the
domain of strategic thinking where Type-2 and Type-3 managers, both coping with an
unfavorable environment they see, recommend different ways to deal with the adversity.
This empirical evidence and support from psychology literature suggests the following:
Proposition 3a: A manager with optimistic outlook of the future
environment will suggest taking actions to influence the environment to
maximize benefit to the firm.
Proposition 3b: A manager with pessimistic outlook of the future
environment will suggest taking actions to change the firm's own structure
to minimize harm to the firm.
4.7 Typology of managerial cognition
The empirical results presented in the previous section clearly show that strategies
envisioned by managers differ along two dimensions of cognition: attention to
environment and future outlook. A manager's attention to environment can be focused
primarily on beneficial factors or hurtful factors; his/her outlook can be optimistic or
pessimistic.
Attention of managers in an organization is influenced by "how the organization
distributes and controls the allocation of issues, answers, and decision-makers within
specific firm activities, communications, and procedures" (Ocasio, 1997, p. 191); by
design, the attention of managers with different responsibilities is distributed to different
issues. Thus, the attention of an individual manager is a function of the situation s/he
finds her/himself in, and the "consistency (or variance) in attention and behavior is
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dependent more on consistency (or variance) in the characteristics of the situation
rather than characteristics of the individuals" (ibid, p. 190). On the other hand,
managerial outlook is an individual characteristic. Furthermore, longitudinal studies
among healthy adults suggest that optimism and pessimism are relatively stable over
time (Scheier & Carver, 1993). While we do not have information to argue for or against
longitudinal stability of managerial outlook, the fact that "future outlook" is an individual
characteristic and "attention to environment" is determined by organizational design
suggests that these two dimensions are orthogonal.
These two dimensions are incorporated into a typology of managerial cognition,
presented in Figure 4-5. The four types in are given more descriptive names. Their style
of cognition is briefly described below.
Future
Outlook
Optimistic Industrious Pioneering
Pessimistic Protective Skeptical
Hurtful Beneficial
Attention to environment
Figure 4-5: Typology of managerial cognition
" Pioneering: These managers primarily pay attention to favorable aspects of the
environment and are optimistic about the firm's future. (hitherto, Type-1)
* Industrious: These managers primarily pay attention to unfavorable aspects of
the environment, but are optimistic about the firm's future. (hitherto, Type-2)
e Protective: These managers primarily pay attention to unfavorable aspects of
the environment, and are pessimistic about the firm's future. (hitherto, Type-3)
" Skeptical: These managers primarily pay attention to the favorable aspects of
the environment, but are pessimistic about the firm's future.
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4.7.1 Propositions for strategic thinking by type of managerial cognition
The propositions for the characteristics strategic thinking of each type of managerial
cognition can be generated from the propositions describing the characteristics of
strategic thinking presented in sections 4.6.2 through 4.6.4. They are presented in this
section. Following the criteria for good inductive research (Bacharach, 1989; Whetten,
1989), the propositions are written so that they can be readily converted into testable
hypotheses.
4.7-1.1 Opportunities and challengesfor generating revenue in
perceived environment
The combination of propositions 1 and 2 help us contemplate the nature of advice the
four types of manager would provide about generating revenue in the future.
Propositions 4a through 4d elaborate the conjectures. In brief, "Pioneering" and
"Skeptical" managers will see novel revenue opportunities for the firm, whereas the
other two types will focus on the commonly known revenue sources used by the firm.
The optimists among them will identify opportunities in the environment where these
products could be sold to generate revenue, whereas the pessimists among them will
identify the challenges in generating revenue from the said sources.
Proposition 4a: A "Pioneering" manager will advocate pursuing novel
products and revenue sources to exploit opportunities in the firm's future
environment.
Proposition 4b: An "Industrious" manager will advocate pursuing
commonly known products and revenue sources to exploit opportunities in
the firm's future environment.
Proposition 4c: A "Protective" manager will identify challenges to the
commonly known products and revenue sources, and propose strategies
to mitigate them.
Proportion 4d: A "Skeptical" manager will identify challenges to generating
revenue from novel products, and propose strategies to mitigate them.
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4.7.1.2 Managerial action to improve fit between firm and perceived
environment
The combination of propositions 1 and 3 help us surmise the nature of advice the four
types of manager would provide about taking actions to improve the fit between the firm
and the perceived future environment. Propositions 5a through 5d elaborate the
conjectures. In brief, the "Pioneering" and "Industrious" managers will suggest
influencing the environment to make it more suitable for the firm for the firm to sell its
products, whereas the other two types will advise changing the firm's own structure to
improve its fit to the environment.
Proposition 5a: A "Pioneering" manager will advocate actions to shape the
environment to maximize the benefits obtained by selling novel products.
Proposition 5b: An "Industrious" manager will advocate actions to shape
the environment to maximize the benefit obtained by selling firm's
traditional products.
Proposition 5c: A "Protective" manager will advocate actions to change the
firm's own structure to minimize harm to the firm when selling the
traditional products.
Proposition 5d: A "Skeptical" manager will advocate actions to change the firm's
own structure to minimize the harm to the firm when selling novel products.
4.7.1.3 Summary
This concludes the inductive part of this research, which resulted in a typology of
cognition linking different types of cognition to different strategic ideas. The results of
this analysis are presented as a set of propositions in sections 4.6 and 4.7. These are
inductively generated propositions from qualitative data, and need to be tested in a
large-N study.
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4.8 Discussion
In this section, the findings of the research on managerial cognition are summarized
and placed back into the context of the extant literature.
4.8.1 Summary of results
The evidence from this prospective study supports three hypotheses characterizing
managerial cognition. Managers characterize the environmental factors they pay
attention to as having a larger impact - either positive or negative - on the firm
compared to the factors they overlook (Hypothesis 1). Furthermore, managers interpret
a greater portion of the environmental factors they pay attention to as having a negative
impact on the firm compared to the factors they overlook (Hypothesis 2). While a
manager's attention to the present environment is focused more on the factors s/he
considers to be more impactful and negative, s/he is optimistic about the future,
believing that the positive (negative) factors are more (less) likely to occur (Hypotheses
3a and 3b). While the three hypotheses describe managerial cognition at the aggregate
level, the individual managers vary significantly. This research found three types of
managers based on their future outlook and attention. An inductive examination of the
strategic thinking of three types of managers shows significant similarities among the
managers of the same type, and striking differences among managers of different types.
The inductive examination of the qualitative data was used to generate a typology of
managerial cognition, and provide propositions for the strategic thinking of each type.
4.8.2 Relationship with extant knowledge
The output of this research is a pair of contributions. The deductive part of the research
described general characteristics of managerial cognition. Their relationship to the
extant literature is presented in section 4.8.2.1. The inductive part of the research
yielded a typology of managerial. Its relationship with the extant literature is presented
in section 4.8.2.2.
4.8.2.1 Managerial interpretation, attention and prediction
Tests of hypotheses show that managers interpret a greater proportion of the
environmental factors they pay attention to as having a negative impact on the firm,
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compared to the factors they overlook. This result appears consistent with the "threat
bias" described by Jackson and Dutton (1988), but there are two subtle differences.
Threat bias, which is detected from a respondent's interpretation of an issue provided to
him/her by the researcher, is described as the greater propensity to consider an
ambiguous issue as a threat, rather than an opportunity. The first difference between
the results of this research and the threat bias is that the managers in this study
discovered disproportionately more issues they considered "threats" on their own. Thus,
the "threat bias" is not limited to managers interpreting ambiguous issues as threats, but
extends to managers disproportionately identifying more threats than opportunities, as
the environmental factors relevant for the firm's strategy. The second difference
between our results and those of Jackson and Dutton regards to the role of threat bias
in strategic decision making. Jackson and Dutton (p. 385) argue that:
"A threat bias may seem inconsistent with research showing that people
often fail to consider threats, often with disastrous consequences. [...] The
findings from this study can be reconciled with previous research by
positing that threat cues have a difficult time initially penetrating into the
awareness of managers. As a result, by the time threats are recognized,
they may in fact be relatively serious."
The results of this research contradict this. We find that threat cues do not have a
difficult time penetrating into the awareness of managers; managers do pay greater
attention to threats on their own. The reason firms fail to consider threats may not be
that their managers fail to see threats, but that the managers may optimistically believe
that threats are less likely to materialize for them and-despite paying attention to
them-may fail to take actions to mitigate the threats.
4.8.2.2 Typology of managerial cognition and strategic thinking
The inductively developed typology of managerial cognition in this study has parallels in
the typology of firm strategies by Miles and Snow (1978). The data in this research
allows us to find parallels to only one of the three types of strategies described by Miles
and Snow, the "entrepreneurial problem", i.e. the nature of product-market targeted by
the firm. The strategies of Prospector and Defender firms are similar to the strategies
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proposed by Pioneering and Protective managers, respectively. Pioneering managers
and Prospector firms both seek to exploit new product-market opportunities; whereas
Protective managers and Defender firms both seek to protect the current product-
market domain. The Analyzer firms seek to "locate and exploit new product and market
opportunities while simultaneously maintaining a firm core of traditional products and
customers" (Miles et al, 1978), generating majority of the revenue from stable products.
This description fits the types of strategies proposed by the cautious managers in our
typology. Miles and Snow suggested the fourth type of firm (Reactor) was "unstable".
While our data did not have any Skeptical managers, we do not have data to claim that
Skeptical cognition type is unstable. One may conjecture that strategy-making in the
firms in Miles-Snow typology may be dominated by the managers of the corresponding
type of cognition in the typology presented in this chapter.
Strategy research has established the importance of managerial attention in
explaining time lags between different firms' entries into new product markets (Eggers &
Kaplan, 2009) and variation in different firms' speed of response to changes in
industries with the same clockspeed (Fine, 1998; Nadkarni & Barr, 2008). This research
studied attention in conjunction with interpretation of factors attended. While managerial
attention to environmental factors is also influenced by organizational design (Ocasio,
1997), interpretation of the attended factors is primarily function of an individual
manager's cognition and prior knowledge (Hambrick, 2007; Gregoire, Barr, & Shepherd,
2010). A large majority of managers in our study focused their attention primarily on
factors they considered hurtful for the firm (Industrious and Protective), i.e. have a
"prevention focus", meaning they are concerned more with absence of negative
outcomes, compared to only a small number of Pioneering managers, who have a
''promotion focus'' and thus are concerned more with presence of positive outcomes
(Higgins, 1998). Given that Medford operates in a highly regulated industry whose
business model is being threatened, the focus on prevention of negative outcomes in
the management team is not surprising.
The importance of managerial outlook is already established in the strategy
literature. While strategy scholars have primarily studied optimism as a cognitive bias
leading to poor decisions, the empirical results show that optimism is also associated
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with desirable (at least socially) outcomes like development of revolutionary products
(Simon & Houghton, 2003). The Pioneering and Industrious managers in our study
showed the same aggressiveness in their strategic thinking.
4.8.3 Are some cognitive types better than others?
A natural question to ask is whether some cognitive types are better than others.
Without an extensive study, we think the answer is no. It may be necessary for firms to
have managers attending to both beneficial and hurtful factors. Managers attending to
beneficial factors could bring new revenue generation ideas into the firm, while those
attending to the hurtful factors could seek to protect the current revenue sources.
Similarly, it may be necessary to have managers with both optimistic and pessimistic
outlooks on the future. While optimistic disposition is generally considered to be
associated with better outcomes (Peterson, Seligman, & Vaillant, 1988), psychologists
(Scheier, et al. 2001, p. 209) also caution that optimism can work against people by
failing "to take steps to protect themselves against threats", and "the worldview of an
optimist might be more vulnerable to the shattering impact of a traumatic event than that
of a pessimist." On the other hand, healthy pessimism "can prompt preparatory actions
that reduce the likelihood of an undesired outcome, diminish negative consequences,
and expedite recovery" (Sweeny, Carroll, & Shepperd, 2006, p. 305).
Thus, it seems reasonable that all four types of managers have roles to play. The
Pioneering managers could expose the firm to novel ways of generating revenue and
identify bold ways to influence the business environment to benefit from these new
ideas. They could help the firm from getting stuck into the rut and keep inventing itself
as the socio-technological environment evolves. The Skeptical managers could be the
Devil's advocates and identify ways in which the novel ideas may fail. They could
provide checks to ensure that the firm does appropriate due diligence before entering a
new, untested territory. The Protective managers are good at ensuring that the existing
revenue sources are being used efficiently and identifingy ways to protect them against
external threats. These managers could ensure that the firm does not lose sight of its
stable, cash-cow businesses while pursuing risky ventures. The Industrious managers
share this focus on the traditional businesses, but seek to find ways to extend these
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known revenue sources into new territories. They could seek to find ways to exploit
what the organization already knows well.
4.8.4 Limitations
This research developed propositions about the strategic thinking of each type of
manager using the evidence from one firm: Medford, a distributor of pharmaceuticals in
the U.S. At the time of our study, this firm was facing high uncertainty due to ambiguity
about future regulations and threats to its core activities (McGahan, 2004). While the
characteristics of strategic thinking found in the four types of managerial cognition
appear to be generalizable to other industries, we do not have data to make this claim.
It is necessary to test the propositions presented in section 4.7.1 in stable industries as
well as those experiencing different types of changes documented by McGahan (ibid).
4-9 Conclusion
We conclude by highlighting the key features of two parts of this study: research method
and substantive findings.
The prospective nature of this study distinguishes it from the prior studies on
managerial cognition. While the prospective nature of the study does not afford us the
opportunity to find relationship between managerial cognition and firm performance, it
allows us to examine how strategies of managers of different cognitive types vary. More
specifically, the prospective study allows us to see how managerial outlook of the future
relates to strategic thinking. As the data shows, strategic thinking of managers with
optimistic and pessimistic outlooks is significantly different. It would not be possible to
study managerial prediction in a retrospective study without being affected by the
hindsight bias (Fischhoff, 1975). The research method used here is also designed to
have as little impact of researchers' own biases on the managerial cognition captured.
The semi-structured interview process followed here allowed us to explore each
manager's strategic thinking as fully as possible; the use of structured questionnaires
with semi-structured interviews allowed us to let each manager provide us his/her own
interpretation of the issues.
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This research tested, and found support for, three hypotheses characterizing
managerial cognition at the aggregate-level. To my knowledge, this is the first study
where managerial cognition has been characterized by a combination of three facets:
attention, prediction, and interpretation. A closer look at individual manager revealed
systematic differences in strategic thinking of managers with different cognitive types.
Exploiting the variation in our data, this research inductively built a typology of
managerial cognition and provided testable propositions about the strategic thoughts of
managers of different cognitive types. Finally, we also identified similarities between the
typology of managerial cognition and Miles and Snow's (1978) time-tested typology of
firm strategies, suggesting that different firm strategies may actually be results of the
cognitive types that dominate strategic decision-making in the firm.
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4.10 Appendix for Chapter 4
Biotech 32519 $ 106.0 2.8% $ 9.50 9.0%
Pharmaceutical & medicine manufacturing 32541 $ 206.0 5.4% $ 24.70 12.0%
Medical supplies wholesaling 42345 $ 144.0 3.7% $ 8.60 6.0%
Ophthalmic lens wholesaling 42346 $ 8.9 0.2% $ 0.40 4.5%
Pharmacies & drugstores 44611 $ 217.3 5.6% $ 4.30 2.0%
Eye glasses & contact lens stores 44613 $ 8.4 0.2% $ 0.50 6.0%
Health & welfare funds 52512 $ 271.1 7.0% $ 8.40 3.1%
Dentists 62121 $ 107.9 2.8% $ 25.90 24.0%
Chiropractors 62131 $ 12.9 0.3% $ 3.60 27.9%
Optometrists 62132 $ 12.7 0.3% $ 3.50 27.6%
Psychologists, social workers, & marriage counseling 62133 $ 8.7 0.2% $ 5.70 65.5%
Physical therapists 62134 $ 21.2 0.6% $ 1.90 9.0%
Podiatrist & other healthcare practitioners 62139 $ 15.0 0.4% $ 5.70 38.0%
Family planning& abortion clinics 62141 $ 1.8 0.0% $ 0.13 7.2%
Substance abuse & mental health clinics 62142 $ 12.6 0.3% $ 0.70 5.6%
Emergency & other outpatient care centers 62149 $ 81.3 2.1% $ 8.90 10.9%
Diagnostic & medical laboratories 62151 $ 46.9 1.2% $ 4.70 10.0%
Home care providers 62161 $ 65.9 1.7% $ 3.30 5.0%
Ambulance services 62191 $ 12.0 0.3% $ 0.24 2.0%
Blood, organ, & ambulatory health services 62199 $ 22.2 0.6% $ 1.10 5.0%
Hospitals 62211 $ 732.0 19.0% $ 54.90 7.5%
Psychiatric hospitals 62221 $ 17.8 0.5% $ 0.36 2.0%
Specialty hospitals 62231 $ 34.2 0.9% $ 3.10 9.1%
Nursing care facilities 62311 $ 101.7 2.6% $ 7.10 7.0%
Mental retardation facilities 62321 $ 20.2 0.5% $ 1.00 5.0%
Substance abuse & mental health facilities 62322 $ 11.9 0.3% $ 0.60 5.0%
Retirement& assisted living communities 62331 $ 37.9 1.0% $ 3.00 7.9%
Elderly & disabled services 62412 $ 24.8 0.6% $ 0.70 2.8%
Health & medical insurance 52411b $ 650.7 16.9% $ 39.00 6.0%
General practitioners and family doctors 62111a $ 66.3 1.7% $ 17.60 26.5%
Specialist doctors 62111b $ 346.7 9.0% $ 80.80 23.3%
Total size of U.S. healthcare sector (by revenue) $ 3,849 100%
U.S. GDP $ 14,256
Source: Data compiled from IBISWorld reports of each industry (2010)
Exhibit 1: Revenue and profitability of industries in U.S. healthcare sector
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Hi <name>,
This is a reminder that we have a phone interview scheduled at
<time> on <date>. I will call you at <phone number>.
These interviews are part of <...> project we are working
together on. For this project, we are using five years as the
planning horizon (year 2015). In this first round of interviews,
I want to hear your thoughts about Medford's business and
business environment in year 2015. So, for the phone call make
yourself comfortable in a place where you can think about the
future - unhindered by the worries of day-to-day tasks. You do
not need to prepare anything. But, try to be where you will not
be interrupted by fires to be put out, urgent emails, or phone
calls, so you can spend an hour or so thinking about the future
of the organization and the business we are in.
I look forward to talking to you soon.
In the meantime, feel free to email or call me if you have any
questions.
And thank you again for your time!
Shardul Phadnis
Exhibit 2: Text of reminder email sent before the interview
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Quotations Suggested products,
revenue sources
Dennis Nelson
"I think Medford is taking the absolute wrong approach when it comes to generic
manufacturing... We need to figure out how to get into generics manufacturing game; not
'oh, how can I execute this launch better than Competitor A'. You know, we need to take
ourselves out of that competition and do something completely different... I really think the
generics are going to be so big that we really have to be at least part ownership in generic
manufacturing to really make significant money."
"We should be using our own solution that we already have. Instead of trying to figure out
how to sell more and penetrate more hospitals, we should be penetrating these grocery
stores that don't have a pharmacy in them, and are going to have to have a pharmacy in
them to compete in the future because... they need that traffic to come through their
store... That's another channel we've got to be tapping rather than waiting for them to
figure it out... We should be driving them to that solution and driving all of our capabilities
to them."
"In essence this is where you don't wait for the physicians to figure it out. In essence, we
take this opportunity to the physicians and say 'hey, why aren't you setting up distribution
points for pharmaceuticals, because in future - you are going to have to look for all kinds
of different revenues as your reimbursement changes and how you get paid changes. You
are going to want to be capturing some of this pharmaceutical business. And why not a
better point than immediately [after] a prescription is given, the patient picks it up right
there."'
Larry Wright
"...the physicians being employed by Medford, the nurses being employed by Medford...
the employee of Medford, the physician, diagnosing, and administering the procedures
while the company also is delivering the pharmaceuticals... our systems basically
calculating which drugs should be sent to this patient for their recovery purposes taking
information from a thousand other points of [treatments administered]"
"Because of Medford's current relationships with the manufacturers and distributors
globally, we have the ability to basically be on the forefront of [developing] new standards
or checklists ... [to guide] somebody who is going overseas to have some type of cure
done by some physician [which is outside the control of the FDA]"
"I don't know why we don't do this today... each drug that we ship has a causal effect...
We can analyze, based on where we are shipping that product... to make a predictive
medicine... if you look at the drugs moving forward and what their use is... imagine going
to a world in future where you are supplying the doctor with that information... [the point is]
how do we become more of that healthcare information [firm], instead of a distributor'
Walter Mitchell
'We could create distribution services for other types of products. I don't know how realistic
that is. But, we have capacity in our network to take on additional products and distribute...
things like veterinary products"
'We will have potentially more information to capitalize on... sales information on where
our product is being distributed, whether it is temperature-controlled throughout; the ability
to meet these pedigree legislation requirements, where we have to say where product was
and when it was checked in all the way through the life of that product, from manufacture
all the way to the end patient. There may be information opportunities to capitalize on
there."
Novel
(Generic mfg.)
Novel
(Set up and supply to
pharmacies in grocery
stores)
Novel
(Set up and supply to
pharmacies in
physician offices)
Novel
(Patient care and drug
delivery)
Novel
(Safety guidance in lieu
of FDA)
Novel
(Disease prediction and
drug supply)
Novel
(New products)
Novel opportunity,
(Did not specify)
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Quotations Suggested products,
revenue sources
"The fact that branded manufacturer pipeline is drying up and there aren't a lot of
blockbuster drugs in the pipeline is creating this cost pressure for the branded
manufacturers. [They could be] potentially looking for ways to save on cost, potentially
looking for ways to go direct to customers. We could be offering that service instead of
manufacturers doing it on their own... because our value in the market is being able to do it
at a lower cost than the manufacturers can do on their own, even if they got together [with
other manufacturers]
"Currently, our two biggest customers [distribute] generics on their own; they go direct from
the manufacturer. So, if they are still in that business - warehousing their own generics -
more of the business will go from manufacturer through them, which will go around
Medford. I think in next five years, you will see us spend more time thinking about how we
take some of that business, become the logistics providers for those generics as well for
those two main customers."
Peter King
"I am convinced by... our operational excellence, lean/six-sigma, and how we've been able
to take out greater than 50 million dollars in inefficiencies... Now let's take that and spread
the wealth... We are doing that [with our customers]... I think we have to take this thing
back to the vendor... that's the piece we have got the greatest opportunity to make them
better but also garnish some fees for what we do."
"I think we have opportunities to take that supply chain service expertise to our customer...
The customers, based on healthcare reform and everything else that's going on, are going
to have to find ways to be profitable themselves... The opportunity to increase the revenue
is to be that supply chain expert to the customer and... build the value around the fact that
we can provide this expertise that can allow them to be more profitable."
Susan Carter
"I can see us kind of shifting our focus a little, but still our main business will be
distribution... I think we can go beyond the bulk of business, certainly that's going to
remain in distribution, but I think we need to have other sorts of offerings for hospitals and
regional chains that we don't have today."
"There are a lot of [programs] that we can at least look at that we have already developed
[for independent pharmacies] to see if some of those transfer over [to regional
pharmacies]"
'We are working on something right now for barcode medication administration... making
sure that within the hospital, the patient is getting the right medicine that's barcoded at the
unit dose level. Initiatives around things like that that are patient safety within a hospital
would be key. I don't know what those offerings may be, but something where we are
focused on improving patient safety within a hospital as well as efficiencies within a
pharmacy."
Related to traditional
(Third-party logistics for
pharma manufacturers)
Traditional
(Distribution)
Traditional
(Sell Op/Ex services to
vendors)
Traditional
(Supply chain
services)
Traditional
(Distribution services)
Traditional
(Pharmacy programs)
New but related to
traditional
(Patient safety)
Jerry Gonzalez
'What we are providing [is] data analytics around their usage... and providing information Traditional and
[so] that they would have visibility into the supply chain - both ours and their inventory... to related
provide order fulfillment on a just-in-time inventory basis... So, in effect, we would be (Distribution, supply
driving cost on the overhead side out of their operation, and at the same time, providing a chain visibility)
value proposition as a fee for service."
'We have vested amount of money and time in these black-belts that we could exploit into Traditional
the hospital space... So, I'd say operational efficiency, financial efficiency, (Consulting using
quality/regulatory, delivery efficiency, inventory efficiency - those are the big ones." black belts)
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Quotations Suggested products,
revenue sources
Tim Young
"Our customers don't do a good job managing their inventory. And that adds cost, it adds
waste, it adds extra handling because of their frequency of order.... They don't understand
demand, they don't understand planning... So it's all around helping them manage their
inventory to help them drive cost out of their operation. And at the end of the day...
improve the supply chain from the manufacturer all the way down to the patient."
"The accidental deaths that occur within hospitals, the number of staggering. A lot of these
unfortunate deaths that are caused because of accidents can be eliminated ... through
process improvement and using lean methods... There is a lot of opportunity within patient
safety within the hospital that we as consultants could help develop solutions... You can
argue that we are making sure that the drugs and the supply that we sell, ultimately are
being administered properly..."
Jose Hernandez
"There is still growth opportunity for us to take what we have learned in our operations
excellence or lean/six sigma process within our four walls and potentially be able to
package some of that... [It] could be business retention, a business differentiator for new
business, could be just a goodwill piece that's thrown in... But, in our industry a lot of
things start out with that idea and then they become seen by the competitors... and
become a bargaining chip for the customer to utilize... Doesn't mean it's not an opportunity
to do so; you'd have to have it marketed right ... you'd have to have a proof to show cost
reduction..."
'We will be a company that is more involved with the specialty products, which would be
temperature controlled, blood products, injectable products.. .So, I believe that will be a
fairly significant difference"
Eric Hill
"I see us as getting back to our core competency, which is really managing the supply
chain, letting the hospitals and other care providers focus on the quality of care, reducing
our manufacturing footprint to really focus on being more of a deliverer and purveyor of
product and services as opposed to manufacturer of products and services; so I don't see
that changing in 2015"
"Expanding the space and getting into more of the oncology space and a few other things
that complement that; may be changing a little bit of the mix and focusing more on the
doctors' office - but again still being a primary provider of products and services. I think
that will be our value proposition: that's what we know best - management of supply chain
end-to-end."
"I don't have any sort of specific ideas of products or services, other than to say whatever
is necessary to fulfill... if we are going to branch off into specialty areas, it's to be able to
take the core... moving the products from point A to point B in the best and the most cost
effective manner"
Ray Scott
"I don't think we can survive just being a supply chain provider. I think that's the cash cow,
but in the current market conditions, the revenue, profit is not there. So, if we want to grow
profitability, we're going to have to develop suites of service that aren't in our normal
market today. I don't think it's moving the same model to the new customer... no... If you
are asking me to identify those services today, I probably don't have a list."
Traditional
(Supply chain
efficiency)
New but related to
traditional
(Patient safety)
Traditional
(Op/Ex consulting)
Traditional
(Specialty distribution)
Traditional
(Supply chain services)
Traditional
(Supply chain services)
Traditional
(No specific ideas)
None
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Quotations Suggested products,
revenue sources
'We could help create solutions that today our partners don't have the time, or money, or
expertise to do. I am not saying we have that expertise. I am just saying that if we want to
create a niche... a bigger pie-niche for ourselves... that's one way to go."
"Most of our customers don't know what they really want; what they do know is they want
less cost. But, they don't know how to get there... We've got to create a better value
proposition that... whether it's the products, whether it's the processes they use today, by
cuffing out some of the waste that they have, show them that value in tangible dollars."
None
No specific products
Carl Turner
"If I think five years out, I believe that we should see something different. Will it be Traditional
completely different? Probably not, but ... at the end of the day, I do envision us continuing Distribution
to be a supplier of products in the marketplace."
"I think [revenue source] comes down to two very broad statements... and certainly a lot Traditional
underneath that. One is, being incredibly relevant to the healthcare marketplace...... and (No specific ideas)
through that relevancy... value will be created both on the transactional level and on the
solutions level... where all partners up and downstream see the relevance, value the
relevance and that we have a sustainable economic model of continued growth."
Exhibit 3: Quotations and codes related to "products and revenue sources"
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Dennis Nelson
"I really think the generics are going to be so big that we really have to be at least part
ownership in generic manufacturing to really make significant money."
"...we should be penetrating these grocery stores that don't have a pharmacy in them,
and are going to have to have a pharmacy in them to compete in the future because...
they need that traffic to come through their store... That's another channel we've got to be
tapping rather than waiting for them to figure it out..."
"In essence, we take this opportunity to the physicians and say 'hey, why aren't you
setting up distribution points for pharmaceuticals, because in future - you are going to
have to look for all kinds of different revenues as your reimbursement changes and how
you get paid changes..."'
Larry Wright
"...the physicians being employed by Medford, the nurses being employed by Medford...
the employee of Medford, the physician, diagnosing, and administering the procedures
while the company also is delivering the pharmaceuticals... our systems basically
calculating which drugs should be sent to this patient for their recovery purposes taking
information from a thousand other points of [treatments administered]"
"Because of Medford's current relationships with the manufacturers and distributors
globally, we have the ability to basically be on the forefront of [developing] new standards
or checklists ... [to guide] somebody who is going overseas to have some type of cure
done by some physician [which is outside the control of the FDA]"
"I don't know why we don't do this today... each drug that we ship has a causal effect...
We can analyze, based on where we are shipping that product... to make a predictive
medicine... if you look at the drugs moving forward and what their use is... imagine going
to a world in future where you are supplying the doctor with that information... [the point
is] how do we become more of that healthcare information [firm], instead of a distributor"
Walter Mitchell
"We will have potentially more information to capitalize on... sales information on where
our product is being distributed, whether it is temperature-controlled throughout; the ability
to meet these pedigree legislation requirements, where we have to say where product
was and when it was checked in all the way through the life of that product, from
manufacture all the way to the end patient. There may be information opportunities to
capitalize on there."
"The fact that branded manufacturer pipeline is drying up and there aren't a lot of
blockbuster drugs in the pipeline is creating this cost pressure for the branded
manufacturers. [They could be] potentially looking for ways to save on cost, potentially
looking for ways to go direct to customers. We could be offering that service instead of
manufacturers doing it on their own... because our value in the market is being able to do
it at a lower cost than the manufacturers can do on their own, even if they got together
[with other manufacturers]
Peter King
"I am convinced by... our operational excellence, lean/six-sigma, and how we've been
able to take out greater than 50 million dollars in inefficiencies... Now let's take that and
spread the wealth... We are doing that [with our customers]... I think we have to take this
thing back to the vendor... that's the piece we have got the greatest opportunity to make
them better but also garnish some fees for what we do."
Opportunity
(Generics market)
Opportunity
(Grocery stores as new
customers)
Opportunity
(Physician offices as
new customers)
Opportunity
(Information availability)
Opportunity
(Medical tourism)
Opportunity
(Information availability)
Opportunity
(Information availability)
Opportunity
(Cost pressure on
branded drug mfg. from
lack of blockbuster
drugs)
Opportunity
(Supply chain
inefficiency of vendors)
(194)
S g Y
L' ILI - Or k
Quotations Characterization of
environmental factor
Quotations Characterization of
environmental factor
"I think we have opportunities to take that supply chain service expertise to our
customer... The customers, based on healthcare reform and everything else that's going
on, are going to have to find ways to be profitable themselves... The opportunity to
increase the revenue is to be that supply chain expert to the customer and... build the
value around the fact that we can provide this expertise that can allow them to be more
profitable."
Opportunity
(Customers under
pressure to reduce cost)
Susan Carter
"There are a lot of [programs] that we can at least look at that we have already developed Opportunity
[for independent pharmacies] to see if some of those transfer over [to regional (New customer:
pharmacies]" Regional pharmacies)
"We are working on something right now for barcode medication administration... making Opportunity
sure that within the hospital, the patient is getting the right medicine that's barcoded at the (Patient safety,
unit dose level. Initiatives around things like that that are patient safety within a hospital efficiency in hospitals)
would be key. I don't know what those offerings may be, but something where we are
focused on improving patient safety within a hospital as well as efficiencies within a
pharmacy."
Jerry Gonzalez
'We have vested amount of money and time in these black-belts that we could exploit into Opportunity
the hospital space... So, I'd say operational efficiency, financial efficiency, (Inefficiency in hospitals)
quality/regulatory, delivery efficiency, inventory efficiency - those are the big ones."
"The off-site management services [i.e. physician offices will] start to get more traction, Opportunity
because folks don't want to go to learning [hospitals] unless they are doing extensive (Increased patient use of
major surgeries. So, we are going to have to have flexibility to offer those services as physician offices)
well. I mean, doctors' offices want to serve patients - they don't want to deal with... am I
ordering the right inventory, do I have enough product on the shelf, what is my forecast
variance... they don't want to be dealing with that. They want to deal with how do I get
more people through the door to generate revenue for my physician and how to do it in a
quality of care mind."
"Supply chain in controlled environment with narcotics continues to be challenged... We Risk
will have an environment where there is an acceleration of theft... We will start to have to (Theft of
look at modified delivery [time] windows that our customers will have to embrace. We pharmaceuticals)
would have broader windows we would be delivering in 2015."
Tim Young
"Our customers don't do a good job managing their inventory. And that adds cost, it adds
waste, it adds extra handling because of their frequency of order.... They don't
understand demand, they don't understand planning... So it's all around helping them
manage their inventory to help them drive cost out of their operation. And at the end of
the day... improve the supply chain from the manufacturer all the way down to the
patient."
"The accidental deaths that occur within hospitals, the number of staggering. A lot of
these unfortunate deaths that are caused because of accidents can be eliminated ...
through process improvement and using lean methods... There is a lot of opportunity
within patient safety within the hospital that we as consultants could help develop
solutions... You can argue that we are making sure that the drugs and the supply that we
sell, ultimately are being administered properly..."
Opportunity
(Customer inefficiency)
Opportunity
(Process inefficiency in
hospitals)
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Quotations Characterization of
environmental factor
"A lot of these large hospital networks that are really exploring the idea of creating their
own infrastructure around distributing to their hospitals using their own resources... We
need to understand why they want to do it, and if it makes sense for them we need to get
into the business of running it for them... We charge them at the point of use as opposed
to them holding the inventory in their pharmacy... There may be an opportunity for them to
improve their cash flow at the same time for us to get a fee for the service for running
their consolidated service center. I think that we as supply chain folks have a better
understanding to operate these consolidated service centers in a much more efficient
way"
Jose Hernandez
"There is still growth opportunity for us to take what we have learned in our operations
excellence or lean/six sigma process within our four walls and potentially be able to
package some of that... [It] could be business retention, a business differentiator for new
business, could be just a goodwill piece that's thrown in... But, in our industry a lot of
things start out with that idea and then they become seen by the competitors... and
become a bargaining chip for the customer to utilize... Doesn't mean it's not an
opportunity to do so; you'd have to have it marketed right ... you'd have to have a proof to
show cost reduction..."
'We will be a company that is more involved with the specialty products, which would be
temperature controlled, blood products, injectable products.. .So, I believe that will be a
fairly significant difference"
'We may consolidate the number of couriers and transportation partners that we can deal
with because we will have higher expectations for security, higher expectations for
temperature control, higher expectations for driver capability. So, I think that might reduce
the number of different courier partners that we can deal with, which will be a challenge."
"Although there may be more volume, the pricing pressures because of consolidation in
hospitals, GPOs, chain drug stores, internet pharmacies... added to that, government
takeover or government's further involvement in healthcare industry will [put] additional
downward pressure on our pricing due to lower reimbursement rates, etc... We may have
to go to [fewer] deliveries per week than what we currently offer... if we are able to get the
market to move in that direction, it might mean the consolidation of our distribution
network [reducing number of facilities by more than half!]"
Eric Hill
"Expanding the space and getting into more of the oncology space and a few other things
that complement that; may be changing a little bit of the mix and focusing more on the
doctors' office - but again still being a primary provider of products and services. I think
that will be our value proposition: that's what we know best - management of supply chain
end-to-end."
"I see us as getting back to our core competency, which is really managing the supply
chain, letting the hospitals and other care providers focus on the quality of care, reducing
our manufacturing footprint to really focus on being more of a deliverer and purveyor of
product and services as opposed to manufacturer of products and services; so I don't see
that changing in 2015"
"I don't have any sort of specific ideas of products or services, other than to say whatever
is necessary to fulfill... if we are going to branch off into specialty areas, it's to be able to
take the core... moving the products from point A to point B in the best and the most cost
effective manner'
Opportunity or threat
(Hospitals seeking to
distribute, and hospital
inefficiency)
I-
Opportunity, challenge
(Product imitation by
competitors; need to
prove)
None
Challenge
(Higher expectation for
security, driver
capability)
Challenge
(Pricing pressure from
consolidation,
govemment intrusion)
None
None
None
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Quotations Characterization of
environmental factor
"I don't think we can survive just being a supply chain provider. I think that's the cash cow,
but in the current market conditions, the revenue, profit is not there. So, if we want to
grow profitability, we're going to have to develop suites of service that aren't in our normal
market today. I don't think it's moving the same model to the new customer... no... If you
are asking me to identify those services today, I probably don't have a list."
"We could help create solutions that today our partners don't have the time, or money, or
expertise to do. I am not saying we have that expertise. I am just saying that if we want to
create a niche... a bigger pie-niche for ourselves... that's one way to go."
"Most of our customers don't know what they really want; what they do know is they want
less cost. But, they don't know how to get there... We've got to create a better value
proposition that... whether it's the products, whether it's the processes they use today, by
cutting out some of the waste that they have, show them that value in tangible dollars."
Challenge
(Low profit market)
None
Opportunity
(Cost-conscious
customers)
Carl Turner
"If I think five years out, I believe that we should see something different. Will it be None
completely different? Probably not, but ... at the end of the day, I do envision us
continuing to be a supplier of products in the marketplace."
"I think [revenue source] comes down to two very broad statements... and certainly a lot None
underneath that. One is, being incredibly relevant to the healthcare marketplace...... and
through that relevancy... value will be created both on the transactional level and on the
solutions level... where all partners up and downstream see the relevance, value the
relevance and that we have a sustainable economic model of continued growth."
Exhibit 4: Quotations and codes related to "elaborated environmental
feature"
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Action to affectQuotations 
environment impact
'We should be using our own solution that we already have. Instead of trying to figure out
how to sell more and penetrate more hospitals, we should be penetrating these grocery
stores that don't have a pharmacy in them, and are going to have to have a pharmacy in
them to compete in the future because... they need that traffic to come through their
store... That's another channel we've got to be tapping rather than waiting for them to
figure it out... We should be driving them to that solution and driving all of our capabilities
to them."
"In essence this is where you don't wait for the physicians to figure it out. In essence, we
take this opportunity to the physicians and say 'hey, why aren't you setting up distribution
points for pharmaceuticals, because in future - you are going to have to look for all kinds
of different revenues as your reimbursement changes and how you get paid changes.
You are going to want to be capturing some of this pharmaceutical business. And why not
a better point than immediately [after] a prescription is given, the patient picks it up right
there.'"
"From manufacturers' standpoint, they don't need to be investing money in plant and
equipment, and figure out how to do warehouse management, logistics to move their
product. That's our expertise. That's something we need to convince them of."
Influence environment
(Grocery stores)
Influence environment
(Physician offices)
Influence environment
(Manufacturers)
Larry Wright
"I don't know why we don't do this today... each drug that we ship has a causal effect... Influence environment
We can analyze, based on where we are shipping that product... to make a predictive (Medical practice / public
medicine... if you look at the drugs moving forward and what their use is... imagine going health using drug usage
to a world in future where you are supplying the doctor with that information... [the point data)
is] how do we become more of that healthcare information [firm], instead of a distributor"
Walter Mitchell
"Currently, our two biggest customers [distribute] generics on their own; they go direct
from the manufacturer. So, if they are still in that business - warehousing their own
generics - more of the business will go from manufacturer through them, which will go
around Medford. I think in next five years, you will see us spend more time thinking about
how we take some of that business, become the logistics providers for those generics as
well for those two main customers."
Peter King
'We have technologies that certainly could offer better efficiencies within the operations...
If we said that in five years from now... 'Mr. Customer, we want to be at the fact that you
will be automated, you will use [automated ordering technology] to put through your
orders, so that we have more predictable wave-drop time frames [and] we can build a
much more leaner organization around that predictability'... automation is not an option
anymore in 2015, it should a requirement of our customer base to cooperate with what we
have as far as automation is concemed - which only benefits them... We've got to
migrate them towards that."
"We have not done a great job with acclimating our customers to [the fee-for-service
business model]... We're going to have to educate our customer better about the fee-for-
service, and we're going to have to customize the programs around the capabilities of the
customers that we are dealing with... they are either going to have to abide by that, or we
decide that that's not the person we do business with."
Susan Carter
Influence environment
(Convince large
pharmacies to outsource
generic dist.)
Influence environment
(Technology used by
customer to order from
firm)
Influence environment
(Customer perception of
industry)
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Quotaionsenvironment impact
'We are working on something right now for barcode medication administration... making
sure that within the hospital, the patient is getting the right medicine that's barcoded at the
unit dose level. Initiatives around things like that that are patient safety within a hospital
would be key. I don't know what those offerings may be, but something where we are
focused on improving patient safety within a hospital as well as efficiencies within a
pharmacy."
Influence environment
(Customer)
Jerry Gonzalez
"Supply chain in controlled environment with narcotics continues to be challenged... We Influence environment
will have an environment where there is an acceleration of theft... We will start to have to (Customer receiving
look at modified delivery [time] windows that our customers will have to embrace. We times)
would have broader windows we would be delivering in 2015."
"We can provide options, we can provide solutions so that, it's essential for that customer Influence environment
to rely on us. So, we are providing trending, ordering patterns, inventory control (Customer commitment
functions... and then all that rolled up, the more they penetrate with us, we would provide to firm)
either deeper discounts, or go back to the base price structure... so the revenue stream
would be contingent upon how deeply we are penetrated with the customer."
Tim Young
'When you get them to a just-in-time inventory type of model... if I ship a drug that has Influence environment
four month's [life] and if [pharmacies] are going to dispense it in three days; that should (Drug dating practice in
be fine. But, as an industry we don't ship drugs that have less than six months' dating, industry)
and that creates a huge, huge waste... We hold [those drugs] in a warehouse until it's
fully expired ... and then the product gets destroyed. We have to be able to somehow
influence the industry in such a way that we don't have this significant amount of waste
that occurs within our industry."
Tylp-3managers
Jose Hernandez
'We may consolidate the number of couriers and transportation partners that we can deal Change firm structure
with because we will have higher expectations for security, higher expectations for (Use fewer carriers)
temperature control, higher expectations for driver capability. So, I think that might reduce
the number of different courier partners that we can deal with, which will be a challenge."
"Although there may be more volume, the pricing pressures because of consolidation in Change firm structure
hospitals, GPOs, chain drug stores, internet pharmacies... added to that, government (Less frequent
takeover or government's further involvement in healthcare industry will [put] additional deliveries, close DCs)
downward pressure on our pricing due to lower reimbursement rates, etc... We may have
to go to [fewer] deliveries per week than what we currently offer... if we are able to get the
market to move in that direction, it might mean the consolidation of our distribution
network [reducing number of facilities by more than half!]"
Eric Hill
"I see us as getting back to our core competency, which is really managing the supply Change firm structure
chain, letting the hospitals and other care providers focus on the quality of care, reducing (Reduce firm activity,
our manufacturing footprint to really focus on being more of a deliverer and purveyor of focus on core)
product and services as opposed to manufacturer of products and services; so I don't see
that changing in 2015"
"As we move everything faster and we rely on the same workforce to deliver the product Change firm structure
in that shortened cycle time... We as an organization need to be mindful that... if we don't (Design appropriate
put the right processes, systems and behaviors in place... I am not sure we would be processes)
reducing the total cost to the same extent that we think we would, if we don't keep in mind
the workforce we're still relying on."
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Action to affectQuotations 
environment impact
Ray Scott
"If we were really collaborative with our suppliers, we probably could take more inventory
out of the system. Sometimes for the suppliers - that's not what they what, because their
initial [reaction] is less inventory means [they] sell less... So, we've got to make sure that
they understand that there is value in having less inventory in the system, because they
had to produce less - which means the operational cost should be less."
Influence environment
(Educate supplier)
Carl Turner
none
Exhibit 5: Quotations and codes related to "action to affect environmental
impact"
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This dissertation research dealt with the issue of long-range planning in engineering
systems. Generally, these planning situations have high stakes for the organizations
and involve making investments in capital intensive assets. Thus, there is a desire to
get these decisions "right". However, the uncertainty stemming from their long planning
horizons and complexity due to the open-systems nature make it difficult to predict the
future environment that the implementation of plans would encounter. This presents an
interesting intellectual as well as pragmatic challenge: how decision-makers think about
the planning context when faced with the need to plan for the long term, and what
planning methods could be used to help planners develop a better plan. This
dissertation answers three research questions related to these two issues. These
research questions are explored in three standalone studies, presented in chapters 2, 3,
and 4. In summarizing this research, this chapter recapitulates the findings from the
three separate studies (section 5.1), provides suggestions for future research in the
individual research areas related to each study (sections 5.2.1 through 5.2.3), and
concludes by suggesting avenues for future research at the cross-sections of the three
studies (section 5.2.4).
5.1 Summary of contributions
Contributions of the three standalone studies in this dissertation are summarized below.
5.1.1 Contributions of "Effect of scenario planning" study (Chapter 2)
This study presents the results of three field experiments in which four hypotheses
about the effects of scenario planning on long-range decisions were tested. Overall, the
results show that the use of scenario planning does influence long-range investment
decisions made by field experts.
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Contrary to the extant, and contradictory, arguments in the literature
(Schoemaker, 1993; Kuhn & Sniezek, 1996), a one-time use of scenarios did neither
increase nor decrease-at the aggregate level-experts' confidence in their long-range
investment decisions. A majority of the experts did revise their investment decisions
(either the decision to invest, or the confidence in that decision) after evaluating them in
a scenario. However, these changes were in accordance with how a given investment
performed in the scenario used by the particular expert. If an investment was found to
be useful (wasteful) in a given scenario, any change in the expert's assessment was
likely to make that investment appear more (less) favorable to him/her. Furthermore, the
likelihood of an expert reevaluating an investment after scenario use also depended on
the expert's prior confidence in the evaluation: scenario-induced changes were more
likely when an expert had expressed less than the highest level of confidence in the
investment decision.
The last, and possibly the most interesting, result is that experts were more likely
to invest in flexible strategies after being exposed to multiple scenarios. Flexibility is a
desirable property of organizations operating in unpredictable environments. However,
with passage of time, organizations are known to add more structure to improve
efficiency and lose flexibility (Sorensen & Stuart, 2000). Because of its ability to make
experts realize the value of flexibility, as demonstrated by the empirical results, the
practice of scenario planning could help organizations' managers see the value of
flexibility and not sacrifice it in their pursuit of improving efficiency.
5.1.2 Contributions of "Scenario creation process" study (Chapter 3)
The primary contribution of this study is the two structured scenario-creation processes
developed in the tradition of Intuitive Logics School. Both, the extensive and the
abbreviated, versions provide detailed methods for performing each step in the generic
process provided by Schwartz (1991). A transparent and clearly prescribed process is
not only easier for practitioners to apply without the help of an experienced scenario
creator, but is also amenable to comparison against alternate processes. An added
benefit of the two scenario creation processes is that they both involve a step that
requires the participants of the process to make an explicit connection between the
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driving forces and the local factors of an organization. Although based on anecdotal
account, participants in the scenario creation process find this to be a useful activity.
The second contribution of this study is the definitions of terms used to describe
various aspects of the business environment (i.e. "local factors", "driving forces"), which
are not provided in the account of Schwartz (1991). Furthermore, this study grounds
these terms in the seminal organizational science literature describing business
environment. The two scenario creation processes are built on eight assumptions
related to these terms, and hence their precise definitions are necessary.
5.1.3 Contributions of "Managerial cognition" study (Chapter 4)
The contributions of the study on managerial cognition are of two types: description of
managerial cognition using deductive tests of hypotheses, and inductively generated
propositions linking cognition to strategic thinking and a typology of strategic thinking.
General characteristics of managerial cognition
The general characteristic of managerial cognition can be summarized, albeit
simplistically, in one sentence as follows:
Managers prioritize their attention to the environmental factors they
consider to have a negative impact on the organization, but optimistically
believe that the negative factors are less likely to occur.
This may explain at least some instances of failures of prominent organizations-such
as Polaroid (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000) or Kodak (Hill, 2012)-where managers may be
aware of environmental threats to their firm but may ignore them due to their optimism.
This explanation is different from the one provided by Jackson and Dutton (1988) using
threat bias, which argues that, the reason people and organizations fail is because they
don't see threats soon enough to respond to them effectively.
As one would expect, the results show that managers also prioritize their
attention on environmental factors they think will have a greater, either positive or
negative, impact on the organization.
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Link between cognition and strategic thinking
The deductive tests characterize managerial cognition of the environment at an
aggregate level. But, the cognition varies significantly among individual managers.
Three types of managers, as characterized by their attention to the environment, are
present in the data. The strategies suggested for their organization by the three types
show patterns of similarity within each type and vary between different types. This
insight leads to a typology of managerial cognition based on managers' attention and
future outlook of the environment, and associate different types of strategies with each
type of cognition. Three types of managers-Pioneering, Industrious, and Protective-
are found in the data. Using the structure of the typology, the study also predicts the
characteristics of the fourth type of manager-Skeptical-not present in the group of
executives studied in this research.
An interesting aspect of this completely inductively generated typology of
managerial cognition is that it parallels the typology of organizational strategies
presented by Miles and Snow (1978). Also interesting is that one of the four types of
organizations (Reactor) in their typology argued to be "unstable" by Miles and Snow
appears to be the counterpart of the type of manager (Skeptical) not present in our data.
The overall parallels between the typology of cognition presented in this study and the
time-honored Mile-Snow typology suggest that different organizational strategies may
be associated with the type of cognition of the manager(s) who influence the
development of those strategies.
5.2 Recommendations for future research
This section provides a few recommendations for the future research. The goal here is
not to provide an extensive list of questions to answer in a future research, but rather to
show some directions which can be explored further. This also shows that the work in
this dissertation contributes not only in its findings, but also by serving as a foundation
to base future research on.
The suggestions for future research presented here are of two types. First, a few
research ideas in the individual domains explored in the three studies are presented
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(sections 5.2.1 through 5.2.3). Following this, a few research ideas at the intersection of
the three standalone studies are presented in section 5.2.4
5.2.1 Future research in "Scenario planning"
The findings from empirical tests of scenario planning are encouraging and also
generate more questions. These questions are of two types: those related to specific
aspects of scenario planning and those related to strategic aspects of the scenario
planning process.
Explore aspects of scenario planning process
One of the obvious questions related to the use of scenario planning is what causes the
change in experts' decisions after the use of scenario(s). One way to answer this is to
see if and how the use of scenarios changes the mental model(s) of the scenario users.
Another question relevant to the practice of scenario planning is the longevity of the
effect. In the field experiments presented in chapter 2, the posttest was conducted
immediately after an expert's exposure to a scenario. If the effect of scenario wears off
after some time, and if a long-range investment decision is evaluated over a period of
time, then the organization may have to use the scenario(s) regularly. A related
question is whether the effect of one-time use of scenarios differs from repeated use.
Organizations like Shell are known to use scenarios on an on-going basis. It will be
useful to test if and how the repeated use of scenarios has a different effect on scenario
users from a one-time use. Finally, scenarios are generally created in a set. A
worthwhile question is whether the use of multiple scenarios affects the confidence and
investment decisions of decision-makers differently from the use of a single scenario.
Study scenario planning as an organizational process
The unfortunate story of scenario planning is that, despite its great potential to help
organizations in preparing for an unpredictable and turbulent environment, scenario
planning has largely been left out of the strategic management literature. Schoemaker
(1993) stands out as a lone scenario planning publication in a major U.S. strategy
journal. One potential reason for this may be that scenario planning, being portrayed as
"art" (Schwartz, 1991) and without empirical evidence of effectiveness, did not appeal to
most strategy scholars. However, its effectiveness in helping field experts recognize the
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value of flexibility suggests that scenario planning may be used as a dynamic capability
that helps an organization adapt itself in response to changing environments (Teece, et
al. 1997; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). The second area of future research is to study
scenario planning in the scholarly tradition of the strategy and organizations literature.
5-2.2 Future research on "Scenario creation process"
Anecdotal evidence from the two cases studied in Chapter 3 suggests that participation
in the scenario creation process itself has benefits. One future avenue of research is to
explore if and how participation in the scenario creation process changes a planner's
thinking in a long-range planning activity. If an effect if observed, it would be interesting
to explore whether the changes happen in the knowledge content of the participant or in
the knowledge structure, such as in the heuristics, schemas, etc. used by the participant
(Walsh, 1995). Another research question of interest is whether participation in the
different steps in the scenario creation process (such as mapping driving forces to local
factors) has any (and what) effects on the participants' understanding of their
organization's business environment and whether it makes the participants more
sensitive to small changes (i.e. weak signals) in the environment.
A second avenue for future research is the comparison of different methods of
creating scenario. Having a structured process, as the ones developed in this
dissertation, makes it easier to compare it against another structured process. One
question of interest is whether the number and/or quality of insights generated from the
use of two sets of scenarios created using two different processes are different.
5.2.3 Future research in "Managerial cognition and strategy"
The output of the inductive section of the study on managerial cognition is a set of
propositions linking managerial cognition to strategy. One of obvious and important
directions for the future research is to present these propositions as hypotheses and
test empirically.
The typology of cognition can be used as a foundation to build various pillars of
future research. One may explore the relationship between cognition type and functional
role. Questions such as, whether certain cognition types get attracted to or are more
suitable for some functional roles, are of interest. Similarly, one could ask whether
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certain cognition types get attracted to or are more suitable for organizations of different
types of missions, and for organizations in different life cycle stages. Another question
of interest is whether the type of cognition of the person(s) shaping an organization's
strategy results into the organization having an apparent counterpart strategy in the
Miles-Snow typology (1978) of organizational strategy.
5.2.4 Future research at the intersection of three studies
The intersection of scenario creation / scenario planning and managerial cognition is a
fertile research area for further scholarly inquiry.
Considering cognition in scenario creation process
Since managers of different cognitive types are aware of different aspects of the
organizational environment and have different ideas about how it may evolve in the
future, they can provide a rich diversity to the scenario creation process. One question
of interest is whether managers of different cognitive type have different ways of making
associations between driving forces and local factors, suggesting different types of
paths in which an organization's environment may evolve. Another interesting question
is whether different types of managers generate different sets of scenarios from the
same set of local factors and driving forces. This has implications for practice if
scenarios are used as "cognitive repairs" (Heath, et al., 1998), as the scenario creators
would need to ensure that the correct type (and mix) of people are involved in the
scenario creation process.
Considering cognition in scenario use / scenario planning process
Strategy scholars have conjectured that certain personalities of people are more likely
to see the benefits of scenario planning than others (Hodgkinson & Clarke, 2007),
suggesting that (p. 248) "scenario planning and related practices will be more favorably
received by big picture conscious individuals" than "detail conscious individuals". A
research strand parallel to this emanates from the intersection of managerial cognition
(as studied in chapter 4) and the use of scenarios. A question of interest is if and how
managers of different cognitive types envision different strategies type using the same
scenario, and if they evaluate an investment in a particular long-term asset differently in
the same scenario. These insights could help structure the scenario planning sessions
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differently, such as by tasking different types of managers with different types of
strategies or bringing the different types of managers in the scenario planning process
at different stages.
5.3 Conclusion
This chapter concludes the dissertation research by summarizing the contributions of
the three research studies and providing some suggestions for future research in the
areas explored in the individual studies as well as at their intersections. Overall, this
dissertation has explored two important aspects of long-range planning: a method used
for long-range planning (scenario planning) and the strategic thinking of managers
faced with long-range planning situations. Both these areas and their intersection
provide an affluence of interesting issues waiting to be explored by a curious mind.
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